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I examine the relationship between social structural factors and political behavior
by applying the concept of social cleavage in American society. Lipset and Rokkan
(1967) developed the concept of social cleavage to explain the influence of social
structure on political behavior in the 1960s. They suggest that social cleavage emerged in
Western Europe in the 1920s and persisted until the 1960s. Some scholars claim that the
influence of social group membership is not as influential in predicting voting behavior in
elections as it was in the 1960s, while other scholars argue that social cleavages are still
important in explaining individuals’ choices in elections. Additionally, many scholars
believe that issue-based factors reduce the influence of social structure on voting
behavior.
I first analyze the voting trend of classes, religious groups, and regions, and their
magnitude of cleavage since 1980. Second, I examine the influence of economic and
cultural factors on Presidential voting. Third, I estimate the relative size of the effects of
economic and cultural factors on Presidential voting. Fourth, I demonstrate the influence
of economic and economic factors on social cleavages.

The findings show that social group membership and geographical residence are
significant factors in Presidential elections between 1980 and 2008. Political cleavage
based on religious group membership is the greatest. Voters also have more distinctive
political preferences based on micro-regional residence compared to macro-regional
residence. The binary logistic regression analysis showed that economic and cultural
factors are significantly associated with Presidential elections between 1984 and 2008,
and that the magnitude of social cleavage changed when economic and cultural variables
were included.
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INTRODUCTION

The influence of social structure on individual behavior has been a main interest
in sociology from the beginning stage of classical sociology (Parsons 1967). Although
definitions of social structure vary widely, it can be generally defined as “the more or less
enduring pattern of social arrangements within a particular society group, or social
organization” (Jary and Jary 2006). In this research, social structure refers to enduring
social divisions based on social groups such as class, religion, and region.
Many sociologists argue both at the theoretical and empirical levels that social
structures influence individual behavior (Alexander 1982; Bourdieu 1984; Geertz 1973;
Giddens 1984). The same logic has been applied to political sociology. Social structure
influences individual political behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Alexander 1982;
Himmelstrand 1986). Even though some scholars discuss it at the theoretical level, many
studies focus on the relationship between social structure and political behavior at the
empirical level (Dalton 1996; Manza and Brooks 1999; Franklin 2010). To examine the
relationship between social structure and political behavior, many scholars have used the
term social cleavage, which is defined as “patterns of political alignment arising out of
social-structural divisions.” The concept of social cleavage includes social division,
shared group identity, and political interest (Franklin 2010; Bartolini and Mair 1990;
Manza and Brooks, 1999). As the concept of social cleavage has been used in many
1

electoral studies, I will use it to examine the relationship between social structure and
political behavior (e.g., vote choice).
Social Structure, Social Cleavage, and Voting
The argument that social structure influences political behavior has been
challenged by the argument that attitudes toward economic (e.g., previous performance of
incumbent party, prospective economic policy of candidate) and cultural issues (e.g.,
abortion, gays and lesbians, feminism, and environmentalism) are more influential than
social structure in voting behaviors (Downs 1957; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Inglehart
and Abramson 1994; Wilcox 1994). However, other scholars claim that social structure
still influences political behavior (Heath, Jowell, Curtice, Field, and Levine 1985;
Weakliem 1995; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Manza and Brooks 1999; Nieuwbeerta
1996; Evans 2000; Goldthorpe 2001; Raymond 2011). For example, Manza, Hout, and
Brooks (1995) suggest that the social bases of voting behavior have been one of the main
topics in political sociology, along with the relationship between states and societies.
Other scholars show that social group membership for class, religious affiliation, and
ethnicity influences individuals’ voting behaviors of the empirical level even though
there are variations in the pattern of the relationships (Alford 1963; Lipset and Rokkan
1967; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Layman 2001).
Despite different perspectives on the role of social structural factors in elections,
few sociologists deny the influence of social structure on individual behaviors because
the existence and influence of social structure have been evident to sociologists from the
beginning stage of classical sociology (Durkheim 1951). Alexander (1987:11) explains
that “sociologists are sociologists because they believe there are patterns to society, that
2

there are structures separate from the individuals who compose it.” Therefore, the
existence of social structure is a basic presupposition of sociologists, although there is no
agreement on how social structure is generated and maintained (Alexander 1987).
However, observable facts should support the assumption that social structure
exists outside individuals. As Van Fraassen (1980:12) explains, “Science aims to give us
theories which are empirically adequate.” Furthermore, social theory on social structure
should be changed if the observable social structure changes over time. For this reason, if
social structure changes in some societies, the relationship between social structural
factors and individual voting behaviors also may change. Thus, observable facts at the
empirical level need to support the proposition that a relationship between social
structural factors and individual voting behaviors at the theoretical level, and the change
of relationship between social structure and individual behaviors at the empirical level
should be reflected in social theory.
Based on this argument, studying trends in relationships between social cleavages
and voting behaviors is important because there is always a possibility that there will be
changes in the relationship between social cleavage and individual behavior. Although
the relationship between social cleavage and individuals’ voting patterns was stable until
the 1960s, many scholars claim that this relationship has changed since then (Lipset and
Rokkan 1967; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Franklin 2010).
To understand the trend of the relationship, it is necessary to understand how the
pattern of the relationship between social cleavages and voting behaviors changes.
Because social cleavages may be related to various short-term factors, it is also necessary
to pay attention to the role of short-term forces, such as attitudes towards economic and
3

cultural issues because they may influence the dynamic of social cleavages in elections.
With regard to attitudes toward economic issues, proponents of the economic theory of
voting suggest that rational voters tend to vote for the party which deliver better
economic performance and offer better prospective economic policy for themselves
regardless of their group membership (Fiorina 1978; Campbell, Dettrey, and Yin 2010).
With regard to attitudes toward cultural issues, some scholars argue that cultural
movements, such as the Religious Right movement, influence voting behavior by
emphasizing religious values during campaigns (Wilcox 1994; Williams 2010). Many
scholars suggest that these issue-based factors make the influence of social structure on
voting behavior decline (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Dalton 1996; Brooks, Dodson,
Hotchkiss 2010; Franklin 2010). Thus, it is important to demonstrate whether these issuebased factors really overshadow the influence of social structure on voting behavior.
Class Cleavage and Voting
In this research, I examine the relationship between social structural factors (e.g.,
social cleavage) and political behavior (e.g., Presidential voting) in American society.
Because of the change of the global economic environment and government policy in the
1980s, the industrial structure of the United States changed after the 1980s (Jenkins and
Eckert 2000; Gill 1993; Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991). These changes influenced the
structure of social cleavage in the United States, especially class cleavage, and its
relationship with voting behavior. For example, professionals leaned toward the
Democratic Party, while the working class who moved upwardly supported the
Republican Party (Manza and Brooks 1999). Thus, I will focus on the trend of class
cleavage between 1980 and 2004.
4

Religious Cleavage and Voting
American religious cleavage also changed in the 1980s. In particular, conservative
Christians participated in politics more actively by establishing the Religious Right
organizations, such as the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice, and the Religious
Roundtable Council. Before the late 1970s, many conservative Christians were not
involved in political activities because of their attitude toward separation of church and
state.
However, since the late 1970s, some fundamental Christians began to oppose the
influence of secularism, such as the pro-choice movement toward abortion, while liberal
Christians showed a more open mind toward the abortion issue (Hoffmann and Johnson
2005). Accordingly, conservative Christians are more likely to participate in political
activity by supporting the Republican Party while liberal Christians are less likely to
support the Republican Party. These cultural polarization processes among religious
groups, initiated in the late 1970s, deepened in the 1980s (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson
1996; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Thus, I will deal with the
trend of religious cleavage between 1980 and 2008.
Regional Cleavage and Voting
To examine the relationship between social cleavages and voting behaviors,
regional or sectional cleavage also need to be considered. Even though Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) dealt with regional or sectional cleavage, regional cleavage has received
less attention in electoral research than other social cleavages. Many scholars suggest that
a regional effect is another important influence on voting behavior. Regional difference is
already regarded as a traditional cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In the United States,
5

many scholars focus on the difference between the South and non-South in voting
behavior (Key 1949; Petrocik 1987). However, some scholars began to focus on the
importance of the rise of the Sunbelt because Sunbelt residents are regarded as strong
Republican supporters. Other scholars study the role of suburbanization. Traditionally,
suburban residents are assumed to support conservative parties because these residents
have high levels of education and income. The suburban population is growing very fast,
so the impact of suburban voting is important in national elections. Because of the
strategic importance of suburban areas, political campaigners have paid close attention to
suburban areas. Suburbanization also accelerated in the 1980s due to the change of
industrial structure. As urbanization in the 1930s was advantageous for the Democratic
Party, accelerated suburbanization was helpful for the Republican Party after the 1980s
(Key 1942; Zikmund 1967; McKee and Shaw 2003; Gainsborough 2005). Thus, I will
deal with the trend of regional cleavage between 1980 and 2008.
Theoretical Background
Even though there are various perspectives about social structure, many
sociological theories on the topic originate from the perspectives of two theoretical
traditions: instrumental and normative approaches (Alexander 1986). Alexander
(1988:20) explains that “the theoretical legacies of Weber and Marx have framed modern
instrumentalist explanations of social structure…the great accomplishment of
instrumental structuralism is to demonstrate that individual action is strongly affected by
the material context within which it occurs…” With regard to the normative approach to
social structure, he explains that “for Durkheim, the emotional bonds of social solidarity
and the symbolic codes of social morality were the fundamental social structures from
6

which all others emerged.” (Alexander 1988:25). He continues to explain that “if
instrumental structuralists demonstrate the impact of the material environment on
individuals, normative thinkers just as forcefully indicate that action is regulated by
moral structures internalized in the personalities of individuals” (Alexander 1988:29-30).
Many sociologists, including Max Weber, try to integrate materialist and normative
approaches to social structure, but two social structural approaches to social structure still
influence theoretical perspectives on social structure (Weber 1968; Geertz 1973;
Habermas 1975; Collins 1981; Bourdieu 1984; Hays 1994; Scott 2012; Emirbayer and
Noble 2013).
Traditional approaches to social cleavage emphasize an instrumental approach to
social structure rather than a normative approach, although a cultural element, such as
shared group identity, is included in the concept of social cleavage. Manza and Brooks
(1999:32) differentiate social-structural cleavage from ideological cleavage However,
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) concept of social cleavage is closer to the Weberian tradition
than the Marxist tradition because the concept of social cleavage includes not only socialstructural division but also shared group identity and political interest among social group
members (Franklin 2010; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Manza and Brooks 1999). Because I
use Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) traditional concept of social cleavage, the concept of
social structure in the current research follows an instrumental approach rather than a
normative approach.
In the current research, social cleavages are used to investigate the relationship
between social structure and voting behavior because social cleavage includes socialstructural divisions. Social-structural divisions are regarded as long-term factors in
7

electoral studies, so I consider social cleavages as long-term factors. On the other hand, I
consider voters’ preference and attitudes toward various issues to be short-term factors
(Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Walczak, van der Brug, and de Vries 2012). Even
though there are various approaches to culture, I follow the subjective approach to
culture. Wuthnow (1989a) identifies four approaches to culture: subjective, structural,
dramaturgic, and institutional. Wuthnow (1989a:11) explains that “the subjective
approach focuses on beliefs and attitudes, opinions and values,” while “the structural
approach focuses on patterns and relationships among cultural elements themselves” and
he also argues that “culture is typically conceptualized in subjective terms in survey
research studies of public opinion.” In the current research, I take the subjective approach
to culture to understand the relationship between social structure as social organization
and culture as voters’ opinions and attitudes.
Traditional and New Social Cleavages
Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) argue that new types of social cleavage, such as
gender cleavage and race cleavage, are also relevant to the change of Western democratic
societies. Manza and Brooks (1999) consider these new types of social cleavage, such as
race and gender, in their analysis. They explain that race and gender cleavages became
important influences’ on American voters’ behaviors in Presidential elections in the postCivil Rights era. However, I will focus on traditional social cleavages. Although many
scholars argue against the claim that social cleavages declined since the 1960s, it seems
that most scholars agree with the argument that at least one social cleavage, especially
regional cleavage, declined after World War II. For example, when Manza and Brooks
(1999) try to demonstrate that social cleavage is not declining, they argue that regional
8

cleavage was unimportant in Presidential elections after World War II. Many scholars
overlook regional political differences because of the development of mass
communication, growth of transportation systems, and high levels of education
(Murauskas, Archer, and Shelley 1988). Although the political influence of central cities
and suburbs was emphasized in the 1930s and 1950s, it seems that voters’ socioeconomic
characteristics are more important than voters’ location (Manza and Brooks 1999).
However, political geographers continue to argue that voter location has an
independent relationship with voting behaviors (Ethington and McDaniel 2007;
Gainsborough 2005; Agnew 1996). For example, Gainsborough (2005:436) explains that
the emergence of suburban politics during the 1980s is not only based on voter
socioeconomic characteristics, but also on the contextual influence of residence. Political
geographers show that macro- and micro-regional factors are associated with voting
patterns (McKee and Teigen 2009; Walks 2004; McKee and Shaw 2003). These
arguments suggest that traditional social cleavages, including regional cleavages, are still
associated with Presidential voting behaviors. Thus, I will examine whether traditional
social cleavages really declined between 1980 and 2008.
Research Questions and Conceptual Map
The current study will show whether social cleavages are still important in
explaining individuals’ choices in elections. Many scholars propose that the formation of
cleavages has changed, so they suggest that new classification systems for social
cleavage are necessary to explain more diverse relationships between social cleavages
and voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Goldthorpe 1980; Hout, Brooks, and
Manza 1993; Manza and Brooks 1999). For example, Goldthorpe (1980) introduced a
9

new class classification system to reflect the transformation of the class system in
industrialized societies. Hout, Brooks, and Manza (1993) used Goldthorpe’s new class
classification system to examine whether class cleavage had declined in Presidential
elections in the United States. Additionally, Brooks and Manza (2004) tried to use the
most appropriate religious cleavage classification system at the time of their research.
My research questions are: Have social cleavages among voters in Presidential
elections declined or remained the same since the 1980s? What is the relative importance
of various economic and cultural issues? Thus, I first examine the voting trends of classes,
religious groups, and regions, as well as their magnitudes of cleavage since 1980. Second,
I examine the influence of economic issues on Presidential voting. Third, I examine the
influence of cultural issues on Presidential voting. Fourth, I analyze the relative strength of
economic and cultural issues in social cleavage voting models. This analysis shows how
social cleavages have changed since the 1980s and how they are changed when economic
and cultural factors are added to the social cleavage models.

10

Figure 1.1

Conceptual Framework

To address these questions I will use data from the ANES Time Series
Cumulative Data File (The American National Election Studies 2010) and use binomial
logistic regression to analyze the association between social cleavages and vote choice
and the influence of short-term factors on the relationship between social cleavages and
vote choice. To measure the magnitude of social cleavage, I will use the Kappa Index
developed by Manza and Brooks (1999). To measure the relative strength of short-term
factors on the social cleavage models, I will use standardized logistic regression
coefficients. The analysis will show that social cleavages based on class, religion, and
macro- and micro-regions influence individuals’ vote choice and that the influence of
social cleavage on vote choice will not disappear when short-term forces are controlled in
the social cleavage models.

11

LITERATURE REVIEW

Several theories have been used to explain voting behavior, including sociological
voting theory, psychological voting theory, and economic voting theory. This chapter will
review these theories and explore their various ways of explaining voting behavior.
Voting Theory
Psychological Voting Theory
The Michigan School, based on the works of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and
Stokes, has been influential in electoral studies and emphasizes the psychological
approach to voting behavior (Thomassen, 1994 Lewis-Beck et al. 2009). The Michigan
School emphasizes psychological factors, arguing that psychological identification with a
particular party is important for voters’ choices (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes
1960). The School explains that there are two types of influences on voting behavior:
“short-term forces,” which involve issues, candidates, and particular conditions for the
election, and “long-term forces,” which involve party identification (Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998). Applying this classification, the Michigan School focuses on long-term
factors, proposing that such factors stabilize trends in voting patterns. Among long-term
factors, this School suggests that voters’ party identification is more important than
structural factors, arguing that a psychological identification is a final factor for voters to
12

make their choice while structural variables, such as class, influence the psychological
preferences of voters at the baseline (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Thus, the
Michigan School emphasizes the strength and direction of the psychological
identification of voters in order to predict voting results (Kamieniecki and Eulau 1985).
Economic Voting Theory
The economic theory assumes that voters are rational. It claims that voters
evaluate the previous performance of candidates or parties and the prospective economic
policies of candidates and parties. Based on these evaluations, voters choose candidates
or parties that provide more benefits to them. (Downs 1957). Scholars who support
economic voting theory suggest that voters’ individual rationality is more important than
their social group membership in determining voting behavior (Downs 1957). Voters’
higher income and education produced a more rational voting pattern among younggeneration voters (Dalton 1996; Manza and Brooks 1999; Franklin 2010). In economic
voting theory, individuals’ rationality based on their evaluation of candidates’ policies
and candidates’ attitudes toward specific issues in particular elections is more important
than their group membership. Thus, economic voting theory argues that short-term
factors overshadow long-term factors in elections.
Sociological Voting Theory
The origin of the sociological approach to voting behavior research can be found
in the research of the Columbia School. Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates, known as the
Columbia School, participated in panel studies based on local areas: Erie County in Ohio
in the first research study and Elmira in New York State in the second research study.
13

Their original intention was to understand the relationship between psychological factors
and voting behavior. They tried to understand how voters’ political preferences change
during the campaign process and the influence of mass media on individuals’ behavior.
Paul Lazarsfeld was engaged in the study using principles of developmental psychology
to understand human actions, such as choice in purchase or occupation (Visser 1994;
1996). However, Lazarsfeld and his associates found that few voters changed their
political preference during the election campaigns (Thomassen 1994). Thus, they
conclude that primary groups based on friends, family, religion, and coworkers do
influence individuals’ political preference. They also suggest that unions, political
parties, and the media did not influence voting behavior to the extent to which political
preference changes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Consequently, the
conclusions of their study became a benchmark for sociological approaches in electoral
research (Thomassen 1994).
Even though the contribution of the Columbia School was influential, their study
was based on a “micro-sociological approach” because they examined the relationship
between individuals’ choice and their group membership within the community (Antunes
2010). In contrast, Antunes (2010) argues Lipset and Rokkan (1967) “start from a
historical and macro-sociological approach that understands the party system in the
countries of Western Europe.” Lipset and Rokkan (1967) take a macro-level approach to
voting behavior research using the concept of social cleavage. Social cleavage is a longlasting division due to conflict among social groups within the national community
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bornschier 2009). The concept of social cleavage began to be
used in the 1950s to explain sociological factors that influence individuals’ political
14

behaviors (Stoll 2004). Lipset and Rokkan developed the concept to explain the influence
of social structure on political behavior in the 1960s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Although
the concept of social cleavage was developed to explain party formation in European
countries, it is now being used to explain the association between social group
membership and vote choice in the United States (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995).
However, as many scholars argue that the influence of traditional social cleavage
(e.g., class, religion, and region) in the United States has declined, scholars are now
paying attention to individual characteristics to explain unstable voting patterns (Lipset
[1960] 1981). European scholars, on the other hand, continue to explain voting behavior
by means of contextual characteristics despite the influence of psychological and
economic approaches (Thomassen 1994). Franklin (2010) explains the reason as follows.
US political scientists generally partake of the ‘American dream’ of
individualistic determinants of political and other success or failure –a dream that
strongly feeds into the rational choice tradition of electoral research – whereas
European scholars appears to have an equally strong commitment to the idea that
individuals are not masters of their fates but are subject to impersonal forces often
associated with life chances established at birth – forces that have different effects
on people born with (or acquiring) different social characteristics. Though most
scholars on both sides of the Atlantic would pay lip service to the joint importance
of both individual and contextual characteristics, American scholars largely
choose to focus on individual determinants of the vote while European scholars
(at least when they work in this large sub-field) choose to focus on contextual
determinants – especially those provided by social group locations (p.649–650).
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These different historical backgrounds continue to influence electoral studies in the
United State and Europe. Additionally, there was “the behavioral revolution” which pays
attention to political “attitude development, change, and structure which were rooted in
psychological models” in the United States (Hatemi and McDermott 2012:397). LewisBeck et al. (2009:12) also explain that the introduction of individual-level surveys, such as
the National Election Studies, “shifted the focus from the collection of sociological
variables to the measurement of attitudes.” Thus, individual-level analysis based on
psychological and economic approaches became more popular than aggregate-level
analysis based on a sociological approach in the United States. So, few studies have used
the concept of social cleavage in electoral studies since the 1980s in the United States.
Nonetheless, some scholars began to emphasize the sociological approach to
voting behavior in the 1990s and continued up through the 2000s (Manza, Hout and
Brooks 1995; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Manza and Brooks 1997; Brooks and
Manza 1997a; b; c; Manza and Brooks 1999; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999; Brooks and
Manza 2004; Manza and Brooks 2008). In European countries, many scholars continue to
focus on the concept of social cleavage in their electoral studies (Ringdal and Hines
1999; Müller 1999; Oesch and Rennwald 2010; Elff and Rossteutscher 2011; Goldberg
and Sciarini.2014). I will review theories regarding the concept of social cleavage as well
as sociological approaches to voting behavior more specifically in the next section.
Social Cleavage
Theoretical Background of Social Cleavage Theory
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain the concept of social cleavage in terms of the
Parsonian AGIL model. However, other scholars argue that Lipset and Rokkan’s social
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cleavage concept can be interpreted with reference to the theories of classical
sociologists, such as Marx and Weber. Thus, I will describe how Lipset and Rokkan
explain it based on the Parsonian AGIL model in this section and how social cleavage is
related to the classical social theories in the following section (Franklin 2010; Bartolini
and Mair 1990).
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explained the relationship between the origin of social
cleavage and political party formation in Western Europe by using the Parsonian AGIL
model. Parsons (1961:30) maintains that social systems are involved in a “processes of
interchange” with environing systems, such as cultural systems, personality systems, and
physical environments. Subsystems of social system are also involved in the processes of
exchange (Parsons 1961). Based on this logic, the AGIL model assumes that “society
should be understood as a system of interdependent parts” (Holmwood 2005:87). AGIL
represents the four basic functions of social systems such as adaptation (A), goal
attainment (G), integration (I), and latency or pattern-maintenance (L) (Alexander 1983).
AGIL corresponds to the four “functional prerequisites” such as “economy” (adaption),
“political institutions for regulation and use of power” (goal attainment), “legal
institutions for regulation of conflicts and control of deviants” (integration), and “a
culture which creates solidarity, social bonds, and a shared identity” (latency) (Allardt
1981:259). Because these four functions are involved in the processes of interchange, the
AGIL model identifies “six lines of interchange between each pair,” such as the A-G, GI, I-L, L-A, A-I, and L-G interchanges (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:7).
Lipset and Rokkan (1967:8) “examine the internal structure of the I quadrant in a
range of territorial societies: What cleavages had manifested themselves in the national
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community in the early phases of consolidation, and what cleavages emerged in the
subsequent phases of centralization and economic growth?” They also tried to “compare
sequences of I-G interchanges to trace regularities in the processes of party formation,”
to “study the consequences of these developments for the I-L interchanges,” and “to
bring all these diverse data to bear on the analysis of the L-G interchanges in the
operation of elections and the recruitment of representatives (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:89).
Talcott Parsons used the AGIL model to “create a general social theory which
could be used at any analytical level from the institutional to the personal” (King
2004:27). Alexander (1983:48) also points out that “Parsons focused…on elaborating
general concepts in relation to concrete institutional analysis--for example, on the patternvariable schema and its relation to the political, economic, and cultural changes that
threatened the vested interests of class, sectional, and religious groups” (Alexander 1983:
48). Tilly (1981:1) asserts that “Stein Rokkan felt the attraction of general
propositions…he could not resist the temptation to try out the new comparative
scheme…” Lipset and Rokkan (1967) used the Parsonian AGIL model not because they
are Parsonians but because functionalism was a dominant theory in the early 1960s
(Allardt 1981; Lipset and Ladd Jr. 1972).
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) differentiate the types of cleavage based on two
dimensions of the Parsonian paradigm: territorial and functional dimensions. They
explain that “the crucial cleavages and their political expressions can be ordered within
the two-dimensional space generated by the two diagonals of the double dichotomy”
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967:10). They also argue that regional cleavage based on the
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territorial dimension and religious cleavage based on the functional dimension were
important during the nation-building process, while class cleavage based on the
functional dimension was important during the industrial revolution. Their explanation is
a “macro-sociological approach” because they analyzed historical changes in the
relationship of social division and political party at the national level (Antunes 2010).
They suggest that cleavage was created during national and industrial revolutions
involving nation building and structural economic changes, respectively. These social
transformation processes tend to create conflicts among social groups, and cleavages tend
to be created by social conflict among social groups during these processes. These
changes also linked certain social groups to particular political parties. Thus, the concept
of cleavage is closely related to the formation of a political party system (Bornschier
2009). In the next section, I will explain the concept of social cleavage in terms of
classical social theories.
Concept of Social Cleavage
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) proposed the social cleavage concept by arguing that
the concept of cleavage is related to social structure. The concept of cleavage in electoral
studies indicates the persistent conflicts among political and social constituencies (Manza
and Brooks 1999). The concept of cleavage includes both social and political cleavages.
Social cleavage reflects political conflict related to social structure while political
cleavage reflects persistent political conflict regardless of its social basis (Manza and
Brooks 1999). Many scholars tend to use the concept of social cleavage to explain the
relationship between social group arrangements and vote choice because social cleavage
includes shared political interest based on group membership (Bartolini and Mair 1990;
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Manza and Brooks 1999). Manza and Brooks (1999) explain that the concept of social
cleavage emerges from the theories of classical social theorists: namely, Karl Marx and
Max Weber.
Although the concept of social cleavage includes both classical sociological
traditions, it is more closely related to the Weberian tradition than to the Marxist
tradition. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) differentiate social cleavage from political cleavage
and explain the relationship between two cleavages based on the Weberian tradition. For
example, Franklin (2010) explains that social cleavages are aligned with political
cleavage under three conditions. The first is distinctive differences in interests between
social divisions. The second is that group members of each division should recognize the
importance of the interest and identify themselves as part of a group. The third is that
there are political means, including political parties, to express and realize their interests
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Franklin 2010; Manza and Brooks 1999). Other scholars
suggest that multiple components at different levels should be considered to understand
the relationship between social cleavage and political cleavage: an “empirical
component” at the social structural level (e.g., social group division), a “normative
component” at the cultural level (e.g., social group consciousness), and a “macroinstitutional component” at the institutional level (e.g., political parties) (Manza and
Brooks 1999:33). When a cleavage exists at all three of these levels, social cleavage is
aligned with political cleavage, and the political divisions endure effectively (Bartolini
and Mair 1990; Manza and Brooks 1999).
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify four types of cleavage: “center-periphery”
(urban-rural), “state-church” (religious-secular), “owner-worker” (capital-labor), and
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“land-industry” (aristocrats-bourgeoisie). These divisions are based on the transformation
of social structure during two revolutions: the national revolution and the industrial
revolution. The national revolution caused social divisions, such as center-periphery and
state-church, and the industrial revolution produced social divisions, such as ownerworker and land-industry (Antunes 2010). These cleavages, based on class, religion,
region, ethnicity, and culture, gave rise to the European Party systems that emerged in the
1920s and persisted until the 1960s (Bornschier 2009; Neto and Cox 1997).
According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), social structure had a stable relationship
with vote choice between the 1920s and 1960s. However, diverse perspectives on the
decline of social cleavage began to appear in the 1960s. Some scholars argued that social
cleavage has had a continuous influence on voting behavior, while other scholars argued
that social cleavage declined after the 1960s. Most scholars studied class and religion
cleavages, although class cleavage is a more popular topic than is religion cleavage.
However, few sociologists focused on regional cleavages after World War II. For this
reason, the argument about the decline of each cleavage needs to be examined separately.
Thus, I will review arguments about the decline of class, religion, and regional cleavages
in the United States.
Decline of Social Cleavage
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggest that social cleavage emerged in Western
Europe in the 1920s and persisted until the 1960s. Based on this continuing influence of
social cleavage on voting, sociological factors had been regarded as good predictors of
voting behavior until the 1960s (Kriesi 1998). Because social characteristics of voters do
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not change easily during their lifetime, scholars argue that sociological factors are longterm factors that stabilize voting patterns (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998).
However, as social structure changes after World War II, many scholars argue
that short-term factors are more influential than long-term factors on voting. Scholars
categorize social factors as structural factors or long-term factors (Franklin 2001).
Opinions about the relationship between social structural factors and voting behavior
diversify because of the different theoretical perspectives of scholars and scholars
interpret the changed situation differently. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasize social
structural factors, while the Michigan School and economic theory of voting emphasize
psychological factors and rational choice of individuals respectively. The Michigan
School and economic voting theorists argue that the influence of structural factors on
voting decline.
In addition to these perspectives, other scholars explain the decline of cleavage
voting based on empirical evidence of social change. Some scholars suggest that social
conflict between social divisions declines because of the improvement of the
socioeconomic situation of working-class people. For example, Clark, Lipset, and
Rempel (1993) argue that the rise of welfare programs, diversified occupations, and
affluence in Western societies has weakened the force of class cleavage in political
systems. He also explains that economic inequality and social conflict among voters have
declined over time because of voters’ higher education and better standards of living.
The improvement of the socioeconomic conditions of young generations also
effected new types of culture among new generations. Inglehart and Abramson (1994)
propose that the highly educated younger generation has an interest in post-material
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issues, such as environmentalism. They maintain that the older generation tends to have
more interest in material-related issues based on their class membership. However, the
material issue is not a big issue for younger generations because of their improved
socioeconomic situations. Thus, post-material cultural issues are influential factors in
voting behavior among young generation voters.
Based on these observed trends, some scholars argue that a stable relationship of
class and political party changed with regard to predicting voting behavior after the
1960s. These scholars suggest that the influence of social group membership is not as
influential in predicting voting behavior in elections as it was in the 1960s (Clark, Lipset,
and Rempel 1993). However, many scholars argue social structural factors continue to
influence voting behavior. In the following sections, I will explain the theories of social
cleavages in terms of class, religion, and region.
Class and Voting
The relationship between class and voting behavior is one of the main concerns of
election studies. Although there are two main traditions of class concepts, many electoral
studies follow the Neo-Weberian class classification for class voting studies. Thus I will
review the debate about class classification and discuss how the Neo-Weberian class
concept is applied to class voting studies.
Definition of Class Concept: Marx and Weber
The concept of class originated in the work of classical sociologists, such as Karl
Marx and Max Weber. Marx and Weber have different perspectives on class. Marx
(1972) suggests that the fundamental cause of inequality is private ownership of the
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means of production. According to Marx, the capitalist class exploits the labor of the
working class for economic gain (Wright 2002). On the other hand, Weber suggests that
Marx’s explanation is too simplistic. Weber suggests that the concept of class is not
enough to explain stratification structure because class is based on economic position in
the market situation determining life chances. He argues that life chances are determined
not only by the ownership of properties but also by the possession of various skills or
assets (Breen 2005). Thus, Weber argues that the number of classes is greater than what
Marx’s schema indicates. He also suggests that there are other kinds of factors related to
inequality, such as social status and political power (Weber 1946). Weber (1946)
maintains that membership of social status groups and collective behaviors based on
political party also need to be considered for defining the concept of social class.
Marx argues that economic structure is the main structure of societies and that it is
determined by the mode of production of the society. Mode of production defines class
structure in societies, and it consists of the capitalist class and the working class in
capitalist societies (Marx 1972). Wright (2002) explains that a class relationship in
capitalist societies is based on conflict because the main characteristic of a class
relationship is exploitation. Based on differences in economic interests, the working class
has different political interests than the capitalist class (Lipset 1983). The Marxist class
concept has been used to explain conflict between social groups and their relationship
with political interests. Weber also deals with the stratification structure of societies, even
though he disagrees with the Marxist class theory. He argues that class determines the life
chances in the market situation, and suggests a more complex stratification theory by
including the concepts of social status and power (Weber 1946). Thus, even though Marx
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and Weber disagree with the concept of class, both classical sociologists agree with the
existence of social structure and its relevance to politics.
When Marx explains the relationship between class and politics, he differentiates
the concept of “class location” from “class formation” (Wright 2002). Even though Marx
did not use the terms like “class-in-itself” and “class-for-itself,” many Marxist scholars
suggest that Marx differentiates these terms (Andrew 1983). Class-in-itself indicates a
common objective condition of a group of people who have the same relationship with
the means of production without class consciousness and collective behavior, while classfor-itself indicates a group that is organized for its economic and political interest by
collective behaviors with class consciousness (Andrew 1983; Wright 2002). Thus, when
class-in-itself is transformed into class-for-itself, the social structural condition of the
working class is connected to political behavior.
Weber also suggests that people who shared common economic situations are not
automatically aligned with a particular political party. In the stratification theory of
Weber, class indicates market situations of individuals without implying communal
identity and collective action. Thus, people who are located in the same class situation are
not defined as a group. Conversely, the people who hold the same status are classified as
social groups because they share common identities based on communal relationship.
However, the concept of status does not imply participation in collective action. If
members of a status group participate in collective action, they become a political party
(Weber 1946; Wright 2002). Even though Marx and Weber explain the concepts of social
stratification differently, they agree that people in the same social structural position are
not necessarily a political group automatically. Both scholars differentiate social
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structural situations from sharing group identity and participating in political activity. In
the next sections, I will review how neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians develop the
concept of class and how class concepts have been used in electoral studies.
Development of Class Concept: Neo-Marxist and Neo-Weberian
Both neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian scholars have developed advanced class
schemas. Erik Olin Wright, a representative neo-Marxist scholar added the petty
bourgeoisie to the original class scheme of the bourgeoisie and proletariat (Wright 1979).
Then, he added more classes, such as managers, supervisors, small employers, and semiautonomous employees, in terms of contradictory class locations (Róbert 1998).
Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) suggest the following multiple
location concepts to reflect the change in class structure: “basic class location,”
“contradictory locations within a mode of production,” and “contradictory locations
between modes of production.” The first category refers to traditional classes such as the
capitalist class and working class. The second category refers to managers because they
are involved in the two class category at the same time. Wright, Costello, Hachen, and
Sprague (1982: 710) explain that “they are thus in a sense simultaneously in two classes:
they are workers in that they are exploited and dominated by capital; they are capitalists
in that they dominate workers.” The third category refers to small employers (petty
bourgeois) and semiautonomous employees (professionals). Their location is not included
in the basic classification of class because they own both means of production and labor
respectively. Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) explain that the third
category can be found in feudal society as well, even though it still exists in the capitalist
society.
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Thus, Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) argue that these diverse
locations should be considered in the class definition. However, he explains that these
classifications are about “class structure” only. They do not pertain to class concepts like
class consciousness or to collective aspects of class concept related to class organization.
Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) also try to use several criteria to
specify the class classification. He uses the number of employees to differentiate small
employers from the bourgeoisie. He also uses three categories, such as decision making,
authority, and formal hierarchical position, to identify managers and supervisors. He
further uses the degree of autonomy to identify semiautonomous employees. Later,
Wright (1985) describes twelve classes in terms of types of assets: production asset, skill
assets, and organizational assets.
In the neo-Weberian tradition, the schema developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and
Portocarero (1979) is a representative classification scheme. This schema, called EGP,
also classifies social classes based on their market situation, location in the production
process, and condition of employment. EGP classifies employers, self-employed workers,
and employees, and differentiates employees based on the types of labor contract and
service relationship (Róbert 1998). Róbert (1998:3) explains that “the employer provides
greater autonomy and independence in work, flexible work hours, greater work hours,
greater job security, a system of fringe benefits, the possibility and promise of
professional advancement and career as well as other promotional advantages,” when
employer need worker’s “special knowledge and skills.” If employee can only provide
their labor without “special knowledge and skills,” employees do not have “decision-
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making possibilities, independence, autonomy or flexible work hours to the employees”
(Róbert 1998:3).
An employee’s position is determined by the type of skills, experience, and
knowledge. The amount of autonomy in the workplaces is another factor in classifying
social class (Róbert 1998; Breen 2005). In the EGP, classes I and II are based on service
relationships. Class I indicates higher grade professionals, administrators, and managers,
and class II indicates lower grade professionals, administrators, and managers. Class III
represents routine non-manual workers including both higher grade (IIIa) and lower
grade (IIIb). Class IV indicates small proprietors including three types of classifications:
few employees (IVa), no employees (IVb), and farmers and small self-employed (IVc).
Class V indicates lower grade technicians, and class VI indicates skilled manual workers.
Class VII indicates semi or unskilled workers and agricultural workers (Erikson,
Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979).
The neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches favor a categorical classification
based on occupation rather than a continuous classification based on prestige scores
(Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992). Even though gradational conceptions of
class had been dominant schemas in social mobility studies, many electoral studies favor
categorical class schemas over continuous class schemas. Among the categorical
schemas, many electoral studies use the EGP class schemas rather than Wright’s class
classification because of limited information for operationalization (Manza and Brooks
1999). In the following section, I will explain the usage of class classification in electoral
studies.
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Application of Class Concepts to Electoral Studies
Manza and Brooks (1999) suggest that electoral studies tend to use one of three
ways to measure social class. The first way is a binomial classification based on bluecollar and white-collar workers. The second way is to classify class based on income. The
third way is to classify class based on occupation. There are two ways to use occupation
for social class schemas. One is the gradational approach and the other is the relational
approach. The gradation approach tends to use the prestige score of an occupation to
locate the occupation on a single continuum, while the relational approach classifies
social class groups based on employment situation and relations of production in the
labor market. Manza and Brooks (1999) argue that the first approach is not appropriate in
the advanced industrial societies due to the complexity of the industrial structure. They
also argue that income is not enough to differentiate social classes because there are
diverse economic or class interests among the same income groups. Regarding the third
approach, they explain that the gradational approach has not been used in electoral
studies, while many social mobility studies use it frequently (Manza and Brooks 1999).
Thus, they use the relational approach which is originated from EGP class classification.
Social cleavage thesis had been examined based on binomial class classification
(e.g., manual vs. non-manual workers) until the 1980s. Many studies, using binomial
class classification, such as the Alford Index, shows the decline of class cleavages. Lipset
([1960] 1981) also shows that class voting in the United States declined from 1948 to
1980 by using an Alford index graph. Other scholars also use the Alford Index to
demonstrate a decline of class voting. Scholars who suggest the decline of class voting
thesis argue that social structural change cause class voting pattern to decline. They
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indicate that previous social class categories are not applicable to post-material society.
However, there are scholars who argue that a class voting pattern still exists. They argue
that the Alford Index does not reflect the change of society, suggesting that a more
diversified class classification is needed to replace the binary class classification scheme.
They also argue that relative measurement needs to be used to complement the
disadvantages of absolute measurement (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993; Clark and
Lipset 2001).
Scholars who criticize the relevance of binomial class classification suggest
various alternative class classification schemas. Heath et al. (1985) suggest a five-class
schema; Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979) use a seven-class schema; and
Manza and Brooks (1999) also used a seven-class schema. All three schemas follow
EGP. Weakliem (1992) uses a six-class-scheme. De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath
(1995) use a six-class schema. Even though Wright’s class classification applies the
relational approach for class schema, it is not used in electoral studies (Manza and
Brooks 1999).
Goldthorpe (1980) developed a new class classification scheme to reflect social
change. Other scholars also suggest that binomial class classification is not appropriate
for analyzing the post-material society, so they claim that more sophisticated class
classification tools should be used to reflect social structural changes (Heath et al. 1985;
Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Weakliem 1995; 1997; Goldthorpe 1999).
Scholars also indicate an absolute class voting index, such as the Alford Index, is
susceptible to the change of the size of parties or classes (Nieuwbeerta 1996). The Alford
Index is calculated by the difference between (1) the percentage of voters who support
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the leftist party among manual occupations and (2) the percentage of voters who support
the leftist party among non-manual occupations (Alford 1963; Hout, Brooks, and Manza
1995). The scholars explain that (1) the Alford Index can be influenced by the change of
associational strength between class and vote, and it may also be affected by the change
of the size of classes or parties (Evans 2000), and (2) the absolute measurement of the
Alford Index is sensitive to variation in the total number of votes for the leftist party.
That is to say, the Alford Index is subject to the variation of the general popularity of
political parties (Heath et al. 1985; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995). Thus, it is suggested
that relative measures, such as odds-ratios, or log-odds-ratios, provide better
measurement of class cleavage (Heath et al. 1985; Manza and Brooks 1999).
The literature also indicates that the binomial class classification of manual
occupations/non-manual occupations is not an appropriate measure of present class
cleavages even though this class classification has been widely used. Manza and Brooks
(1999) argue that the two-class classification frame cannot identify divisions within
classes such as the white-collar or blue-collar classes, so it cannot reflect diverse changes
in the class structure of the United States. They also criticize class classification based on
income because there are many life chance variations within the same income group
(Manza and Brooks 1999). Nieuwbeerta (1996) explains that self-employed and farmers
tend to vote differently within the same-income group.
Manza and Brooks (1999) use a seven category class frame (“professionals,”
“managers and administrators,” “owners, proprietors, and other non-professional selfemployed persons,” “routine white-collar workers,” “skilled workers and foremen in all
industries,” “non-skilled workers in all industries,” “non-full-time labor-force
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participants”) to identify the class structure of the United States. They explain that this
class frame can accurately identify the various life chances and class locations of voters.
By using relative class measurement and multiple class frames, Manza and
Brooks (1999:79) conclude that the class voting trend in the United States is
characterized by “trendless fluctuation” rather than “monotonic decline.” However, they
also suggest that each class group has its own voting trend. The political preference of the
professional group has changed from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party due to
the professional group’s higher level of education. This trend may be explained by the
“New Class” thesis or post-materialism thesis. Other scholars argue that the professional
group tends to have “pro-state” and “anti-market” attitudes because professionals can
exert more power than the capitalist class in bureaucratic organizations (Manza and
Brooks 1999).
Manza and Brooks (1999) also explain the voting trend of the self-employed. The
self-employed tend to have a “pro-market” attitude because they are more likely to be
influenced by the market situation. The self-employed, thus, have a conservative political
perspective. For example, the self-employed were against the New Deal policy and
supported the rise of McCarthyism (Domhoff 1990). Manza and Brooks (1999) show that
the self-employed had a centrist position until late 1970s and have leaned toward the
Republican Party since the 1980s, possibly because of disappointment with the Carter
Administration and the “ideological appeals” of the Reagan Administration.
Non-skilled workers also show a conservative voting trend that may be due to the
deteriorated economic situation during the Carter Administration period. Some scholars
suggest that this trend is caused by the “embourgeoisement” of the working class, that is,
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the improvement of the economic situation of the working class and “working-class
authoritarianism,” that is, the intolerance of the working class toward social and cultural
issues related to race or the Civil Right Movement (Lipset 1959; Goldthorpe, Lockwood,
Bechhofer, and Platt 1967). In the following sections, I will explain the development of
class voting theory and debates about related issues.
Class Voting Theories
Class voting began to be a main issue in these studies when the revolutionary
Marxist movement failed and the reformist movement emerged as an alternative
approach in Western European countries (Evans 2000; D’Amato 2000). Reformist
European Socialists tried to achieve socialism through the election process, believing that
the working class would vote for social democratic parties (Przeworski and Sprague
1986; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995). Even though the working class was enfranchised,
there were many restrictions on the voting rights of working class before World War I.
However, in the 1920s, the working class could participate in the electoral process
without restriction because of suffrage reform. For example, in England, the working
class could participate in the election process without restriction because of franchise
reform in 1918 (Wald 1978). Freeman and Snidal (1982) suggest that eight European
countries among the nine European countries they studied experienced significant
political franchise reform between 1918 and 1920. Under universal enfranchisement,
most Western European countries showed similar class voting patterns: manual workers’
support for the left party and non-manual workers’ support for the right party (Weakliem
and Heath 1999). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain that class voting patterns showed
consistent trends from the 1920s until the 1960s. Based on this context, earlier class
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voting studies focused on the relationship between two-class and two-party systems
(Evans 2000; Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995).
In the United States, many electoral studies find class to be an important factor as
well. However, class politics in the United States tend to be characterized as “American
exceptionalism” (Manza and Brooks 1999; Kim 2003). In contrast to the European
countries, there has not been a powerful labor party or socialist party in the United States,
so class division has not been politicized as much as in European countries (Manza and
Brooks 1999). Regional division between the South and the North discouraged class
politics in the South (Manza and Brooks 1999). Labor movements in the United States
had failed because of the successful suppression of powerful employers, along with the
support of courts and government in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Manza and
Brooks 1999).
Class politics in the United States began to emerge in the 1930s. Because of the
Great Depression, the institutional hindrance of labor movements decreased, and the
number of working class people increased. These groups supported the Democratic Party,
resulting in the New Deal coalition. The power of labor unions increased because of the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act. For these reasons, most scholars suggest
that the level of class polarization increased dramatically (Manza and Brooks 1999).
In electoral studies, class has been regarded as one of the main factors, so most of
these studies provide explanations of how class influences voting behavior. There are
four main explanations of how class influences voting behavior: economic interest,
psychological attachment, social networks, and social cleavage (Manza and Brooks 2008;
Kim 2003). Each explanation uses a different level of analysis: individual, institutional,
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and social structural. The economic theory of voting and the psychological theory of
voting are based on an individual level analysis. The original economic theory of voting
behavior assumes that rational voters have all the information they need to know.
However, some critics argue that most voters do not have enough information about the
previous achievements and prospective policies of parties or candidates, so Downs (1957)
argues that voters tend to depend on parties’ ideology about policy. This theory explains
why voters tend to vote according to their class background. Downs (1957) explains that
class voting corresponds with the economic interest of voters Thus, even though there are
some variations, many class voting theorists assume that voters choose specific parties or
candidates according to their class or economic interest.
The Michigan School suggests that the voters who are more aware of their class
location tend to vote according to their class interests. Even though class is not the most
important factor in voting behavior, the Michigan School emphasizes the role of class in
partisanship formation as a long-term factor Therefore, class location is still an important
factor in the party identification of voters (Manza and Brooks 1999).
The Columbia School advances an institutional-level sociological explanation of
the relationship between class and voting behavior. The research of this School examines
how voters’ psychological preference changes during the campaign process. However,
this research found that voters’ partisanship was not changed and showed stable patterns
during the campaign process. The Columbia School argues that sociological factors, such
as class, do influence voting behavior. However, the School examines sociological
factors with an institutional perspective rather than a structural perspective, explaining
that voters’ social experience tend to accumulate, persist, and strengthen within social
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networks (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995; Kim
2003).
The fourth perspective on the relationship between class and voting behavior is
the social structural perspective. Alford (1963) suggests that structural factors such as
urbanization, social mobility, income inequality, and class are important influences on
voting according to the National Election Survey (NES). Lipset ([1960] 1981) also
suggests that political parties represent different class interests. He explains that the
working class is more likely to support leftist parties because leftist parties seek to move
toward social equality, while the middle class or upper class supports conservative parties
because conservative parties protect present privileges (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995;
Brooks and Manza 1997c; Kim 2003). Moreover, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain the
relationship between social structural change and party formation in European countries
in the early 20th century by using the concept of “cleavage.” While they identify multiple
types of cleavage, such as class, religion, region, ethnicity, Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
emphasize that class cleavage became a basic cleavage in the advanced industrial society
during the industrial revolution. However, as social structure changed into postmaterial
society, some scholars argue that the relevance of class to voting behavior declined. Thus,
I will review explanations about decline of class voting thesis.
Decline of Class Voting
The decline of class voting has been a central topic of electoral studies. Some
scholars argue that class influenced voting behavior until the early 1970s, while other
scholars have argued that class voting has declined since the 1950s (Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Asher 1980; Campbell et al. 1960; Lipset
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[1960] 1981). Some scholars maintain that class voting continuously influences voting
behavior (Manza and Brooks 1999). Thus, I will first review the argument supporting the
decline of class thesis and then review the argument supporting the continuance of class
cleavage.
First of all, scholars who propose the decline of class voting thesis have taken
approaches based on post-materialism, racial cleavages, economics, social mobility, and
institutions (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Manza and
Brooks 1999; Kim 2003). The post-material interest approach is a representative
approach to the decline of the class argument. It focuses on the difference in the values of
the older generation and the younger generation, arguing that the values of the older
generation are based on material values of industrial societies, while values of the
younger generation are based on post-material values of post-industrial societies
(Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). Clark and Lipset (1991) explain that the younger
generation is more likely to be middle class due to a higher level of education and is more
likely to support policies that advance post-material issues like lifestyle and natural
environment. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) also argue that younger generations are
more likely than others to experience income-security, so they have a stronger
commitment to post-material values.
Some scholars argue that racial cleavage has been more important than class
cleavage since the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1984; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989).
Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) explain that southern whites and working class whites
departed from the Democratic Party when the Party tried to recruit black voters. Southern
whites thought that they might lose their dominant position in the Democratic Party.
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Additionally, the white working class wanted to be separate from the black working class
and did not want to be affiliated with the same party as the black working class. For these
reasons, southern whites and working class whites began to support the Republican Party
after the Civil Right movement.
The economic approach suggests that affluence can alter the political preferences
of the working class. This approach argues that though the working class previously
supported the leftist party, it now supports the conservative party because of its improved
economic situation (Lipset [1960] 1981). Thus, an improved economic situation resulting
from social mobility can cause a decline of class voting. Cognitive mobilization may also
reduce the class voting trend. While traditional voting behavior theory argues that voters
depend on class identification because of a lack of information, cognitive mobilization
theory suggests that the degree of dependence on class has decreased because of higher
education and greater availability of information (Manza and Brooks 1999).
Institutional theories suggest that change in institutions, such as government,
political parties, and labor unions, can transform voters’ political preferences (Manza and
Brooks 1999; Tolbert 2003; Kim 2003; Peters 2012). For example, Clark, Lipset, and
Rempel (1993) explain that welfare states make the working class less radical, because
welfare systems provide occupational stability and economic security for the working
class. Manza and Brooks (1999) further explain that when welfare states provide voters
with economic security, working class members begin to be less dependent on leftist
parties. The weakening of labor unions also influences the decline of class voting.
Because of the change in industrial structure, the number of labor union members has
declined (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). Hout, Manza, and Brooks (1999) suggest that the
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decline of union membership made the Democratic Party look for alternatives, so they
began to attract middle class voters. Lastly, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) explain that
the change of leftist parties causes a decline of class voting. After the collapse of
Communism in Eastern Europe, leftist parties decided to change their leftist policy to
attract centrist voters because the support of the working class was insufficient to win in
elections. The moderation of ideology in the leftist parties results in the decrease of the
support of the working class.
As I explain above, many scholars challenge Lipset and Rokkan’s “freezing
hypotheses,” which argues that the relationship between social cleavage and vote choice
remained stable until the 1960s (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Franklin, Mackie, and
Valen 1992; Franklin 2010). Although many scholars have found no evidence that the
relationship has dealigned since the 1960s, some continue to disagree (Franklin, Mackie,
and Valen 1992; Franklin 2010). Although many studies focus on elections until the
1990s, expanding the study period may provide new evidence about which argument
better explains the relationship between social cleavage and vote choice. In the next
section, I will review religious voting theories.
Religion and Voting
Religious cleavage is one of main cleavages in the argument of Lipset and
Rokkan (1967). However, many comparative studies pay more attention to class cleavage
than to religious cleavage even though religious factors still influence voting behavior in
European countries (Cebolla, Cordero, Montero, and Segatti 2011). In the United States,
religious factors have been regarded as more important than in European countries
(Manza and Brooks 1997). While religious conflict occurred between the religious39

conservative coalition and the secular-left coalition in European countries, in the United
States, religious conflict was based on ethnoreligious cleavage during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries (Manza and Brooks 1997). In the United States, political divisions
were determined by both ethnic and denominational differences in the 19th century. For
example, immigrant groups which arrived at earlier time supported the Republican Party,
while immigrant groups which arrived at later time supported the Democratic Party in the
later 19th century. Thus, I will first discuss how religion has influenced politics in the
United States since the 19th century.
History of Religious Cleavage in the United States
Historians have studied the main determinants of the political affiliations of voters
in American history in the 1800s. While the Progressive historians argue that social class
is an important factor in political partisanship, the Ethnocultural School of political
historians suggests that ethnic or religious affiliation is an important factor in political
behavior (Benson 1961; Hays 1965; Kleppner 1970; McCormick 1974; Wilentz 1982).
The ethnocultural historians argue that religious division correlates with political conflict
after economic variables are controlled (Wright 1973).
Ethnocultural historians use various terms to express religious cleavage in the 19th
century, such as “puritan-nonpuritan,” “pietists-ritualists,” “pietists-liturgicals,” and
“evangelical-nonevangelical” (Benson 1961; Kleppner 1970; Jensen 1971; Formisano
1971; McCormick 1974; Feller 1992). Even though there are many terms to represent
conservative Protestants, the term “evangelicals” is used by many scholars. Evangelicals
“is also the best word available to describe a fairly discrete network of Protestant
Christian movements arising during the eighteenth century in Great Britain and its
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colonies” (Noll, Bebbington, and Rawlyk 1994:6). Evangelicals are “the heirs of
numerous spiritual traditions including Puritan theology, German Pietism, the Great
Awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a long tradition of periodic
revivals” (Lee 2008:515). Hunter (1983) emphasizes behavioral aspect of evangelical
movement in addition to doctrinal aspect. He said that “behaviorally, evangelicals are
typically characterized by an individuated and experiential orientation toward spiritual
salvation and religiosity in general and by the conviction of the necessity of actively
attempting to proselytize all nonbelievers to the tenets of the Evangelical belief system”
(Hunter 1983:7).
Ethnocultural model of voting theory explains that pietistic or evangelical voters
supported the Whigs or the Republican parties, while nonevangelical or ritualistic voters
supported the Democratic Party (McCormick 1974). Howe (1991:1222) explains “the
evangelical movement in the antebellum United States was in many respects the
functional equivalent of an established church.” The evangelical Christians thought that
they should fight against worldly sin in American society, so they agreed that government
should intervene in personal behavior. Thus, they supported the temperance movement,
the abolition movement, and Sabbatarian legislation.
The debate about Sabbath-keeping started when Congress passed the Postal Act
of 1810. It required every post office to be open on Sunday. Evangelicals opposed to this
act and launched the General Union for Promoting Observance of the Christian Sabbath
in 1828. They submitted petitions to protest the “Sunday mail law” in 1929 (Formisano
1971: 122). The topics of Sabbath-keeping debates covered opening of post office,
running railroad mail cars, traveling on any road. In a vote for the Sabbath bill, Majority
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of Whigs supports the Sabbath bill, while half House Democrats support the bill
(Formisano 1971).
However, nonevangelical or ritualistic Christians did not agree with these
movements. The Whigs or the Republican parties supported moral reform movements,
while the Democratic Party opposed governmental intervention in personal behavior.
Benson (1961) argues that puritans support the Whig party, while nonpuritans
supported the Democratic Party. Kleppner (1970) defines the ritualistic Christians as
those who emphasize formal doctrine based on traditional confession. He explains that
ritualistic practices are not synonymous with liturgical practices. Ritualistic religious
groups agree that the world is sinful, but they do not try to change the sinful world.
Ritualistic Christians do not support religious emotionalism. They emphasize right belief
rather than right behavior. On the other hand, pietistic Christians stress personal
conversion and emotional commitment to a transcendental God. They think that they
should change the sinful world, so they emphasize active participation in moral
movements for right behavior. However, Kleppner (1970) explains that these religious
perspectives do not align with the denominational classification. Formisano (1971)
suggests that evangelicals emphasize “devotionalism,” while non-evangelicals stress
“doctrinal orthodoxy.” Even though these classifications do not align with
denominationalism, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Baptists are classified as
evangelicals.
Even though these classifications are not aligned with denominationalism,
denomination is an important religious category. Denominationalism became a general
term in the 1850s in the United States (Mead 1956), because European immigrants
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preserved their own religious traditions and formed denominations. Until the late 19th
century, most Protestant denominations embraced conservative or evangelical beliefs,
even though there had been theological debates within Protestant groups and
ethnocultural conflicts among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews (Liebman, Sutton, and
Wuthnow 1988; Noll 1992). Even though most denominations shared evangelical beliefs
in the 19th century, scholars differentiate denominations based on their socioeconomic
differences (Niebuhr 1929; Davidson, Pyle, and Reyes 1995). These scholars argue that
Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians ranked higher in status with regard
to income and educational level, while Methodists, Lutherans, and Baptists showed lower
socioeconomic status in the early 20th century. Jews are classified as a higher status
group, while Catholics are classified as a lower status group in the early 20th century
(Pyle 2006). Davidson, Pyle, and Reyes (1995) show that the dominant position of the
Protestant Establishment persisted until the 1990s, while both Jews and Catholics
advanced in status by this time. They argue that the social stratification of religious
denominations has been the main factor influencing religious cleavage in the United
States (Pyle and Koch 2001; Pyle 2006).
Even though there has been agreement on the importance of denominational
classifications in the early 20th century, some scholars believe that internal division
within denominations is more important than denominational classification (Wuthnow
1989b). While Glock and Stark (1965) found that denominational differences in
socioeconomic status decreased after World War II, many scholars suggest that
theological divisions within main denominations in the early 20th century became a main
factor that contributed to religious cleavage in the U. S. (Marsden 1991; Hunter 1991;
43

Liebman et al. 1988). In the next section, I will explain the religious group cleavage
based on religious liberalism in the 20th century.
Theological Debates and Religious Cleavage
A major theological debate in American society started after evolutionism and the
higher criticism of the Bible transferred from European countries. German scholars
studied philology and compared “the usage of words and texts with other writings in its
historical context” (Lee 2008: 513; Brown 1960). Higher criticism “examined literary
forms, styles, and models” while “lower criticism was devoted to the study of original
texts and versions” (Lee 2008: 520). Even though the basic idea of Higher criticism was
used by Erasmus in the 16th century and by Benedict Spinoza and Thomas Hobbes in the
17th century, it was German scholars, such as J. S. Semler, J. A. Ernesti, J. D. Michaelis,
and J. G. Eichhorn, who began the “naturalist-historicist interpretations of the Bible” in
the 18th century. They “did not abandon the doctrine of divine inspiration, but they did
historicize the texts by reading them comparatively, with other biblical texts and with
extra-biblical secular literature” (Carhart 2007:165). The Tübingen School, such as
Ferdinand Christian Baur and David Strauss, developed higher criticism in the 19th
century based on “the German innovators of the historicist biblical criticism” in the 18th
century (Lee 2008:513). Higher criticism and became popular in Germany in the 1830s
and began to be introduced to the U.S. in the early 19th century (Lee 2008).
Even though some scholars, such as Andrew Norton and Moses Stuart introduced
higher criticism before the Civil War, it had not been a great issue not until the
publication of Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1959. Higher criticism became a great
issue after 1880 because conservative Protestant began to react against these issues
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(Brown 1960; Lee 2008). The influence of “European learning,” irreligious culture of
European immigrants in cities, and the reformulation of higher education system made
conservative feel anxious and began movements for defense against higher criticism and
evolutionism after the Civil War (Noll 1985:232-233). Thus, conservative Protestants felt
the necessity for revival movement and Prohibition campaign (Noll 1985).
Before evolutionism and German higher criticism imported to the U.S., majority
of Christians believed that the Bible was inspired by God, and that the Bible includes no
error until the early 19th century (Lee 2008). The debate on traditional belief about
Biblical inerrancy deepened when Scopes Trial happened in the 1920s. In the 1920s,
conservative Protestants made efforts to forbid teaching evolutionism in public high
schools and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), founded in 1920, looked for a
way to increase their fame for their movement to support antiwar protesters and recruit a
volunteer to challenge the antievolution Law in Tennessee (Stark 2003; Matzke 2010).
Even though it seemed conservative Protestants won the trial because Scopes was found
guilty at the trial, scholars explain that fundamentalists were defeated because they were
ridiculed by the press and the court’s decision was overturned later on procedural
grounds (Stark 2003; Matzke 2010; Larson 2008; Webb 2011). Since that time, religious
cleavage reconstructed based on the debate between fundamentalism and liberalism.
Smith (1990) explains that the Fundamentalist movement emerged in the early 20th
century in reaction to the secularization of many mainstream Protestant groups. This
movement is based on: 1) Biblical inerrancy, 2) born-again experience for personal
salvation, 3) “premillennialism,” which “believed that Christ would return prior to the
millennium and defeat the Antichrist in a major battle” (Wilcox 1992:2). Wilcox (1992:2)
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also explains “it was commonly believed that it would be triggered by a worsening of the
world situation, as well as the growing successes of the Antichrist in the world,” 4) an
evangelical movement for conversion of nonbelievers, and 5) traditional Protestant
teaching, such as the Trinity and the Virgin birth. Liberal Protestants, on the other hand,
emphasized: 1) social reform, 2) acceptance of secular scientific knowledge, 3) resistance
against literal interpretation of the Bible about miracles, and 4) the progress of this world
rather than the second-coming of God. Smith (1990) proposes that the fundamentalistliberalist continuum is the basis for differentiating the Protestant denominations.
Even though there are some divisions, conservative Protestants are regarded as a
single group because the conservative/liberal division is a larger division in present
religious situation. While some people do not differentiate evangelical Protestants from
fundamentalist Protestants, there are salient differences between Fundamentalism and
Evangelicalism (Smith 2002). Historically, Fundamentalism arose to resist against the
teaching of Evolution in the 1920s (Marsden 1991; 2006). In general, Fundamentalism
resists the influence of modernism and seeks to create a separate life from modern culture
(Ammerman 1987). Wilcox (1992:2) explains “fundamentalism developed out of
evangelicalism early in the twentieth century.” On the other hand, some conservative
Protestants, such as Billy Graham, Carl Henry, and Harold Ockenga, were dissatisfied
with separatism of Fundamentalism and began new evangelical movement to “have a
broader influence in shaping American society” in the late 1940s (Bendroth 1999;
Marsden 1991; 2006; Evans 2009:251). Even though Ockenga invented the term “neoevangelicals” to emphasize their new identity, “evangelicals” became a common term to
indicate the movement in the 1960s (Marsden 1991:73). They “coalesced around central
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institutions such as Fuller Theological Seminary, Christianity Today, the National
Association of Evangelicals, and other organizations” (Evans 2009:248) The debate
between Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism has been a major issue in the conservative
Protestant churches, so scholars tend to classify conservative Protestants as either
fundamentalists or evangelicals. Often, this classification replaces denominational
classification because of decline of denominationalism even though denominational
affiliation tends to be used to decide religious preferences. Hunter (1981:364) explains “it
is fallacious to presume that because the Southern Baptist (or any other) denominational
tradition falls within the religious heritage of American Evangelicalism, therefore all
Southern Baptists (or Nazarenes, etc.) are Evangelicals.”
The participation of liberal denominations in the Ecumenical movement of the
1960s also contributed to the decline of denominationalism (Stark and Glock 1968). The
decline of interdenominational tensions (Protestants/Catholics, Protestants/Jewish), the
increase of “denominational switching” or “religious mobility,” and the increase of
religious intermarriage have further accelerated the decline of denominationalism in the
U.S. (Wuthnow 1989b; Greeley 1972; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999). Accordingly,
many scholars suggest that political differences based on denominationalism have been
replaced by political divisions based on religious ideology (conservatism/liberalism).
However, Woodberry and Smith (1998) use “evangelical Protestant” to describe
theologically conservative groups because “conservative Protestant” refers to religious
conservatism as well as to social, political, and economic conservatism. These religious
cleavage influence voting behavior in the United States after World War II. In the next
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section, I will discuss how religious voting theories explain the relationship between
religious affiliation and voting behavior.
Religious Voting Theories
There are several issues involved in the study of the relationship between
religious belief and voting behavior. One issue concerns “secularization” and the “decline
of denominationalism” (Manza and Brooks 1999:91). In Western Europe, secularization
theory explains the voting pattern of religious voters. Religious voting decreased as
church attendance decreased (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Broughton and Napel 2000).
On the other hand, in American society, the number of church attendants has not
decreased to the extent that it has in Europe (Finke and Stark 2005; Stark and Iannaccone
1994).
Some scholars have become interested in the role of the Christian Right
movement, believing that this movement contributed to the success of the Republican
Party in the Presidential elections and Senate elections in the 1980s (Manza and Brooks
1999; Brooks and Manza 2004; Claassen and Povtak 2010). Yet, other scholars, such as
Wilcox (1994), find that the impact of the Christian Right movement was modest in the
1980s. None the less, the influence of the Christian Right movement changed after the
1980s because the main Christian Right movement organization in the 1990s was the
Christian Coalition, and its foundation and strategy were also different from those of the
Moral Majority. The main denominational base of the Christian Coalition was the
Pentecostal church. The Christian Coalition focused on state and local level elections
rather than on national level elections in their beginning stage. Because the strategy of the
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Christian Coalition was successful, the impact of the Christian Right movement in the
1990s was bigger than it was in the 1980s (Williams 2010; Wilcox 1994).
The Catholic dealignment thesis is the idea that Catholics have changed their
political preference from the Democratic Party to a more centrist posture (Manza and
Brooks 1999). According to thesis, Catholics’ socioeconomic status has increased and
was similar to that of the majority by the 1980s (Greeley 1989). The thesis also argues
that Catholics also began to live in the suburbs by this time and were no longer
residentially different from non-Catholics (Davidson 1994; 2013). Based on these
arguments, scholars suggest that Catholics’ political preference departed from the
Democratic Party (Gallup and Castelli 1987). However, Manza and Brooks (1999)
conclude that the dealignment thesis of Catholics is overstated because Catholics seem to
have supported the Democratic Party since 1952 without much variation.
The dealignment of liberal or mainline Protestants is also an important issue.
Mainline Protestant denominations, such as Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and
Presbyterians, tend to have above average socioeconomic status in the U.S. (Mills 1956;
Baltzell 1964). Furthermore, mainline Protestants have been supporters of the Republican
Party (Manza and Brooks 1999). However, although there are debates about whether
mainline Protestants have changed their political preference toward the Democratic Party
(Lopatto 1985), Manza and Brooks (1999) conclude that liberal Protestants moved
toward the Democratic Party and away from the Republican Party. Conservative
Protestants consistently have supported the Republican Party with some exceptions
(Manza and Brooks 1999).
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As I explain above, ethnoreligious cleavage was an important influence on the
political affiliations of American voters until early 20th century. Theological differences
between religious conservatives and liberals were important influences on political
preferences after World War II. Although the secularization process influenced religious
denominations, religious conservative continued to support the Republican Party and the
Christian Right movement and seemed to strengthen this trend. Some religious groups
seemed to change their political support in Presidential elections. As Manza and Brooks
(1999) argue, the degree of religious cleavage has been relatively consistent with the
exception of liberal Protestants until the 1990s. However, it was not measured in the 2000s
and few studies analyze the relationship between the influence of the Christian Right
movement and the magnitude of religious cleavage or the influence of economic attitudes
of religious groups on vote choice since the 1980s. Thus, I will analyze whether religious
cleavage declined between 1980 and 2008 and influenced voters’ attitudes toward cultural
and economic issues pertaining to religious cleavage. In the following section, I will review
the relationship between region and voting.
Region and Voting
Sectional Cleavage in the United States
Sectional cleavage is one of the main topics in the structural cleavage literature
even though this topic receives less attention than class cleavage and religious cleavage
in electoral research. Layman (2001) argues that sectional cleavage was associated with a
major transformation of party politics in the United States in the 19th century. He explains
that the transformation of party politics, such as (1) the Republican Party’s replacement
of the Whig Party in the 1850s and 1860s, (2) the Democratic Party’s establishment as a
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party of farmers and laborers in the Southern and Western areas, and the Republican
Party’s establishment as a majority party representing industrialists in the Northeastern
and Midwestern areas in the 1890s, (3) the Democratic Party became a majority party
based on “lower-status whites and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, leaving the
Republicans with a coalition of upper-status, non-southern white Protestants” (p. 27), and
(4) African Americans began to support the Democratic Party and white southerners
began to move their political preference toward the Republican Party in the 1960s.
Layman (2001) argues that the first transformation is related mostly to sectional cleavage,
while the second transformation is related to sectional cleavage and class cleavage. He
explains that the third and fourth transformations occurred in the 20th century and are
related not to sectional cleavages but to class cleavage and racial cleavage (Layman
2001). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) also include an urban/rural cleavage in the four main
social cleavages.
Turner (1932) studied the sectional difference of voting patterns in the U.S. in the
early 20th century. His argument of political sectionalism has influenced studies of the
geographical distinctiveness of the West in political preferences since the early 20th
century (Archer 1988). Key (1942) also analyzed the geography of political preferences
in the U.S., observing that sectional cleavage began during the westward movement of
the early 19th century. It contrasted to European countries that had long-established
sectional cleavages. Key (1942) explains that the economic interests of western residents
were different from those of eastern residents because, in many cases, land in western
areas was owned by easterners in the early 19thcentury. Additionally, the interests of
small farmers in western areas were different from those of manufacturers and bankers in
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the eastern areas. Because of the difference in economic interests, westerners supported
Jefferson and Jackson in Presidential elections because these candidates supported the
sectional interest of western areas (Key 1942).
The pattern of sectional cleavage changed during the abolitionist movement. Even
though the West still had distinctive interests, sectional conflict occurred based on the
economic dispute between northern and southern areas in the mid-19th century.
Furthermore, after the development of transportation networks, such as railroads, the
distance between the West and the East was shortened, and the sectional conflict between
the West and the East was replaced by the conflict between the South and the North (Key
1942).
The main economic conflict was between northeastern manufacturers and
southern cotton producers. Even though there were also divergent sectional interests
based on the economic specializations of particular sections, such as the cornbelt region,
the pasture region, and the corn-and-winter-wheat belt region, the main sectional
cleavage was between manufacturing industry of the North and cotton farming in the
South (Key 1942). The slavery system made the sectional cleavage more intense between
the North and South (Key 1942). Because of the weather and soil conditions, cotton could
be produced only in the South, and the huge demand for labor in cotton production made
the southerners adhere to the ideology of white supremacy and the slavery system. Thus,
economic interests based on cotton production and racial prejudice were primary reasons
why the South could maintain its political separation from the rest of the country (Key
1942).
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Key (1942) explains that a common economic interest within the same region is
important to maintain sectionalism because diversified economic interests tend to reduce
sectionalism. When there is division within the same section or differences in economic
interests between sections, sectional cleavage tends to decrease. In the early 20th century,
due to the industrialization of the South, the economic interests of southern voters
diversified along the lines of manufacturing industry in the Carolinas, petroleum industry
in Texas, and citrus fruits and sugar production in Florida and Louisiana. With the
introduction of new industry in the southern states, the number of Republicans also
increased. Additionally, the issues of religion and prohibition helped the spread of
Republicanism in the South. However, the industrialization of the South progressed
gradually and most manufacturing jobs remained in the northeast. The percentage of
manufacturing jobs in the northeast decreased from 86 percent to 82 percent between
1899 and 1935. However, even though manufacturing industry in the South grew
gradually, it diluted the political unity of the region (Key 1942).
Recently, some scholars focus on different aspects of regional cleavage. Some
researchers examine a more detailed regional classification, such as the South,
Mountain/Plains, Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast. They found that voters in the
Mountain/Plains region are more likely to support the Republican Party than voters in
other areas (McKee and Teigen 2009). Some researchers focus on newly developed
regions, such as the Sunbelt, because voters in the Sunbelt seem to have political and
religious preferences that differ from those of voters in other regions (Kellstedt and Guth
2009). In the following section, I will describe the influence of urbanization and
suburbanization on voting.
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Urbanization and Suburbanization
With the process of industrialization, more areas were urbanized, and urbanization
transformed sectional cleavages. The percentage of the population living in urban places,
where the population was 2500 or more, increased from 39.7 percent to 56.5 percent
between 1900 and 1940. By 1940, 48 percent of the U.S. population lived in the nation’s
140 metropolitan areas in the United States (Key 1942).
Key (1942) argues that urbanization decreases sectional cleavage because it
creates divisions within the same region. For example, the interests of big cities differ
from those of rural areas. Political cleavage in big cities is based on class cleavage rather
than sectional cleavage. Thus, Key (1942) suggests that urbanization increases the
importance of class cleavage as a factor in elections in big cities, giving the Democratic
Party an advantage in Presidential elections. Residents in metropolitan cities in the North
and West areas were especially likely to support the Democratic Party and contributed to
the re-election of the president Roosevelt in 1944. On the other hand, urbanization did not
affect the South as much as did the northeast. In the South, rural residents showed
stronger support for the Democratic Party than did urban residents (Brunn and Ingalls
1972; Ingalls and Brunn 1979). Brunn and Ingalls (1972) maintain that the South was a
“one-party region” before 1948, and remained solidly Democratic from 1948 to 1968
until it was politically fragmented by the challenges of the Republicans after the 1950s.
Gregory (2005) explains that southerners had supported the Democratic Party since the
early 19th century, and the party was related to the Confederacy in the Civil War period.
Southerners continued to support the Democratic Party until the New Deal alignment was
effective in the 1960s (Layman 2001; Gregory 2005).
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Even though the patterns of urbanization were different in the North and South,
the influence of urbanization on voting patterns increased. Some scholars argue that
urbanism became a more important factor than sectionalism in American politics. For
example, Mendelson (1977:318) explains “the election of 1932 was the last in which
sectionalism played the dominant role.” Holcombe (as cited in Eldersveld, 1949:1206)
explains “a leading feature of contemporary American politics is the shift in the balance
of power from the country to the cities.” Eldersveld (1949:1189) deals with a contention
“that sectionalism, if still valid, is being modified, or supplemented, by an urban-rural
party alignment which bodes major change for the future.” After he examined the
electoral data of twelve major cities in Presidential elections between 1920 and 1948, he
concludes “the metropolitan vote may well have become the balance-wheel in our
political system” (Eldersveld 1949:1206). Agnew (1988:138) argues “sectionalism is
initially and finally about common regional interests and ideology. It is not about similar
voting behavior by region per se. From this point of view a sectional interpretation of
American politics no longer makes much sense whatever the electoral pattern.” However,
other scholars disagree with the issue. For example, Wright (as cited in Archer,
1988:123) “sectionalism will remain as a dominant factor in the national life.” Archer
(1988) also deals with the contention that macrogeographical cleavage, such as sectional
cleavage, had been replaced by microgeographical cleavage among central cities,
suburbs, and rural areas. He explains that sectional cleavages among northeastern,
southern, western are defined as macrogeographical cleavages and cleavages among
urban, suburban, and rural are classified as microgeographical cleavages. Archer (1988)
examined the relative importance between macrogeographical and microgeographical
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cleavages by using county-level Presidential election result between 1940 and 1984.
Archer (1988) concludes that macrogeographical cleavage is still a more important factor
than microgeographical cleavage in voting behavior. However, there is not enough
evidence to decide which is more important between sectionalism and urbanism in
American politics.
The influence of urbanism on American politics gradually became an important
issue based on urbanization and suburbanization in the Unites States. The growth of
urban population strengthened the Democratic coalition and it continued until
suburbanization offset the political influence of city residents. After suburbanization
accelerated in the 1950s, the suburban population surpassed the urban population.
Conversion theory argues that new residents in the suburbs became Republicans to adapt
to the new environment, while transplantation theory suggests that suburban residents
became Republican because of their upward mobility (Archer 1988).
Political differences among urban, suburban, and rural areas are important topics
in studies of the relationship between region and voting (Zikmund 1967; McKee and
Teigen 2009). The political preferences of urban dwellers were assumed to be different
from those of rural residents for a long time before the suburbs were developed (Zikmund
1967; Oliver and Ha 2007). The political difference between city and rural areas persisted
before migration from rural areas to cities. Sauerzopf and Swanstrom (1999) explain that
many rural residents migrated to urban areas in the early 20th century and became
Democratic Party supporters as they adjusted to urban culture. Theorists call this
movement “residential conversion.” As the population of city residents increases, the
Democratic Party gains more votes because formerly rural residents changed their
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political party preference after they migrated to cities. Thus, the Democratic Party built
the “New Deal coalition” that dominated national elections during the 1930s and 1960s.
However, the political geography has changed with suburbanization.
Suburbanization accelerated in the 1950s, and began to be a topic for academic
research in the 1960s (Walks 2004). Some scholars argue that suburban residents had a
conservative political preference based on their higher income and their achievement and
social mobility (Campbell et al. 1960; Walks 2004). Walks (2004) explains the
relationship between conservative ideology and suburbanization by using the concept of
“residential conversion,” “transplantation,” and “consumption process.”
Walks (2004) explains that place of residence affects political preference
independently of race and class. He suggests that suburban residents tend to choose their
locations actively based on their lifestyle preferences regarding consumption patterns,
desire for privacy, and value of self-reliance over public responsibility. These specific
lifestyle preferences of suburbanites result in distinctive political preferences among
suburban voters regardless of race and class. Walks (2004) also explains that
homeownership tends to make suburban voters more politically conservative than central
city voters. Homeowners tend to have a conservative political preference because of their
material interests in terms of property value and property taxes. Lastly, Walks (2004)
explains that suburbanites’ commuting pattern with automobiles and the low density of
suburban areas make suburbanites more self-reliant and competition-oriented by reducing
the interaction of suburbanites with people of different classes. On the other hand, city
dwellers’ high density living environment and public transportation usage expose
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urbanites to different classes and ethnicities, causing them to have a more liberal ideology
(Walks 2004).
Gainsborough (2001; 2005) also found that suburban location influences party
identification and voting behavior by analyzing U.S. national election data between the
1950s and 1990s. She argues that suburban residents are more likely to vote for the
Republican Party than are city residents even when religion, race, gender, age, and
income variables are controlled. Additionally, she argues that the rise of the New Right
movement is also related to suburbanization. She explains that the political influence of
suburbs began to be stronger in the 1980s because of the increase of the suburban
population, and because of the independence of suburbs from cities. Since then, suburbs
began to have more interest in benefits for suburbanites than city dwellers and supported
separation from cities, both politically and legally.
Immigration and ethnic diversity also affect the political geography of cities and
suburbs. African-Americans and Hispanic immigrants are more likely to live in central
cities, while white middle class, native-born Americans are more likely to live in suburbs.
Thus, the political patterns of metropolitan areas are influenced by the concentration of
ethnic minority populations in cities (McKee and Shaw 2003).
The urban/suburban voting pattern began to change again after Democratic Party
supporters who had lived in central cities began to move toward suburbs in the 1990s, so
that the political preference of suburban areas was more complex in the 1990s (McKee
and Shaw 2003). McKee and Shaw (2003) found that suburban voters’ political
preferences shifted from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party in the 1990s due
to the migration of Democratic Party supporters into suburban areas.
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Lang, Sanchez, and Berube (2008) also discovered that suburbs are not politically
homogenous. Some suburban areas are urbanized, while other suburban areas are rural in
character because of recent suburbanization. Thus, the voting pattern of a suburban area
is influenced by its degree of urbanization. Lang et al. (2008) classify metropolitan areas
based on commuting patterns, land use, and population growth into the following:
“Core,” “Inner Suburb,” “Mature Suburb,” “Emerging Suburb,” and “Exurb.” Based on
this classification of counties, they analyzed the voting pattern of areas in 2000 and 2004
and found a negative relationship between distance from the urban center and Democratic
Party voting and between population density and Democratic Party voting. The residents
of urban and inner suburbs, which are densely populated, are more likely to vote for the
Democratic Party, while the residents of exurbs, which are less densely populated, are
more likely to vote for the Republican Party. Consequently, the Core, Inner Suburb, and
Mature Suburb residents are more likely to support the Democratic Party, while the
Exurb residents are more likely to support the Republican Party. In the Emerging
Suburbs, the Republican Party shows strength, while the Democratic Party shows
competitiveness (Lang et al. 2008). In the United States, class conflict became an
important issue in American politics during the New Deal era (Manza and Brooks 1999).
According to Rae (1992: 630-631), “American politics in the period prior to the New
Deal and for most of the nineteenth century was preoccupied with conflicts over regional
and cultural issues.” In the 1930s, the growth of the working class and labor unions
strengthened the power of the working class in the New Deal coalition (Manza and
Brooks 1999; Rae 1992).
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The improved political influence of working class was associated with
urbanization because the working class increased dramatically due to development of
manufacturing industry in urban areas. In particular, “the Manufacturing Belt” in
Northeast and Midwest regions was the economic core of the United States in the early
20th century (Fan and Casetti 1994:179). Furthermore, “The agglomeration of
manufacturing attracted capital, and large cities with ample employment opportunities
became magnets for labor migration especially from the South” (Fan and Casetti
1994:179). In the following sections, I will explain how region is related to economic
interests and religious affiliations in forming voting behavior.
Region, Economic Interests, and Voting
Geography has been associated with economic interests and religious affiliations
since the 19th century. For example, Key (1942:153) observed that the economic interests
of the “thinly populated agricultural West were different from those of the “more densely
populated financial industrial East” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The sectional cleavage between the West and the East changed into a sectional cleavage
between the North and the South in the early nineteenth century (Key 1942). The South
and the North had different economic interests in slavery (Sundquist 1973). Sundquist
(1973:75-76) suggests that the economic interests of “liberal capitalist” were related to
the antislavery movement in the northern states even though many scholars argue that the
moral perspective about slavery was a main reason of “sectional rivalry and hostility.”
Even though sectional cleavage was based partly on economic interests, Key
(1942:169) found that the different economic interests of sections were still based on
“agrarian sectionalism” in the 19th century. He also suggests that “the basis for agrarian
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sectionalism is weakened by the introduction of industry and other nonagricultural
pursuits” (Key 1942:169). The economic structure of the United States changed from
“small scale artisanal production” to “large-scale mechanized mass production” between
the Civil War and the Great Depression (Oestreicher 1988:1258).
Large-scale manufacturing industry caused the formation of the working class in
the North. Because large factories concentrated in this region, the size of the working
class also increased in the northern states. Key (1942:169) explains that “in 1899 the
northeastern industrial area accounted for 86 per cent of the industrial jobs; in 1935, 82
per cent.” Therefore, the presence of the working class influences the geographical
association between class and politics in the northern states. That is, class formation in
the United States was related to the geographical distribution of manufacturing industries.
Marx also suggests that class formation is associated with urbanism because large
factories concentrated in cities in the early stage of capitalist development. Southworth
and Stepan-Norris (2003:321) further point out that “Karl Marx…suggested that the
physical concentration of workers in cities and large factories contributed to their ability
to realize their aggregate class…interests.” Thus, capitalist development is unevenly
distributed and the geographical association between class and politics varies by location.
After the Second World War, the relocation of manufacturing industry influenced
the geographical relationship between class and voting. As more factories moved from
the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt, the size of the working class decreased in the northeastern
region, decreasing political influence of the working class in the Frostbelt. On the other
hand, industrial employment in the Sunbelt increased. Fan and Casetti (1994:179) suggest
that “the second phase of regional dynamics in the United States was characterized by
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slower growth, stagnation, and decline of states within the main core and new growth in
the former periphery which began in the 1960s and early 1970s.” According to Fan and
Casetti (1994:180), “less unionization,” “lower labor and land costs,” and “attractive
climate and amenities” led to the economic development of the Sunbelt.
Suburbanization also influences class politics because the middle class moved
into the suburbs while the working class remained in urban areas. McKee and Teigen
(2009:486) observe that “Americans increasingly move into locations compatible with
their demographic and political preferences.” McKee and Teigen (2009) also explain that
suburbanites tend to live in homogenous place while urbanites live in heterogeneous
environments. However, suburban areas also became heterogeneous places because the
working class eventually moved to suburbs (Lang et al. 2008). Thus, the relationship
between class and voting also varies geographically.
Region, Religious Affiliations, and Voting
Religion is associated with geographical characteristics because ethnoreligious
identity is closely related with region in the United States (Carroll 2012). In the United
States, ethnoreligious identities have been formed by combinations of religious and
ethnic origins because religion of European immigrants “has remained strongly identified
with ethnic origin” (Zelinsky 1961:159). These ethnoreligious groups were associated
with specific regions and ethnoreligious identity based on regions developed in the early
19th century. During this time, established denominations, such as Congregationalists,
Presbyterians, and Episcopalians concentrated in the East, while newer denominations,
such Methodist and Baptists spread into the West (Zelinsky 1961). Slavery was an
important issue in the geographical pattern of religion in the early 19th century (Key
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1942). Many denominations split because of disagreements over slavery. Southern
denominations began to develop their own identity to differentiate themselves from
northern denominations. In particular, the Southern Baptist church became a regional
church after the Civil War (Cromartie 1992). For example, the Southern Baptists created
their own subculture and tried to differentiate it from that of other evangelicals because
“many Southern Baptists consider evangelicalism to be a ‘Yankee’ phenomenon”, so
Southern Baptists tried to avoid using the term “evangelicals” because of its association
with northern denominations (Ingersoll 2003:48).
Based on the ethnoreligious traditions in the United States, scholars tried to
identify religious regions. For example, Zelinsky (1961:163-164) developed a
classification of religious regions: “New England region,” “Midland region,” “Upper
Middle Western region,” “Southern region,” “Spanish Catholic region,” “Mormon
region,” and “Western region.” The New England region is dominated by Roman
Catholics, Congregationalists, Unitarians, and Episcopalians. The Midland region is
dominated by Methodists. The Upper Middle Western Region is dominated by Lutherans
and Catholics. The Mormon Region is dominated by Mormons. The Spanish Catholic
Region is dominated by Catholics. The Western Region is dominated by diverse religious
traditions of immigrants. Shortridge (1977:150) updated Zelinsky’s classification because
he thought that the classification of Zelinsky is “highly subjective and based on criteria
somewhat different not only from the present map, but from each other.” These
classification schemes of religious regions are the foundation of regionalization studies of
religion (Bauer 2012:522).
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After Zelinsky suggested the classification scheme of religious regions, scholars
continue to debate the topic. While some scholars suggested alternative classification
schemes, other scholars criticized the concept of regionalization of religion. For example,
convergence theorists argue that regional differences in religion have decreased because
of internal migration and the development of mass media (Bauer 2012; Labovitz and
Purdy 1970; McKinney and Bourque 1971). They argue that “Zelinsky’s regions were
artifacts of a bygone era, not current entities” (Bauer 2012:523). However, some scholars
show that regionalization of religion still exists in the United States (Bauer 2012; Brunn
and Barcus 2004; Crawford 2005; Jordan 2007; Warf and Winsberg 2008). Bauer
(2012:537) revisited the topic, reviewing recent regionalization studies of religion, and
concludes that “religious regions continue to exist today.”
Subsectional structure also influences the geographical distribution of religion.
Zelinsky (1961:150) reports that 97.5 percent of Jews lived in metropolitan areas, while
74.5 percent of Catholics and 72.7 percent of Episcopalians lived in metropolitan areas in
1952. He reports, too, that more than 60 percent of “the Disciples of Christ, Churches of
God, Brethren, Baptist, and Mennonite bodies” lived in non-metropolitan areas (Zelinsky
1961:151).
The development of megachurches is also related with geographical structure.
Warf and Winsberg (2010:33) found that megachurches concentrate in “suburban,
metropolitan, and Sunbelt” areas and that “typically, megachurches are defined as having
a minimum of 2,000 members, and some reach 10,000” (Warf and Winsberg 2010:34).
The size of megachurches influences the structural change of religion. For example, even
though many megachurches are non-denominational, they are related to the
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evangelicalism. Thus, the growth of megachurches is associated with the decline of
mainline Protestant churches. The number of megachurches has increased since the
1970s: 50 in 1970, 150 in 1980, over 300 in 1990, and around 1,310 in 2005 (Warf and
Winsberg 2010).
The growth of megachurches in the suburban Sunbelt areas is also related to the
relationship between religion and politics because megachurches tend to support the
religious right’s positions on school prayer, abortion, and gay rights. According to
Aleksic, “the megachurch can in fact be characterized as an ideal community of the
American Christian Right: a planned collective environment governed in accordance not
only with evangelical church doctrine, but also with a conservative social and political
ethos” (as cited in Warf and Winsberg 2010:38).
As I explain above, region is associated with many factors, including class,
religion, and politics. These associations result in each region having distinctive political
preferences. In particular, sectional cleavage significantly influenced political preferences
in the 19th century. With the acceleration of urbanization in the early 20th century, the
importance of micro-regional cleavage also emerged. Suburbanization also influenced
micro-regional cleavage after World War II. However, we do not know whether microregional cleavage is more important than macro-regional cleavage. Although some
scholars assume that the importance of regional cleavage erodes because of
modernization, other scholars argue that place of residence is still an influential factor in
vote choice regardless of demographic and socioeconomic background (Walks 2004).
Thus, I will examine the relationship between regional cleavage and voting behavior
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using various measures for region. In the next section, I will review how economic
factors influence voting behavior.
Economic Factors and Voting
Socioeconomic Voting
Many scholars agree that economic factors have influenced voting behavior.
However, the economic voting pattern became important after the industrialization
process began in the United States in the early 20th century; more studies focus on the
period after World War II because of data credibility and changed ability of government
in economic policy (Lynch 1999). Lin (1999) explains that the ethnoreligious or
ethnocultural perspective had been important until the Third Party System (1860-1896)1
and the period of the “preindustrial democratic system.” In the preindustrial democratic
system, the community-based long-term stability of political preference and the high
level of political participation were dominant characteristics (Burnham 1965). Hays
(1965) argues that the community-based political environment changed into a societybased, political environment in 1896, and impersonal relationships became more
prevalent than personal relationships. From that time on, socioeconomic voting became
important gradually (Lin 1999). Socioeconomic voting patterns appeared conspicuously
in the election of 1928. Working class people in large cities supported Democratic

1

Political scholars who argue realignment thesis classify the political system of the United States
as follows: “1. 1796-1816, First Party System: Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists,”“2.
1840-1856, Second Party System: Democrats and Whigs,”“3. 1860-1896, Third Party System:
Republicans and Democrats,”“4. 1896-1932, Fourth Party System: Republicans and Democrats,”
and“5. 1932-, Fifth Party System: Democrats and Republicans (Benedict, Burbank, and Hrebenar
1999: 11).
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candidate Al Smith in 1928 even though he tried to emphasize ethnocultural issues (Lin
1999).
Some scholars argue that economic voting patterns decreased after the period of
“postindustrial politics” began even though there are debates about the timing of
realignment (Burnham 1965; Lin 1999). Inglehart (1987) also developed a similar term,
such as the era of “postmaterialist” even though the terms were developed independently.
Lin (1999) explains that cultural value and meaning are more important than material
value in postmaterialism. The emphasis on the cultural factors undermined the
importance of economic factors. However, the influence of cultural factors is different
based on the types of economic voting. For example, the influence of postmaterialism on
socioeconomic voting may be different from that of issue-based economic voting because
group-based economic interest is different from individual-based economic interest,
while economic voting based on an individual’s rational choice is less influenced by
cultural factors (Lin 1999).
The Great Depression and the New Deal policy also contributed to the
development of economic voting patterns. Lynch (1999) explains that the President’s
power of policy-making ability in the 1930s increased after the election of President
Roosevelt and his New Deal policy. With this change, government’s ability of controlling
economic conditions grew dramatically in the 1930s. Thus, voters began to think that
economic condition depends on a President’s performing ability of economic policy, and
they tend to reward the incumbent president while they punish the incumbent party
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-Beck, Norpoth, and Jacoby 2009). However,
there are debates about how rational voters decide in elections. In the following sections,
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I will explain rational voting behavior by applying retrospective and prospective voting
theories.
Retrospective and Prospective Economic Voting Theories
Conover, Feldman, and Knight (1987) propose the retrospective and prospective
economic voting theories. The retrospective evaluation of the economic condition has
been studied by many scholars (Key 1966; Kramer 1971). They suggest that economic
performance is one of the major determinants of national Presidential voting for the
incumbent President’s party (Erikson 1989). The political party of the incumbent
President tends to win in the election if the economy is improving, while the incumbent
party lost in the presidential election when the economy was declining (Erikson 1989;
Welch and Hibbing 1992). For example, Welch and Hibbing (1992) explain that the
increase of consumer prices and the decline of real income caused Jimmy Carter to lose
in the 1980 Presidential election, while the low inflation and low unemployment helped
Ronald Reagan and George Bush to win the 1984 and 1988 Presidential elections
respectively. However, they also explain that the effects of economic condition are
different on congressional elections because election results of the House and the Senate
tend to show inconsistent relationships with economic conditions in the 1980s (Welch
and Hibbing 1992). The representative scholars in retrospective economic voting theory
are V.O. Key (1966) and Gerald H. Kramer (1971). They suggest that voters tend to
punish or reward the incumbent party based on the past economic performance (Nadeau
and Lewis-Beck 2001). They assume that voters do not have enough information about
candidates and their policies and that they tend to vote based on the economic
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performance of the incumbent party while they do not have information about the
competing party (Fair 1978)
On the other hand, prospective economic voting theory proposes that voters are
rational and well-informed (Fair 1978) even though there are some variations in the
amount of voters’ ability to get information. Stigler (1973) argues that voters are
concerned with prospective policy rather than retrospective economic evaluation (Stigler
1973). Downs (1957) explains that retrospective evaluation also needs to be considered
because future expectations are influenced by the past experience. Prospective voting
theory seems to be similar to “classical democratic theory” because it assumes that
rational voters have enough information (Marini 1969; Fair 1978). It assumes that voters
understand policies of both incumbent and non-incumbent parties and expect the results
of the policies. Based on the information, rational voters seek maximized utility by
selecting parties for their own economic interests (Fair 1978). However, Downs (1957)
explains that voters do not have enough information about the policies of parties, so
voters depend on a party’s ideology. Based on the difference of two theories, Nadeau and
Lewis-Beck (2001) contend that Key’s retrospective voting theory explains incumbent
elections better than the prospective voting theory while Downs’ prospective voting
theory explains non-incumbent elections better than the retrospective economic voting
theory.
The Michigan School includes both economic voting explanations. This School
identifies four important factors in voting behavior research: “partisan affiliation,”
“evaluations of national economic conditions,” “the candidates’ stances on salient
issues,” and “candidate likeability” (Campbell et al. 1960; Oliver and Ha 2007). Thus,
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these factors have been used as important variables in much national-level voting
research and were regarded as more important factors than social group membership.
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) suggest that subjective economic measure, such as
retrospective evaluation and prospective economic assessment became more important
because objective economic measures based on macroeconomic factors, such as
unemployment rate, inflation, income, and economic growth does not indicate solid
relationships with voting behaviors.
As I explain above, economic voting became important in the early 20th century
and economic voting theory began to develop after World War II and became a more
important theory in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Anderson 2007). Regarding objective
and subjective economic measures, subjective economic measures are more influential
than are objective measures in vote choice (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).
Specifically, subjective measures suggested by retrospective and prospective economic
voting theories seemed to become more influential than social group membership after
the 1960s (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Thus, I will
examine the idea that voters’ perceptions about economic performance reduce the
influence of social cleavage on vote choice.
Cultural Factors and Voting
Cultural factors are considered in order to explain the decline of social cleavage
since the 1960s. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) explain that political cleavage based on
cultural values (i.e., materialism vs. postmaterialism) is a more important mechanism
than political cleavage based on social groups. In industrialized societies, the highly
educated younger generation tends to have more interest in post-material issues such as
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environmentalism and human rights whereas the older generation continues to stick to
traditional values based on their social group membership (Dalton 1996). After the Civil
Rights movement, the general public in the United States showed a more liberal attitude
toward abortion, gender equality, and LGBT rights (Brooks 2000). Hayes, McAllister,
and Studlar (2000) also explain that those who support postmaterialism tend to have a
more favorable attitude toward feminism. These differences in values caused a reactive
movement of religious conservatives in the 1970s (e.g., anti-environmentalism, antiabortion, anti-feminism, and anti-gay rights movements). Religious conservatives tried to
mobilize resources to prevent society from becoming liberalized. These attitudes toward
civil rights of the general public influenced national elections (Brooks 2000). Because
these trends are related to the influence of issue voting patterns in the United States, I will
provide some historical background for the cultural movements of abortion, feminism,
and LGBT rights and explain how these attitudes influenced voting behavior.
Cultural Conflict and Reactive Movement
Reactive movements against liberalization of cultural issues such as abortion,
feminism, and LGBT rights were initiated by conservative Christians in the 1970s.
Because they have a distinctive worldview based on Christian beliefs that differs from the
liberalized worldview, their reactive movement caused cultural conflict as they began to
mobilize in order to prevent secularization of their society through political campaigns.
Cultural conflict within the American electorate has been described as a “culture war”
(Hunter 1991). While many sociologists argue that attitudes toward moral issues are
determined by social factors, such as class and gender, other scholars, arguing the culture
wars thesis, suggest that moral attitude toward social issues, such as abortion and gays
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and lesbians, is mostly influenced by worldview which is explained as “notions of moral
authority,” or “understanding of reality” (Evans 1997). Some scholars believe that
religious conflicts occur because of social factors, such as ethno-religious group
membership: Protestant, Catholic, and Jew (Liebman et al. 1988). However, other
scholars argue that religious worldview is a more important factor in religious conflict
over moral values, regardless of denominational membership (Wuthnow 1989b; Layman
1997; 2001). According to the culture wars thesis, the religious ideologies of
conservatism and liberalism are more important classification frames than are
denominations.
Two different worldviews have different perspectives on cultural issues. First of
all, the literalism of the Bible is one of the important issues in the culture war debate.
Religious conservatives advocate a literal interpretation of the Bible, while liberals
suggest a flexible interpretation. The disagreement arises because conservatives believe
in the transcendental authority of the Bible, while liberals do not (Smith 2002; Layman
2001). However, even though the transcendental authority of the Bible is important in the
culture wars debate, the culture wars thesis has not been used for a political campaign.
On the other hand, abortion, gays and lesbians, women’s rights, and school prayer are
frequently issues in political campaigns. In particular, conservative parties have used
these cultural issues to mobilize conservative Christian voters (Williams 2010).
Abortion is one of the most important issues in the culture war debate (Evans
2002). Even though it is known that conservatives tend to support the pro-life position
and liberals support the pro-choice position, conservative Protestants showed ambivalent
attitude toward abortion in the 1960s and early 1970s (Williams 2010). Bendroth
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(1999:48) explains “Before the late 1970s, few evangelicals worried about abortion,
perceiving it primarily as a ‘Catholic issue.’” Williams (2010:115) also explains
“Southern Baptists were more tolerant of abortion than northern evangelicals were, partly
because they were suspicious of a Catholic cause and partly because abortion law did not
become a political issue in the South until several years after it had begun polarizing
northern state legislatures.” Abortion became a “national political issue” since the
Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Williams 2010:129; Phillips
2006; Kaplan 2004). However, even though Roe v. Wade was “the catalyst” for the prolife movement, many conservative Protestants were not actively engaged in a pro-life
movement in the early 1970s because they thought it “as highly controversial and
predominantly Catholic” (Ramet 2005:432; Williams 2010:155). Williams (2010:154)
explains “Francis Schaeffer was largely responsible for mobilizing evangelicals against
abortion during the Carter presidency.” Schaeffer urged Christians to resist against
secular humanism, such as pro-choice movement, by publishing books and making
documentary film, How Should We Then Live? (Williams 2010:140). Due to the efforts of
Schaeffer, the leaders of Religious Right, such as Jerry Falwell, began to “cooperate with
Catholics and to join the pro-life movement” (Williams 2010:156).
Prohibitions of Bible reading and school prayer in public schools constitute
another important issue that was used to mobilize conservative Christians during election
campaigns. For the issues of Bible reading and school prayer, three decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court are important. The first decision was in Engel v. Vitale (1962), which
forbade “recitation of state-composed prayer” in the school. The second decision was in
Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), which dealt with a law in Pennsylvania
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about reading 10 Bible verses at the beginning of the school day. The third decision was
in Murray v. Curlett (1963) which dealt with Bible reading and school prayer in the
Baltimore schools (Elifson and Hadaway 1985). In these cases, the Supreme Court
decided that school prayer and Bible reading in the public schools are unconstitutional
(Elifson and Hadaway 1985). Additionally, the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) is
regarded as an important decision because the Court made the “Lemon Test” to decide
whether or not religious activities such as school prayer or Bible reading violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment (Schwadel 2013).
Various Christians’ responses to these decisions were based on their
denominations and religious perspectives. Catholics criticized the decision about school
prayer. On the other hand, many conservative Protestants show an ambivalent attitude
toward the decision while some conservative Protestant groups supported the decision.
Even though conservative Christians felt that forbidding recitation of state-composed
prayer was a threat to their religious tradition, they thought that it would have little
consequence because it applied only to state-composed prayer. Conservative Protestants
had not used the state-composed prayer because the prayer was composed by an
ecumenical group of liberal Christians. Additionally, they thought that the Court’s
decision could be a way to counter the influence of Catholics. Thus, even though some
conservative Protestant groups, such as the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE),
tentatively supported the Supreme Court’s decision about school prayer, evangelical
magazines, such as Christianity Today and Moody Monthly, supported the decision of
Engel. Among fundamentalists, Carl McIntire supported the Supreme Court decision by
stating that the state-composed prayer was “a pagan prayer” (Williams 2010).
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However, the reaction of conservative Protestants toward the Court’s decision in
Abington v. Schempp (1963), which prohibited “devotional Bible reading” in public
school classrooms, was different from the reaction to the Court’s ruling in Engel v. Vitale
(1962) (Williams 2010). Evangelical Protestants felt that if Bible reading was forbidden
in public schools, it would accelerate the secularization process of American society
because reading verses from the King James Version of the Bible had been a symbol of
the influence of Protestantism in the American public educational system since the early
19th century (Williams 2010). Thus, evangelical Protestants opposed the Supreme Court’s
decision about Bible reading and changed their attitude toward the Supreme Court’s
decision about school prayer (Williams 2010).
Fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants had similar attitudes toward school
prayer and Bible reading. McIntire also changed his position began to ask political parties
to support a constitutional amendment for a return of school prayer and Bible reading.
Billy James Hargis took the same position on school prayer and Bible reading (Williams
2010). Hargis’s Christian Crusade and McIntire’s American Council of Christian
Churches disseminated messages in support of a constitutional amendment through radio
broadcasting, newspapers, and leaflets. Because public opinion seemed to be favoring a
constitutional amendment, the Republican Party decided to support a constitutional
amendment about school prayer and Bible reading in 1964. On the other hand,
evangelicals did not actively participate in this movement even though they opposed the
Supreme Court decisions.
While evangelicals and fundamentalist Protestants oppose the Supreme Court’s
decisions about school prayer and Bible reading, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC)
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took a different position. The SBC agreed with the Court’s decision on school prayer and
Bible reading. One of the reasons was that most leaders of the SBC were moderate
Baptists in the 1960s and 1970s (Ammerman 1990). What is more, because of the
persecution they suffered in early America, the SBC thought that the separation of church
and state was a more important principle than support of school prayer and Bible reading.
Additionally, the SBC still worried about the political influence of Catholics, perceiving
that the constitutional amendment movement would strengthen the political influence of
Catholics and non-Christians (Williams 2010). The position of the SBC on school prayer
and Bible reading persisted until the 1970s before more conservative pastors took over
the leadership of the SBC in the 1980s (Williams 2010).
Because of the opposition of the SBC to a constitutional amendment and the
ambivalent attitude of evangelical groups, the constitutional movement was not
successful in the 1960s despite the efforts of fundamentalist Protestants. Other
conservative Protestants also began to follow the position of the SBC on school prayer
and Bible reading in public schools because school prayer and Bible reading continued in
schools (McGuire 2009). Thus, there was division on the school prayer and Bible reading
issues among conservative Christians in the 1960s and 1970s (Williams 2010).
The attitude of conservative Christians on the school prayer issue changed in the
1980s. Conservative Christians began to feel that the influence of secular culture became
stronger and thought that the decision in Engel v. Vitale was a critical moment of
deterioration of American morality. Therefore, more conservative Christians believed
that a constitutional amendment movement for school prayer would be required. Gallup
Polls in the 1980s showed that over 80% of evangelicals supported a return to school
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prayer (Green and Guth 1989; Williams 2010; Woodrum and Hoban 1992).
Subsequently, many Christian Right movement leaders, such as Pat Robertson, a founder
of the Christian Coalition in 1989, Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority, Bill Bright of
Campus Crusade for Christ, and even SBC leaders joined the constitutional amendment
movement for school prayer in the public schools in the 1980s (Martin 1996; Williams
2010).
Gay and lesbian rights are another important culture war issue. Conservative
Protestants strongly oppose the gay rights movement, while liberal Protestants support it,
believing that a gay and lesbian relationship should be accepted under the love of God
(Brooke 1993; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006). For
example, Presbyterians for Lesbian and Gay Concerns (PLGC) began in 1974 to support
the gay rights movement (Anderson 1997). It was not until the 1960s that laws against
gays and lesbians became an important issue in American society. Before the 1960s, gays
tended to hide their sexual identity to avoid discrimination and harassment in the schools
or workplaces. However, gays began to raise their voice to protect their rights after the
fledgling movement ignited in the triumph in Greenwich Village in 1969. In New York’s
Greenwich Village, gay community members began to demonstrate for their rights when
police arrested gay patrons at the Stonewall Inn, known as a gay bar. They claimed that
the police raid at the Stonewall Inn occurred because of discrimination against gays.
Then, gays began to participate in gay rights parades. After that event, the National Gay
Task Force’s lobby for gay protection laws in 1973 resulted in the first introduction of a
gay rights bill in Congress, even though it failed (Williams 2010). However, some local
governments began to remove anti-sodomy laws, and professional and academic groups,
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such as the American Psychiatric Association, also began to change their attitude toward
gays by deciding to delete homosexuality from the mental disorder list in 1973 (Williams
2010).
Conservative Protestants responded when the political influence of the gay rights
movement expanded significantly. Many conservative Protestants signed petitions to
prevent the enactment of gay rights policies in local areas. The SBC decided to pass a
resolution against the gay rights movement in 1976. Conservative Protestants’ antigay
efforts influenced conservative Protestants to change their political preference because
the Democratic Party decided to support gay rights. The opposition of conservative
Protestants to the Democratic Party made the latter apart from the political opinion of
President Carter. Even though President Carter, personally, was a born-again Southern
Baptist Protestant, he followed the Party’s decision about gay rights (Williams 2010).
The character of the anti-gay rights movement is similar to that of the antifeminist
movement. The antifeminist movement began after the legal status of women advanced
dramatically. When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, American
companies could not discriminate against women in the employment process. In 1972,
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was passed in Congress and was supported by both
parties (Williams 2010). However, conservative Protestants opposed the ERA because
they believed that it undermined traditional moral values of family and femininity
(Jimenez 1999; Williams 2010). Conservative Protestants believe that the family is based
on traditional values about gender relations and gender roles. They believe that husbands
should have a leadership position in the family and wives should obey their husbands.
They believe that husbands should work for their living and wives should take care of
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children and other domestic responsibilities, such as cooking and cleaning because God
created men and women differently and gave different roles to men and women within
the family. Thus, many conservative Protestant women felt that the ERA was an assault
on their religious morality.
The opposition of conservative Protestant women to the ERA led to the anti-ERA
movement. After the ERA was passed in the U.S. Congress in 1972, it had to be ratified
by the 50 states, and 22 states ratified the ERA immediately (Soule and King 2006).
Many conservative Protestant women began to move to defend their conservative values.
In 1975, Phyllis Schlafly established the Eagle Forum to prevent the progress of the
ratification process and organized the anti-ERA movement, called “STOP ERA” (Martin
1996). When Schlafly began her efforts, 28 states had already ratified the ERA (Tedin,
Brady, Buxton, Gorman, and Thompson 1977). Most anti-ERA movements were related
to Schlafly’s movement until Beverly LaHaye began a new national level anti-ERA
organization in 1979. LaHaye mobilized many conservative women to influence the
political decision processes and organized Concerned Women for America (CWA)
(Martin 1996). The membership of CWA reached almost 500,000 in less than five years
of its initiation. Thus, the political influence of the anti-ERA movement grew
dramatically until later in the 1970s, and the ERA failed because only 35 states had
ratified it by 1979. The required number of states for ratification was 38. Consequently,
conservative Christian women seemed to be successful in defending their values from the
influence of feminism. Even though the time limit of ratification was extended three more
years, the ERA failed to be ratified (Williams 2010). As I explained above, conservative
Christians began to participate in political activity to prevent their society from
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liberalization. These movements influence of electoral politics since the 1970s. I will
review how these issues are related to voting behavior in the next section.
Gender and Voting
Cultural conflict occurs based on gender-related issues such as abortion,
feminism, and LGBT rights, and these issues are used to mobilize conservative
Christians. Many scholars have examined how these gender-related issues influence
voting behavior. While the Religious Right tried to mobilize conservative Christians to
protect their traditional values, feminists also tried to use the gender gap to persuade
political elites in both parties (Manza and Brooks 1999).
After the Republican Party failed to receive a majority vote from women in the
1980 Presidential election, gender cleavage became a distinctive topic in national
elections (Manza and Brooks 1999). Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) argue that voters’
ideological position is related to partisanship. Killian and Wilcox (2008) argue that voters
tend to change their political preference according to their position on gender-related
issues, such as abortion. Studies done in the 1980s argue that the influence of the issue of
abortion on national elections is minimal; however, many scholars began to find a
significant association between the abortion issue and elections in the 1990s. This is
consistent with the findings of Carmines and Woods (2002), who argued that the general
public was polarized on the issue of abortion in the 1990s.
Abortion gradually became an important issue in American politics since the
1970s. Adams (1997:718) used “the theory of issue evolution” to explain how abortion
issue influence political preference of partisans among major political parties. Since the
mid-1970s, there has been a difference of opinion on abortion among elite partisans, and
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since the mid-1980s, there has been a polarization of opinion on the abortion issue among
party activists (Carmines and Woods 2002). Carmines, Gerrity, and Wagner (2010)
examine the effort of interest groups in connecting political elites and general citizens.
They explain that the first groups which responded to the decision of Roe v. Wade and
made it into a political issue were interest groups. The abortion issue was perceived as a
personal issue, but interest groups made it a politically relevant issue by exposing the
abortion issue in the media (Carmines, Gerrity, and Wagner 2010). Adams (1997)
demonstrates that Congress members of both parties began to be polarized on the
abortion issue in the late 1970s and began to have consistent roll-call votes in the 1990s.
Carmines and Woods (2002) explain that the general public began to be polarized on the
abortion issue in the 1990s. Thus, the abortion issue has not appeared abruptly in a short
time as critical realignment theory suggests. Rather, it has evolved for a relatively longer
time, so the “issue evolution” thesis is proposed to explain abortion politics (Key 1955).
Attitudes toward LGBT rights have received less attention than abortion and
feminism in electoral studies. Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) argue that political
scientists paid little attention to the role of LGBT issues on politics until the mid-1990s
although national media dealt with LGBT rights quite frequently; however, LGBT rights
became part of the discourse during the 1992 and 1996 Presidential campaigns (Haeberle
1999). Additionally, many studies argue that the general public’s attitude toward LGBT
rights became liberalized in the 1990s (Keleher and Smith 2012; Baunach 2011; 2012;
Hicks and Lee 2006; Brewer 2003).Conservative Christians tend to support the
Republican Party because they believe Democrats support liberalization. Many scholars
argue that the Christian Right movement contributed to the victories of the Republican
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Party in the 1980s (Brooks and Manza 2004; Claassen and Povtak 2010). Wilcox (1994)
argues that the influence of the Christian Right movement was more influential in the
1990s. The Christian Right movement was closely related to the mobilization of
conservative Christians in Presidential elections (Williams 2010). Therefore, voters’
attitudes toward various cultural issues, such as abortion, gays and lesbians, and women’s
rights, might influence the voting behaviors of conservative Christians. Atheists’
reactions is another influence of the Christian Rights movement on presidential elections
(Hout and Fischer 2002). Thus, I will examine the influence of attitudes toward these
cultural issues on Presidential elections. Furthermore, I will also examine the influence of
attitudes toward cultural issues on voting behaviors in class, religion, and macro- and
micro-regional cleavage voting models.
As I explain above, the study will examine the decline of traditional social
cleavages, such as class, religion, and region, and the influence of attitudes on economic
and cultural issues between 1980 and 2008. Although many studies have examined the
decline of social cleavages up to the 1990s, few studies show that social cleavages are
still significant predictors in Presidential elections in the 2000s. Regarding short-term
factors, many scholars argue that short-term factors are more influential than are longterm factors. Thus, the study will analyze the association between social cleavage and
vote choice and the influence of short-term factors on the association between social
cleavage and vote choice between 1980 and 2008.I will ask: Did social cleavages in
Presidential elections decline or remain the same between 1980 and 2008? What is the
influence of short-term factors on Presidential elections and relative importance of
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economic and cultural issues? What is the influence of short-term factors on the
association between long-term factors and presidential elections?
Hypotheses
I will test whether the concept of social cleavage can explain individuals’ voting
behavior from 1980 to 2008. I focus on class cleavage, religious cleavage, and regional
cleavages because they are representative of traditional social cleavages. By comparing
the patterns of these types of cleavages, we can understand the overall pattern of social
cleavages in U.S. national elections. I also test whether short-term factors, such as
attitudes toward economic issues, influence the relationship between social cleavages and
voting behavior in Presidential elections. By adding the short-term factors, such as
evaluation of government’s performance in economic policies and expectations about a
candidate’s prospective economic policies, we can ascertain the relative importance of
long-term factors, such as social cleavages and short-term factors, such as attitudes
toward economic issues. In addition, I test whether attitudes toward cultural issues, such
as abortion, the gay rights movement and feminism2, influence the relationship between
social cleavage and voting behavior. Lastly, I test the pattern of regional cleavage in U.S.
Presidential voting since the 1980s and examine its relationship with class and religious
cleavages.
Hypothesis 1: trends of social cleavages since the 1980s
H1:

2

Social cleavages have decreased in Presidential elections since the 1980s.

‘Feminism’ and ‘gender equality are used interchangeably.
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H1-1: Class cleavage has decreased in Presidential elections since the 1980s.
H1-2: Religious cleavage has decreased in Presidential elections since the 1980s.
H1-3: Macrogeographical cleavage has decreased among the South, Mountain/Plains,
Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast regions in Presidential elections since the
1980s.
H1-4: Microgeographical cleavage has decreased among urban, suburban, and rural
areas in Presidential elections since the 1980s.
Hypothesis 2: influence of economic factors on the relationship between social
cleavage and Presidential voting
H2:

Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with
the magnitude of social cleavages since the 1980s.

H2-1: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with
the magnitude of class cleavage since the 1980s.
H2-2: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with
the magnitude of religious cleavage since the 1980s.
H2-3: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with
the magnitude of macrogeographical cleavage since the 1980s.
H2-4: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with
the magnitude of microgeographical cleavage since the 1980s.
Hypothesis 3: influence of cultural factors on the relationship between social
cleavage and Presidential voting
H3:

As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of social cleavages has increased.

H3-1: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of class cleavage has increased.
H3-2: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of religious cleavage has increased.
H3-3: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of macrogeographical cleavage has
increased.
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H3-4: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of microgeographical cleavage has
increased.
Hypothesis 4: influence of cultural factors on the relationship between social
cleavage and Presidential voting
H4:

The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the
social cleavage voting models since the 1980s.

H4-1: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the
class cleavage voting models since the 1980s.
H4-2: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the
religious cleavage voting models since the 1980s.
H4-3: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the
macro-regional cleavage voting models since the 1980s.
H4-4: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the
micro-regional cleavage voting models since the 1980s.
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METHODOLOGY

Data
I use the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (The American National
Election Studies 2010) for this analysis. Since the American National Election Studies
(ANES) data have been available, most electoral research has concentrated on national
level elections including Presidential and Congressional elections (Oliver and Ha 2007).
From the data file, I selected data on Presidential election years between 1980 and 2008
because voting trends of Presidential elections and Congressional elections are different.
In the Presidential elections, voters pay attention to national issues. On the other hand,
voters tend to pay attention to local issues in the congressional elections (Biggers 2011;
Burden and Wichowsky 2010). In Congressional elections, party loyalty is the most
important factor in voting even though individual candidates try to show their
independence from their party leadership (Stokes and Miller 1962; Kramer 1971). Many
voters have no information about candidates and their policies in Congressional elections
(Stokes and Miller 1962) or less information than in Presidential elections (Burden and
Wichowsky 2010). Burden and Wichowsky (2010) also explain that Congressional
elections are different from Presidential elections because the number of constituencies is
smaller in Congressional elections, and because congressional elections are more
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frequent, less competitive, and less salient than Presidential elections. Thus, I analyzed
Presidential elections only.
Statistical Model and Analysis Method
The main goals of this study are to show the pattern of class cleavage, religious
cleavage, and regional cleavage in Presidential elections; and to analyze the effect of
economic factors and cultural factors on voting behaviors of social groups in Presidential
elections. First, I use binomial logistic regression models to examine the relationship
between social group and Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008. Second, I examine
the effects of economic and cultural variables on Presidential voting. Third, I use the fit
statistics of the logistic regression models to assess the effects of economic factors and
cultural factors on Presidential voting. I also use standardized logistic regression
coefficients of the economic and cultural variables to compare the relative size of the
effects of the variables on Presidential voting. Fourth, I calculate the Kappa Index,
introduced by Manza and Brooks (1999), to estimate the magnitude of the cleavages of
social groups in Presidential elections. Fifth, I examine the influence of economic and
cultural factors on social cleavages between 1980 and 2008.
The Kappa Index is the standard deviation of social groups’ log odds ratios, so it
measures the degree of cleavage among social groups defined in terms of class, religion,
and region. It indicates the magnitude of the differences of social groups’ voting patterns
in elections. While the Kappa Index was created to measure the magnitude of social class
cleavage, it can also measure social cleavage based on religion, gender, and race (Manza
and Brooks 1998; 1999).
87

The Alford Index is a commonly used measure of the magnitude of class voting
differences (Alford 1963). It measures the difference between the percentage of voters
supporting Left wing parties among manual occupations and the percentage of voters
supporting Left wing parties among non-manual workers (Alford 1963; Hout, Brooks,
and Manza 1995). Korpi (1972) developed the following table to help researchers
understand how the Alford Index is calculated (Table 1). His formula of the Alford Index
is “Class Voting = a/(a+b)-c/(c+d).”
Table 3.1

The Alford Index Calculation

Class

Party

Total

Left

Right

Manual workers

a

b

a+b

Non-manual

c

d

c+d

a+c

b+d

N

workers
Total
Note: Korpi 1972
The Alford Index is an absolute measure of class voting. Although it has been
widely used, it has several disadvantages. One is that absolute measurements are unduly
influenced by the size of social groups or political parties (Evans 2000; Lachat 2007).
The Alford Index is also sensitive to changes in the popularity of political parties during
election years (Heath et al. 1985; Hout et al. 1993). Thus, the Alford Index cannot
differentiate behavioral changes from structural changes in voting patterns (Lachat 2007).
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Relative class voting measurement has been used to overcome the disadvantages
of absolute class voting measurement. Some scholars use odds ratios or log odds ratios
(Heath et al. 1985). Nieuwbeerta (1996) notes that the methodology of relative class
voting measurement is borrowed from the methodology of mobility research. Heath et al.
(1985) were the first scholars to examine the relative class voting index using log-odds.
Weakliem and Heath (1999) and Evans, Heath, and Payne (1991) also used log-odds to
analyze class voting trends in Britain (Nieuwbeerta 1996). Nieuwbeerta (1996:352)
explains that scholars who use “log-odds-ratios” tried to show linear patterns in these
ratios when they examined the strength of the relationship between class and voting.
Relative class voting measurement is “margin-free,” so it is unaffected by changes of the
size of social groups or political parties (Brooks and Manza 1997b:940). Gijsberts and
Nieuwbeerta (2000:411) suggest that “Scores for this index measure the magnitude of the
class effects for a given election in deviations from the mean. When the voting behavior
of classes diverges, the standard deviation of the group-specific coefficients will increase.
Conversely, when the voting behavior of classes converges, the index score will approach
zero” when they explain the class Kappa Index. Lachat (2007) emphasizes that relative
class voting measurement can assess only the behavioral change of voters in elections.
Brooks and Manza (1997a; b) use relative class voting measurement for more
than two social groups. They argue that measuring the vote difference among more than
two social groups is made possible by log-linear models. Thus, they use 7-category class
variables and 7-category religious denomination variables to measure class cleavage and
religious cleavage. While some scholars use separate models for each election year to
measure social cleavage, Brooks and Manza (1997a) use one model for the period by
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analyzing pooled data. For this model, they include a time dummy variable and a variable
for the interaction between social group and election year. By using this method, they
calculate overall social cleavage over time and group-specific trends for vote choice.
Following the tradition of social cleavage analysis, I use multivariate logistic
regressions to examine the relationship between social groups and Presidential voting.
Second, using the same method, I also analyze the effects of various factors, such as
economic and cultural factors, on Presidential voting. Third, I examine the relative
strength of economic and cultural variables by using partially standardized coefficients.
Fourth, I calculate the Kappa Index and demonstrate the influence of economic and
cultural variables on this index.
To analyze the effect of economic factors (attitudes toward economic issues) and
cultural factors (attitudes toward cultural issues) on voting, I use fit statistics. Following
Brooks (2002), I use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and log-likelihood values
to examine the fit of the statistical models to the data. As Brooks (2002) suggested, an
effect of explanatory factors is revealed by an improvement of the BIC or log-likelihood
index over the null model, so I examine the fit statistic index to ascertain the effect that
economic and cultural factors have on voting in Presidential elections. Menard (2002)
states:
In linear regression, we use the F statistic and R2 to test statistical significance and
substantive significance, respectively, of the relationship between the dependent
variable and the independent variables. Both are based on the total and error sums
of squares, SST and SSE. In logistic regression, if our principal concern is how
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well the model fits the data (for example, in the context of theory testing), we use
GM and R2L , based on -2LL, to test for statistical and substantive significance. (p.41)
The BIC and -2 log-likelihood values are useful to compare the fitness of the
models. However, the BIC can be used to compare non-nested models, while the -2 loglikelihood statistics are available only in nested models (Burnham and Anderson 2004).
The Bayesian approach has been used for model selection in sociology since 1986 and
avoids some problems inherent in p-value tests (Raftery 1995; 2001). The p-values test is
limited because it considers only two models: H1 (alternative model) and H0 (null model).
Many scholars include all the possible variables in their models and remove unnecessary
variables by using the t-statistic of each parameter or a stepwise method until the adjusted
R-squared values are maximized. But these methods do not consider unidentified
relationships among the independent variables and random relationships among
independent variables. On the contrary, Raftery (1995:156) explains that “Bayesian
model averaging enables one to take into account model uncertainty and to avoid the
difficulties with standard model selection procedures.” He argues that BIC is a better
method to choose the best model. Thus, I used both the BIC and the -2 log-likelihood
values.
BIC and log-likelihood can be used to examine whether predictors have statistical
effects on a dependent variable, while it is hard to know the relative strength of the
effects of independent variables. To compare the relative size influence of independent
variables, scholars have developed a way to calculate standardized coefficients in logistic
regression models (Menard 2011, Kaufman 1996, Long 1997). Kaufman (1996) suggests
that these standardized coefficients “can be used to determine the relative size of the
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effects of different independent variables and to make judgments about the absolute
strength of the relationship” (Kaufman 1996:90). Although there is no agreement about
the best way to calculate standardized logistic coefficients, many scholars use the spost9
user package of STATA, developed by Long and Freese (Long and Freese 2006; Long
1997; Kaufman 1996; Menard 2011). Long and Freese (2006) explain how to calculate
fully-standardized and semi-standardized logistic coefficients. Fully-standardized
coefficients standardize both independent and dependent variables, while partially
standardized coefficients standardize either the independent or dependent variable.
However, Kaufman (1996) suggests that it is hard to interpret the standardized
coefficients of dummy variables even though these coefficients can be compared to the
standardized coefficients of other variables. Kaufman (1996:108) also suggests that
“standardized coefficients cannot be used for a polychotomous nominal predictor because
changing the reference (or excluded) category changes the coefficients for all the dummy
variables without changing the nature of their relationship to the outcome variable”
(Kaufman 1996:108). Thus, I use x-standardized logistic coefficients to compare the
relative size of influence of economic and cultural variables.
Finally, I coded election years as dummy variables to solve the temporal
dependence issue in binary time-series-cross-section data (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck,
Katz, and Tucker 1998). Even though there are some arguments about using dummy
variables for election years to avoid the temporal dependence issue, using time dummy
variables is a simpler way to solve the temporal dependence issue (Beck 2008; De Boef
and Keele 2008; Carter and Signorino 2010).
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The binary logistic regression equation for the social cleavages voting models
with Time-Series Cross-Section data are as follows:

(3.1)

where DEMOCRATICVOTE i is “the logit transformation of the expected probability”
that person i (i=1,...N) votes for the Democratic Party; ELECTIONYEARs (1=1984,…N1=2008) are the dummy variables for the Presidential election years; SOCIALGROUPs
(1 to N-1: varies according to the number of groups of class, religion, macro-region, and
micro-region) is the dummy variables for social groups; FEMALE is a gender dummy
variable; EDUCATIONYEAR is years of education; AGE is the age of respondents;
FAMILYINCOME is the income categories based on percentiles of family income
distribution; and WHITE, BLACK, and HISPANIC are dummy variables for race. For
the analysis of the influence of attitudes toward economic and cultural issues, I will add
the variables of attitudes toward economic issues (RETROEVALUATION and
PROSEVALUATION) and attitudes toward cultural issues (ABORTION,
GAYLESBIAN, and GENDEREQUALITY) to the social cleavage voting models:
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(3.2)

I will use this model to test Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested
together in the same models. Hypotheses 4 will also be tested by using the same models. I
will use x-standardized logistic coefficients to test the relative strength of the variables.
The formula of x-standardized logistic coefficients is as follows.
X-Standardized Coefficient = Logistic Coefficient of X* Standard Deviation of X

(3.3)

Kappa Index can be calculated based on either logistic coefficients or
probabilities. For this project, I will use binomial logistic regression coefficients. I will
calculate the Kappa index of each election year using the formula of the Kappa Index as
follows:
∑(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 )2

Kappa Index = √

𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠

(3.4)

where the Kappa Index is the standard deviation of logistic coefficients of social groups
in each Presidential election. The Kappa Index will be calculated for both social cleavage
models, which are social cleavage models without control variables and social cleavage
models with control variables.
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Dependent Variables and Independent Variables
The dependent variable is “vote choice” (Republican = 0, Democrat = 1) in the
national Presidential election for a large part of the analysis. Erikson, Lancaster, and
Romero (1989) used vote choice in general elections rather than party identification
because vote choice determines the election outcome, not party identification. For
example, the Republican Party won most of Presidential elections between 1968 and
1988 even though most voters belonged to the Democratic Party. Vote choice is different
from party identification, especially among white southerners, between 1968 and 1988.
Party identification has stable characteristics, so it changes slowly. Accordingly, the
pattern of vote choice changes first and party identification tends to follow. Lastly, vote
choice is more likely to be influenced by short-term factors than is party identification
(Erikson, Lancaster, and Romero 1989; Manza and Brooks 1999). For these reasons, vote
choice is the dependent variable.
Researchers traditionally use the binomial class classification of middle class and
working class in terms of occupation or income (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Even
though both neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians have developed a class definition, neoMarxist class classifications have not been used in voting studies, while neo-Weberian
class classifications have been used extensively (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992;
Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992; Goldthorpe 2001; Wright 1985; 1996; 2005). However,
both schools regard “source of income” as more important than “amount of income”
(Brooks and Brady 1999). Even though some scholars prefer income to occupation for
the class definition, a measure of income does not differentiate among various
occupational groups at the same income levels. The literature suggests that people are
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more similar in terms of social class when they have the same occupation (Brooks and
Brady 1999; Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995; Brooks and Manza 1997a). Thus, I use the
occupation-based class classification.
Manza and Brooks (1999) also explain that the binary classification of white
collar and blue collar can exclude some people who are middle class or in service
industry occupations. Additionally, this classification has not reflected the change of the
class structure of the U.S. since World War II (Manza and Brooks 1999). Therefore,
Manza and Brooks (1999) used the class classification based on occupational position
and employment condition. They used relational occupation groups to measure class
because they think that such groups reflect different life chances and class interests in the
present society. Specifically, they use the seven-category class classification frame:
“professionals,” “managers and administrators,” “owners, proprietors, and other nonprofessional self-employed persons,” “routine white-collar workers,” “skilled workers
and foremen,” “non-skilled workers,” and “non-full-time labor-force participants”
(Manza and Brooks 1999). I use the same class classification for my analysis. My
categories include “professionals,” “managers,” “routine white-collar,” “proprietors,”
“skilled worker,” “unskilled/semi-skilled worker,” and “not-in-the-labor force.”
Homemakers and all others are classified as not-in-the-labor-force. I use “not-in-the-labor
force” variable as a reference variable.
For selection of the reference group, Hardy (1993) provides three guidelines, even
though arbitrary choice is allowed in many cases. First, the reference group has to be
defined distinctively. For example, “other” group is not an appropriate reference group
because “it is unclear exactly what the composition of the ‘other’ group is” (Hardy
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1993:10). Second, “when there is an underlying ordinality to the qualitative categories (as
in this case of occupation), some researchers choose as the reference group a category at
the upper or lower boundary, whereas others prefer to designate a category that is roughly
midrange” (Hardy 1993:10). Third, the reference group should have a sufficient number
of cases for reasonable estimation. I follow these guidelines when I selected reference
categories for the social group variables.
There are various ways to classify religious groups. Some investigators use the
“fundamentalist-liberal continuum” or simple categories like “fundamentalist vs. nonfundamentalist,” while others use complex categories like “fundamentalists,
conservatives, moderate, liberal, and excluded” (Smith 1990). However, these
classifications do not capture the religious diversity of American society today. To
overcome the weakness of previous religious classification, Steensland, Park, Regnerus,
Robinson, Wilcox, and Woodberry (2000) developed a seven-category religion
classification system: Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Black Protestant,
Catholic, Jewish, Other religion, and Nonreligious. This classification was based on the
General Social Survey (GSS). Steensland et al. (2000) argue that many respondents
dislike classifying themselves as fundamentalists because the term has a negative
connotation, so fundamentalists are not classified as a separate category in their
classification. Their classification is created based on respondents’ religious group
affiliation rather than religious ideology (Hackett and Lindsay 2008). Thus, it is an
appropriate measurement of the religious group membership of respondents. Brooks and
Manza (2004) used this religious classification for their analysis of the National Election
Survey (NES). Claassen and Povtak (2010) developed a classification table to transform
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the GSS-based religious classification of Steensland et al. (2000) into NES-based religion
classification variables. Thus, I use the seven-category religious classification variables
developed by Steensland et al. (2000).
With regard to regional variables, I examine several different regional
classifications. The first classification is a five-category classification for macro-region.
McKee and Teigen (2009:487) used a “five-region division” rather than a “simple
North/South dichotomy,” following the example of Black and Black (2007). The five
sections are: “(1) the South, (2) the Mountains/Plains, (3) the Midwest, (4) the Pacific
Coast, and (5) the Northeast.” The South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia;
the Mountains/plains includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming; the
Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; the Pacific Coast includes California, Oregon, and
Washington; and the Northeast includes Connecticut, Delaware, Washing, D.C., Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted (McKee and Teigen 2009: 487). I
used this classification scheme to make five section dummy variables.
To operationally define cities, suburbs, and rural areas, the NES provides an
“urbanism” variable (VCF0111: 1-central cities, 2-suburban areas, 3-rural, small towns,
outlying and adjacent areas). The urbanism variable is available up to 2000, so I will use
it to analyze the voting pattern between 1980 and 2000.
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For a detailed analysis of suburban areas, Lang et al. (2008) provide a more
specific suburban classification. They classify suburbs into “core,” “inner suburb,”
“mature suburb,” “emerging suburb,” and “exurb” based on commuting patterns within
urban areas, land use, and population growth. They explain that Core counties contain “at
least 1,000 housing units per square mile in 2000.” In Core counties, more than half of
workers commute to central cities. Inner Suburbs include more undeveloped land, but
more than half of the workers of Inner Suburbs commute to the city center, which is
located in the central business district in the city, and to the most densely populated areas
during the day (Glaeser and Kahn 2001; 2003). More than 90% of residents reside in
urbanized environments. Mature Suburbs are counties in which more than 75% of
residents live in urbanized environments and have a population growth rate that is less
than one and a half times that of the national average between 2000 and 2006. Emerging
Suburbs are counties in which more than 25% of residents reside in urbanized
environments and more than 5% of residents commute to central cities. Exurban counties
include less than 25% of residents who reside in urbanized areas and less than 5 percent
of workers commute to major urban areas (Lang et al. 2008). I transformed the “FIPS
STATE-COUNTY” variables into various suburban variables by using Lang et al.’s
(2008) classification tables based on counties. However, the ANES Time Series
Cumulative Data File does not include the “FIPS STATE-COUNTY” variable, so I used
individual time series data to find “FIPS STATE-COUNTY” variables. These variables
are available up to 1996. Consequently, I can perform a detailed analysis of residential
areas between 1980 and 1996.
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An alternative classification system for suburbs is based on the “Belt code”
variable. The belt code was developed by the Survey Research Center (SRC) for the
General Social Survey (GSS) to classify the rings of metropolitan areas based on a
place’s size and type. Its definition has changed over time, but assuming it is stable I use
the classification of GSS cumulative data for the belt code. I recoded the data into 6
dummy variables: Belt 1 (“central city of 12 largest SMSAs”), Belt 2 (“central city of
remainder of the 100 largest SMSAs”), Belt 3 (“suburbs of the 12 largest SMSAs”), Belt
4 (“suburbs of the remaining 100 largest SMSAs”), Belt 5 (“other urban”), and Belt 6
(“other rural”) (National Opinion Research Center 2009). The belt codes are available in
the individual time-series data between 1980 and 2000.
I use income, race, gender, education, and age as control variables. Income
categories are based on percentiles of the income distribution: 1=0 to 16 percentile, 2=17
to 33 percentile, 3=34 to 67 percentile, 4=68 to 95 percentile, and 5=96 to 100 percentile.
I transformed the 6-category race variable (VCF 0106a) into a race dummy variable. The
original categories are: whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, native-Americans, and others. I
coded these categories into four categories: whites, blacks, Hispanics, and others. I
transformed the gender variable (VCF0104) into a dummy variable. If respondents are
female, I recoded them as 1, if respondents are male I recoded them as 0. I use the 7category education variable (VCF 0140a) as an ordinal categorical variable based on
years of education: “8 years or less” equals to 8, “9-12 years with no diploma” equals to
11.5, “12 years with diploma” equals to 12, “some college with no degree” equals to 13,
“BA level degree” equals to 16, “Advanced degree” equals to 18. The age variable is
used as originally coded.
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I use subjective economic assessments for economic factors, such as the
evaluation of the overall economy and expectations about the future economic situation.
To measure the individual’s economic evaluations, I used the item, “R (respondent)
Opinion: Better or Worse Economy in Past Year” (VCF 0870) as the measure of
retrospective economic evaluation (better=1, stayed same=3, and worse=5). To measure
the individual’s economic outlook, I used the item, “R Opinion: Better or Worse
Economy in Next Year” (VCF 0872) as the measure of prospective economic expectation
(get better=1, stay about the same=3, and get worse=5).
I also use subjective measures for cultural factors, such as attitudes toward
abortion, gay rights, and gender equality. The abortion attitude variable is based on the
item, “R Opinion: By Law, When Should Abortion Be Allowed” (VCF 0838): 1=By law,
abortion should never be permitted, 2=The law should permit abortion only in the case of
rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger, 3=The law should permit abortion for
reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for
the abortion has been clearly established, and 4= By law, a woman should always be able
to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. Attitude toward gay rights is
measured by the thermometer scale, ranging from 0 (least favorable) to 100 (most
favorable), for gays and lesbians (VCF0232). To measure attitudes toward gender
equality, I used the item, “R Placement: Women Equal Role Scale” (VCF 0834), which
ranges from 1= “Women and men should have an equal role” to 7= “Women’s place is in
the home.”
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables. Even though I planned
to examine the time between 1980 and 2008, some variables are not available for specific
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years. For example, class is not available for 2008. Micro-regional variables for urbanism
and the Beltcode classifications are not available for 2004 and 2008, and Lang et al.’s
(2008) classification is not available for 2000, 2004, and 2008. The variable for attitudes
toward gays and lesbians is not available for 1980.
Additionally, the number of cases varies in the analyses of class, religion, and
macro/micro regions because of missing values. The number of missing values differs for
class, religion, and macro/micro regions. However, the same set of independent and
control variables is used for the analyses. Thus, the analyses of class, religion, and
macro/micro regions are based on different sample sizes.
Table 3.2

Descriptive Statistics

Variables
Dependent Republican voting (reference)
variable
Democratic voting
Subtotal (Presidential voting)
Class
Professional
Managers
Routine White-Collar
Proprietors
Skilled Workers
Un/Semi-Skilled Workers
Not in the labor force (reference)
Subtotal (class)
Religion Mainline Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Black Protestant
Other religions
Catholics (reference)
Jewish group
No religion
Subtotal
5-Category South
MacroMountain
Region
Midwest
Pacific Coast (reference)
North East
Subtotal (macro-region)

N

Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

4,381

0.00

1.00

.47

.50

4,928
9,309
2,072
984
1,635
827
801
898
5,801
13,018
3,687
3,656
1,368
531
3,777
313
1,939
15,271
5,137
1,400
3,734
2,212
2,963
15,446

0.00

1.00

.53

.50

1980-2008

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

.16
.08
.13
.06
.06
.07
.45

.37
.26
.33
.24
.24
.25
.50

1980-2004
1980-2004
1980-2004
1980-2004
1980-2004
1980-2004
1980-2004

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

.24
.24
.09
.03
.25
.02
.13

.43
.43
.29
.18
.43
.14
.33

1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

.33
.09
.24
.14
.19

.47
.29
.43
.35
.39

1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008

102

Years
1980-2008

Table 3.2 (continued)
3-Category Central cities (reference)
MicroSuburbs
Region
Rural
Subtotal (3-category micro-region)
5-Category Core (reference)
MicroInner suburb
Region
Mature suburb
Emerging suburb
Exurb
Subtotal (5-category micro-region)
6Belt 1 (central city of 12 largest
Category SMSAs, reference)
MicroBelt 2 (central city of remainder of
Region
the 100 largest SMSAs)
Belt 3 (suburbs of the 12 largest
SMSAs)
Belt 4 (suburbs of the remaining 100
largest SMSAs)
Belt 5 (other urban)
Belt 6 (other rural)
Subtotal (beltcode)
Economic Retrospective evaluation
variables Prospective expectation
Cultural Abortion attitudes
variables Gender equality attitudes
Gays and Lesbians attitudes
Control
Male (reference)
Variables Female
Subtotal (gender)
Education
Age
Family income
White
Black
Hispanic
Others (reference)
Subtotal (race)
Total

2,845
4,565
3,706
11,116
892
952
1,324
452
299
3,919

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00

.26
.41
.33

.44
.49
.47

1980-2000
1980-2000
1980-2000

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

.23
.24
.34
.12
.08

.42
.43
.47
.32
.27

1980-1996
1980-1996
1980-1996
1980-1996
1980-1996

895 0.00 1.00

0.09

0.29

1980-2000

1,605 0.00 1.00

0.16

0.37

1980-2000

1,666 0.00 1.00

0.17

0.37

1980-2000

2,471 0.00 1.00

0.25

0.43

1980-2000

0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00

0.27
0.07

0.44
0.25

1980-2000
1980-2000

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

5.00
5.00
4.00
7.00
97.00
1.00
1.00

3.56
2.85
2.85
5.61
39.64
0.44
0.56

1.57
1.39
1.09
1.75
27.96
0.50
0.50

1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1984-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008

8.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

18.00
99.00
5.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

12.98
45.82
2.84
0.73
0.15
0.08
0.04

2.37
17.90
1.14
0.44
0.35
0.27
0.21

1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008
1980-2008

2,671
682
9,990
15,141
13,439
13,635
12,501
11,687
6,837
8,614
15,451
15,307
15,451
13,845
11,177
2,238
1,239
682
15,336
15,451

The number of respondents is 9,309 between 1980 and 2008. Among them, 4,381
(47%) stated they voted for the Republican Presidential candidate, while 4,928 (53%)
stated they voted for the Democratic candidate. The number of respondents who voted for
the Democratic Party was larger than those who voted for the Republican Party between
1980 and 2008.
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With regard to the class variables, the total number of respondents is 13,018
between 1980 and 2004. The number in each occupational class is as follows:
professional (2,072, 16%), manager (984, 8%), routine white-collar (1,635, 13%),
proprietor (827, 6%), skilled worker (801, 6%), un-/semi-skilled worker (898, 7%), and
not-in-the-labor force (5,801, 45%).
Regarding the religious groups, the total number of respondent is 15,271 between
1980 and 2008. The number in each religious group is as follows: mainline Protestant
(3,687, 24%), evangelical Protestant (3,656, 24%), black Protestant (1,368, 9%), other
religion (531, 3%), Catholic (3,777, 25%), Jewish group (313, 2%), and no religion
(1,939, 13%).
With regard to the 5-category macro-region variables (South, Mountains/Plains,
Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast), the total number of respondents is 15,446
between 1980 and 2008. The number of respondents in the South is 5,137 (33%), the
number in the Mountain region is 1,400 (9%), the number in the Midwest is 3,734 (24%),
the number in the Pacific Coast region is 2,212 (14%), and the number in the Northeast is
2,963 (19%).
Regarding the 3-category micro-region variable (central cities, suburbs, and rural
areas), the total number of respondents is 11,116 between 1980 and 2000. The
information for the micro-region variable was provided until 2000, after which point no
further data are available due to privacy issues. The number of respondents who reported
residence in central cities is 2,845 (26%). The number in the suburbs is 4,565 (41%), and
the number in rural areas is 3,706 (33%).
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With regard to the 5-category micro-region variable (Core, Inner suburb, Mature
suburb, Emerging suburb, and Exurb), the total number of respondents is 3,919 between
1980 and 1996. The number of core area residents is 892 (23%), the number in inner
suburbs is 952 (24%), the number in mature suburbs is 1,324 (34%), the number in
emerging suburbs is 452 (12%), and the number in exurbs is 299 (8%).
With regard to the 6-category micro-region variable (Belt 1: Central city, large
metropolitan area (MA), Belt 2: Central city, other MA, Belt 3: Suburb, large MA, Belt 4:
Suburb, other MA, Belt 5: Other urban area, and Belt 6: Other rural area), the total
number of respondents is 9,990 between 1980 and 2000. The number of respondents in
belt 1 was 895 (9%), the number in belt 2 is 1,605 (16%), the number in belt 3 is 1,666
(17%), the number in belt 4 is 2,471 (25%), the number in belt 5 is 2,671 (27%), and the
number in belt 6 is 682 (7%).
Regarding the economic variable, the total number who answered the question
about retrospective evaluation is 15,141. The mean is 3.56 and the standard deviation is
1.57. The number who answered the question about prospective expectation is 13,439.
The mean is 2.85 and the standard deviation is 1.39.
Regarding the cultural variable, the number who answered the question about
abortion is 13,635. The mean is 2.85 and the standard deviation is 1.09. The number who
answered the question about gender equality is 12,501. The mean is 5.61 and the standard
deviation is 1.75. The number who answered the question about gays and lesbians is
11,687. The mean is 39.64 and standard deviation is 27.96.
Regarding the control variables, the number of males is 6,837 (44%), and the
number of females is 8,614 (56%). The mean number years of education is 12.98 and the
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standard deviation is 2.37. The mean age is 45.82 and the standard deviation is 17.90.
The mean family income variable is 2.84 and the standard deviation is 1.14. The total
number of respondents who answered the question about race is 15,336. The number of
whites is 11,177 (73%), the number of blacks is 2,238 (15%), the number of Hispanics is
1,239 (8%), and the number who reported “other race” is 682 (4%).
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RESULTS

Trends of social cleavages since the 1980s (Hypothesis 1)
The magnitude of social cleavages for class, religion, macro-region, and microregion were analyzed with the Kappa Index, which is the standard deviation of social
groups’ log odds ratios. The Kappa Index was calculated from the results of binomial
logistic regression estimation for class, religion, macro-region, and micro-region because
the Index can be used for multinomial variables. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting (Democratic voting=1) in all models. Model 2 did not include control variables,
while Model 3 included control variables for gender, education, age, family income, and
race. The number of cases differs in the analyses of class, religion, and regions because of
differences in missing values.
First, the Kappa Index was calculated for each social cleavage by using the
logistic regression results based on the pooled data. Two Kappa Indexes were calculated
to examine the influence of the control variables on social cleavages; one was for the
model without control variables, and the other was for the model which included control
variables. The influence of control variables on the association between social groups and
Presidential voting was examined. Second, the Kappa Index of individual year variables
was calculated to understand the trend of social cleavages of class, religion, and regions.
Third, the Kappa Index was calculated for class, religious, and macro-regional cleavages
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by using single measurements. However, for micro-regional cleavage, more than one
measurement is used to examine the variation of political preference across various
micro-regional classifications, such as the 3-category classification (city, suburb, and
rural), the 5-category classification (core, inner suburb, mature suburb, emerging suburb,
and exurb), and the 6-category classification (Belt 1: central city of 12 largest SMSAs,
Belt 2: central city of remainder of the 100 largest SMSAs, Belt 3: suburbs of the 12
largest SMSAs, Belt 4: suburbs of the remaining 100 largest SMSAs, Belt 5: other urban,
Belt 6: other rural).
Class Cleavage between 1980 and 2004 (Hypothesis 1-1)

Table 4.1

Logistic Regression Results for Class Groups’ Voting Behavior, 1980-2004

Professional
Manager
Routine White-Collar
Proprietor
Skilled Worker
Un/Semi-Skilled Worker
Female
Education
Age
Family income
White
Black
Hispanic
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
Constant
-2LL
BIC
df
The Kappa Index

b

Model 1

S.E.

-0.14
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.66***
0.10
0.62***
0.11
0.53***
0.12
0.24*
0.11
-0.28**
0.08
7163.02
7222.99
7

Model 2
b
S.E.
0.09
0.08
-0.49***
0.10
0.20*
0.09
-0.68***
0.12
-0.16
0.12
0.29*
0.13

-0.11
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.68***
0.10
0.65***
0.11
0.57***
0.13
0.27*
0.12
-0.26**
0.09
7079.99
7191.37
13
0.33

Model 3
b
0.44***
-0.09
0.20
-0.30*
0.14
0.24
0.27***
0.00
0.00
-0.26***
-0.20
2.34***
0.48*
-0.13
0.11
0.66***
0.66***
0.51***
0.13
0.19
6493.84
6665.18
20
0.22

S.E.
0.10
0.12
0.10
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.03
0.16
0.22
0.21
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.12
0.30

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential voting. The reference variable for
class groups is not-in-the-labor force. N=5,256.
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Figure 4.1

Trend of Class Cleavage between 1980 and 2004

Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not.
Table 4.1 shows the relationship between class groups and the Presidential voting
pattern. Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control election-specific
effects. In Model 2, class variables were added to test the statistical effect of class groups
on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2004. In Model 2, the log-likelihood value (2LL) changed from 7163.02 to 7079.99. The likelihood ratio test (lr test) was performed
to test that there was statistically significant improvement in model fit (-2LL). The lr test
also showed that class groups had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting
by comparing the fit of Model 2 with that of Model 1. The hypothesis that all of the
logistic coefficients for class groups are concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the
0.01 level (LR χ2=83.03, df=6, p <0.01). Thus, the effect of class dummy variables on
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Presidential voting is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Additionally, the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) also improved in Model 2 (from 7222.99 to 7191.37).
The Kappa Index was calculated to show whether there was class cleavage
between 1980 and 2004, and to examine the magnitude of this cleavage by analyzing the
logistic coefficients of class groups. The value of the Kappa Index for Model 2 was 0.33,
while it was 0.22 in Model 3. It decreased after controlled variables were added,
indicating that class cleavage between 1980 and 2004 was partially explained by the
control variables for gender, education, age, family income, and race.
The unstandardized logistic coefficients of each class group also changed when
control variables were added. The logistic coefficient of the professional group increased
and became statistically significant (from 0.09 to 0.44) when control variables were
added to Model 2. The logistic coefficient of the manager group was statistically
significant in Model 2, but not in Model 3. The logistic coefficient of the routine white
collar group did not change after the control variables were added. However, this
coefficient was not statistically significant in Model 3. The logistic coefficient of the
proprietors group increased when control variables were added (from -0.68 to -0.30) and
remained statistically significant. The logistic coefficient of skilled workers increased
when control variables were added (from -0.16 to 0.14), but was not statistically
significant in either model. The logistic coefficient of un-/semi-skilled workers decreased
when controlled variables were added (from 0.29 to 0.24) and was no longer statistically
significant.
Figure 4.1 shows the trend of class cleavage between 1980 and 2004. Overall,
class cleavage increased from 1980 to 1988, and then decreased to 1992. Since 1992, it
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increased gradually up to 2004. Thus, overall class cleavage has increased between 1980
and 2004. Even though the magnitudes of class cleavage estimated in Model 2 and Model
3 are different, the general trend of class cleavage revealed by both models is similar,
showing that class cleavage increased gradually between 1980 and 2004.
Religious Cleavage between 1980 and 2008 (Hypothesis 1-2)

Table 4.2

Logistic Regression Results for Religious Groups’ Voting Behavior, 19802008

Evangelical Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Other religion
Jewish
No religion
Female
Education
Age
Family income
White
Black
Hispanic
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
Constant
-2LL
BIC
df
The Kappa Index

b

Model 1

S.E.

-0.09
0.10
0.14
0.10
0.71***
0.10
0.62***
0.10
0.53***
0.12
0.24*
0.11
0.98***
0.14
-0.29***
0.08
8024.64
8094.11
8

Model 2
b
S.E.
-0.73***
0.08
-0.42***
0.07
2.61***
0.21
0.02
0.16
1.21***
0.21
0.38***
0.10

-0.06
0.11
0.22*
0.11
0.77***
0.11
0.71***
0.11
0.55***
0.13
0.16
0.12
0.92***
0.15
-0.22*
.10
7384.22
7505.80
14
1.06

Model 3
b
-0.89***
-0.39***
0.12
-0.04
1.51***
0.36***
0.36***
-0.01
0.00
-0.29***
-0.38*
2.11***
0.32
-0.08
0.21
0.77***
0.73***
0.50***
0.10
0.63***
0.96***
6951.04
7133.41
21
0.42

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting. The reference variable for religious group is Catholic. N=5,909.
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S.E.
0.08
0.08
0.29
0.17
0.22
0.11
0.06
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.15
0.26
0.20
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.13
0.16
.28

Figure 4.2

Trend of Religious Cleavage between 1980 and 2004

Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not. The results of 1996
and 2008 were not included. Because no Jewish respondent supported the Republican
Party in 1996 and no Black Protestant supported the Republican Party in 2008, the
logistic coefficients of the Jewish group in 1996 and the Black Protestants in 2008 were
very large.
Table 4.2 shows the relationship between religious groups and the Presidential
voting pattern. Even though it seemed that the black dummy variable would be correlated
with the Black Protestant dummy variable, there was no multicollinearity issue. The
values of tolerance for all independent variables are greater than 0.2 and the values of
VIF are less than 5.
Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control election-specific
effects. In Model 2, religious group variables were added to test the statistical effect of
religious groups on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008. In Model 2, the loglikelihood value (-2LL) changed from 8024.64 to 7384.22. The lr test also showed that
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religious groups had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting. The
hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for religious groups are concurrently equal
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=640.42, df=6, p <0.01). Thus, the
effect of religious group variables on Presidential voting is statistically significant at the
0.01 level. Additionally, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also improved in
Model 2 (from 8094.11 to 7505.80).
The Kappa Index was calculated to show whether there was religious cleavage
between 1980 and 2008, and to examine the magnitude of religious cleavage by
analyzing the logistic coefficients of religious groups. The value of the Kappa Index for
Model 2 was 1.06, while it was 0.42 in Model 3. It decreased after the controlled
variables were added.
The logistic coefficient of the Evangelical Protestant group decreased slightly
when control variables were added (from -0.73 to -0.89), while the significance level did
not change. The logistic coefficient of the Mainline Protestants increased slightly (from 0.42 to -0.39) and the significance level did not change. The logistic coefficient of the
Black Protestant group decreased remarkably and ceased to be statistically significant.
The logistic coefficient of the other religions group variables did not significantly
change when control variables were added. The logistic coefficient of the Jewish group
and the logistic coefficient of the no religion group were statistically significant in both
models.
Figure 4.2 shows the trend of religious cleavage between 1980 and 2004. Overall,
religious cleavage increased from 1980 to 2000, and then decreased in 2004. The level of
religious cleavage decreased after control variables were added. Even though the
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magnitudes of religious cleavage estimated in Model 2 and Model 3 are different, the
overall trend of religious cleavage for both models is similar.
Macro-Region Cleavage between 1980 and 2008 (Hypothesis 1-3)

Table 4.3

Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across the 5-category
Macro Regions, 1980-2008
Model 1
b

S.E.

South
Mountain
Midwest
Northeast
Female
Education
Age
Family income
White
Black
Hispanic
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
Constant
-2LL
BIC
df
The Kappa Index

Model 2

-0.10
0.10
0.13
0.10
0.71
0.10
0.63
0.11
0.55
0.12
0.25
0.11
0.97
0.14
-0.29
0.08
8092.66
8162.21
8

Model 4

Model 3

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

-0.11

0.08

-0.54***

0.09

-0.30**

0.11

-0.33**

0.12

-0.14

0.08

-0.17

0.09

0.07

0.09

-0.11
0.10
0.13
0.10
0.71***
0.10
0.65***
0.11
0.54***
0.12
0.24*
0.11
1.00***
0.14
-0.21*
0.10
8077.43
8181.75
12
0.14

0.00
0.30***
0.02
0.00
-0.28***
-0.32*
2.44***
0.63**
-0.13
0.11
0.69***
0.70***
0.51***
0.10
0.61***
0.59*
7233.28
7398.45
19
0.22

0.09
0.06
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.15
0.21
0.19
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.13
0.12
0.16
0.27

b

0.30*** 0.06
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.26*** 0.03
-0.31*
0.15
2.36*** 0.21
0.57** 0.19
-0.11
0.11
0.13
0.11
0.69*** 0.11
0.67*** 0.11
0.52*** 0.13
0.12
0.12
0.54*** 0.15
0.28
0.26
7288.79
7419.19
15

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting. The reference variable for macro-region is the Pacific Coast. N=5,963.
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S.E.

Figure 4.3

Trend of 5-category Macro-Regional Cleavage between 1980 and 2008

Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not.
Table 4.3 shows the relationship between macro-region and the Presidential
voting pattern. Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control electionspecific effects. In Model 2, macro-region dummy variables were added to test the
statistical effect of macro-region variables on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008.
In Model 2, the log-likelihood value (-2LL) changed from 8092.66 (Model 1) to 8077.43.
The lr test also showed that macro-region variables had a statistically significant effect on
Presidential voting. The hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for macro-region
variables are concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chisquare=15.23, df=4, p <0.01). Thus, the effect of religious group variables on Presidential
voting is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However, the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) did not improve in Model 2 (from 8162.21 to 8181.75). The BIC
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improved in Model 3 when control variables were added (7398.45). But, when control
variables were added prior to the macro-region variables, the addition of 5-category
macro-region variables improved the value of the BIC (from 7419.19 to 7398.45).
The Kappa Index was calculated to show whether there was macro-regional
cleavage between 1980 and 2008, and to examine the magnitude of macro-regional
cleavage by analyzing the logistic coefficients of the macro-regions. The value of the
Kappa Index for Model 2 was 0.14, while it was 0.22 in Model 3. It increased after
controlled variables were added.
The logistic coefficient for the South decreased when control variables were
added (from -0.11 to -0.54) and became statistically significant. The logistic coefficient
for the Mountain region has the same value and is statistically significant in both models.
The logistic coefficients for the other regions were not statistically significant in either
model.
Figure 4.3 shows the trend of macro-regional cleavage between 1980 and 2008.
The macro-regional cleavage decreased in 1980 when control variables were added,
while it increased between 1984 and 2008 when control variables were added. However,
there was no consistent trend in macro-regional cleavage between 1980 and 2008.
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Micro-Region Cleavage between 1980 and 2000 (Hypothesis 1-4)

Table 4.4

Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across the 3-category
Micro Regions, 1980-2000
b

Suburban

Model 1

S.E.

Rural

Model 2
Model 3
b
S.E.
b
S.E.
-0.84***
0.07 -0.47***
0.08
-0.83***

0.08 -0.56***

0.09

Female

0.30***

0.06

Education

0.00

0.01

Age

0.00

0.00

Family income

-0.24***

0.03

White

-0.32*

0.16

Black

2.09***

0.23

Hispanic

0.31

0.22

1984

-0.10

0.10

-0.08

0.10 -0.09

0.11

1988

0.13

0.10

0.16

0.10 0.15

0.11

1992

0.70***

0.10

0.73***

0.10 0.71***

0.11

1996

0.63***

0.10

0.65***

0.11 0.69***

0.11

2000

0.53***

0.12

0.53***

0.13 0.54***

0.13

Constant

-0.29***

0.07

0.33***

0.10 0.95**

0.30

-2LL
BIC
df
The Kappa Index

6743.22
6794.27
6

6589.90
6657.97
8
0.39

6094.27
6221.91
15
0.25

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting. The reference variable for micro-region is central city. N=4,961.
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Figure 4.4

Trend of 3-category Micro-Regional Cleavage between 1980 and 2000

Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not.
In Table 4.4, the relationship between the 3-category micro-region and
Presidential voting is analyzed with pooled data from 1980 to 2000. Table 4.4 shows the
relationship between the 3-category micro-region and the Presidential voting pattern.
Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control election-specific effects. In
Model 2, micro-region dummy variables were added to test the statistical effect of microregion variables on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2000. In Model 2, the loglikelihood value (-2LL) changed from 6743.22 to 6589.90. The lr test also showed that
the micro-region variables had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting. The
hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for the micro-region variables are
concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=153.32, df=2, p
<0.01). Thus, the effect of the 3-category micro-regional variables on Presidential voting
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is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also
improved in Model 2 (from 6794.27 to 6657.97).
The value of the Kappa Index for Model 2 was 0.39, while it was 0.25 for Model
3. The value of the Kappa Index decreased when control variables were added,
suggesting that micro-regional cleavage is partially explained by the combined influence
of gender, education, age, family income, and race between 1980 and 2000.
The logistic coefficient for suburban residence increased when control variables
were added (from -0.84 to -0.47), and the p-value of the coefficient did not change. The
logistic coefficient for rural residence increased when control variables were added and is
statistically significant in both models (from -0.83 to -0.56).
Figure 4.4 shows the trend of the 3-category micro-regional cleavage from 1980
to 2000. The cleavage decreased when control variables were added, but the trends are
similar in both models. The 3-category micro-regional cleavage decreased until 1996, and
it increased in 2000.
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Micro-Region Cleavage (belt code) between 1980 and 2000 (Hypothesis 1-4)

Table 4.5

Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across Belt Codes, 19802000
b

Belt 1: Central city, large Metropolitan
Area (MA), Reference

Model 1
S.E.

b

Model 2
S.E.

b

Model 3
S.E.

Belt 2: Central city, other MA

-0.34*

0.14

-0.28

0.15

Belt 3: Suburb, large MA

-1.03***

0.13

-0.58***

0.15

Belt 4: Suburb, other MA

-1.18***

0.13

-0.76***

0.14

Belt 5: Other urban area

-1.11***

0.13

-0.78***

0.14

Belt 6: Other rural area

-1.10***

0.17

-0.92***

0.18

Female

0.31***

0.07

Education

0.00

0.02

Age

0.00

0.00

Family income

-0.26***

0.03

White

-0.41*

0.18

Black

2.05***

0.25

Hispanic

0.23

0.23

1984

-0.10

0.10

-0.09

0.10

-0.10

0.11

1988

0.13

0.10

0.14

0.11

0.14

0.11

1992

0.77

0.12

0.80***

0.12

0.76***

0.12

1996

0.63

0.11

0.62***

0.11

0.65***

0.12

2000

0.55

0.12

0.53***

0.13

0.51***

0.13

Constant

-0.29

0.08

0.60***

0.14

1.24***

0.34

-2LL

6080.49

5918.96

5462.96

BIC

6130.93

6011.43

5614.27

df

6

11

18

0.45

0.32

The Kappa Index

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting. The reference variable for the Belt code is belt 1. N=4,474.
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Figure 4.5

Trend of Micro Regional Cleavage based on the Belt code between 1980
and 2000

Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not.
In Table 4.5, the relationship between the Belt Code and Presidential voting is
analyzed with pooled data from 1980 to 2000. Model 1 includes election year dummy
variables to control election-specific effects. In Model 2, the 6-category micro-region
variables were added to test the statistical effect of the micro-regions on Presidential
voting between 1980 and 2000. In Model 2, the log-likelihood value (-2LL) changed
from 6080.49 to 5918.96. The lr test also showed that the 6-category micro-region
variables had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting. The hypothesis that
all of the logistic coefficients for 6-category micro-region variables are concurrently
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=161.53, df=5, p <0.01). Thus,
the effect of the 6-category micro-region variables on Presidential voting is statistically
121

significant at the 0.01 level. Additionally, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also
improved in Model 2 (from 6130.93 to 6011.43). The value of the Kappa Index for
Model 2 is 0.45 and is 0.32 for Model 3. The Kappa Index decreased when control
variables were added.
The logistic coefficient for Belt 2 slightly increased when control variables are
added (from -0.34 to -0.28) and ceased to be statistically significant. The logistic
coefficient for Belt 3 increased (from -1.03 to -0.58) and remained statistically
significant. The logistic coefficient for Belt 4 increased (from -1.18 to -0.76) and is
statistically significant. The logistic coefficient for Belt 5 increased (from -1.11 to -0.78)
and also remained statistically significant. The logistic coefficient for Belt 6 increased
(from -1.10 to -0.92) but is statistically unchanged.
Figure 4.5 shows the trend of belt code micro-regional cleavage between 1980
and 2000. The cleavage decreased when control variables were added, but the trends are
similar in both models. The belt code micro-regional cleavage decreased until 1988, and
it increased in 1992 in both models.
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Micro-Region Cleavage (5-category) between 1980 and 1996 (Hypothesis 1-4)

Table 4.6

Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across the 5-category
Micro-Regions, 1980-1996
Model 2
b
S.E.
-0.36*
0.15
-1.03***
0.14

Model 3
b
S.E.
-0.05
0.16
-0.57***
0.15

Emerging suburb

-1.15***

0.19

-0.64**

0.20

Exurb

-1.12***

0.21

-0.64**

0.22

0.35***

0.11

Education

0.02

0.02

Age

0.00

0.00

-0.27***

0.06

White

-0.38

0.30

Black

2.40***

0.40

0.76

0.42

Inner suburb
Mature suburb

Model 1
b
S.E.

Female

Family income

Hispanic
1984

-0.15

0.15

-0.07

0.16

-0.05

0.17

1988

0.03

0.15

0.10

0.16

0.18

0.17

1992

0.92

0.17

1.03***

0.18

1.06***

0.19

1996

0.52

0.15

0.65***

0.16

0.72***

0.17

Constant

-0.19

0.12

0.42**

0.16

0.77

0.53

-2LL

2478.57

2393.61

2135.17

BIC

2516.14

2461.23

2255.39

5

9

16

0.47

0.29

df
The Kappa Index

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting. The reference variable for 5-category Micro-region is the Core. N=1,833.
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Figure 4.6

Trend of 5-category Micro Regional Cleavage between 1980 and 1996

Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not.
In Table 4.6, the relationship between the 5-category micro-region and
Presidential voting is analyzed with pooled data from 1980 to 1996. Model 1 includes
election year dummy variables to control election-specific effects. In Model 2, the 5category micro-region variables were added to test the statistical effect of the microregions on Presidential voting between 1980 and 1996. In Model 2, the log-likelihood
value (-2LL) changed from 2478.57 to 2393.61. The lr test also showed that the 5category micro-region variables had a statistically significant effect on Presidential
voting. The hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for the 5-category micro-region
variables are concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chisquare=84.96, df=4, p <0.01). Thus, the effect of the 5-category micro-region variables
on Presidential voting is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Additionally, the
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Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also improved in Model 2 (from 2516.14 to
2461.23). The value of the Kappa Index for Model 2 is 0.47 and is 0.29 for Model 3. The
Kappa Index thus decreased when control variables were added.
The logistic coefficient for residence in an inner suburb increased when control
variables were added (from -0.36 to -0.05) and ceased to be statistically significant. The
logistic coefficient for residence in a mature suburb increased (from -1.03 to -0.57) and
continued to be statistically significant. The logistic coefficient for residence in an
emerging suburb increased (from -1.15 to -0.64) and remained statistically significant.
The logistic coefficient for exurban residence increased (from -1.12 to -0.64) and is
statistically significant in both models.
Figure 4.5 shows the trend of the 5-category micro-regional cleavage between
1980 and 1996. The cleavage decreased when control variables were added except in
1992, but the trends are similar in both models. The 5-category micro-regional cleavage
decreased until 1984, and it increased in 1988, then it decreased until 1996 in both
models.
Summary of the Association between Social Cleavage and Presidential Voting
Although there were variations, most Kappa Index values showed an association
between social cleavages and Presidential voting. First, the overall Kappa Index of class
cleavage between 1980 and 2004 was 0.33. When control variables, such as gender,
education, age, family income, and race were added to the model, the Index declined to
0.22. The control variables influenced the association between the professional
occupations and Presidential voting, but these variables failed to explain the association
of the other class groups with Presidential voting.
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Second, the overall Kappa Index of religious cleavage was 1.06 and decreased to
0.42 when control variables were added to the model. The control variables influenced
the association between Black Protestant religion and Presidential voting and decreased
the Kappa Index.
Third, the overall Kappa Index of the 5-category macro-regional cleavage was
0.14. However, it increased to 0.22 when control variables were added. The magnitude of
the association between residence in the South and Presidential voting increased
significantly when control variables were added to the model, reflecting the increase of
macro-regional cleavage.
Fourth, the overall Kappa Index of the 3-category micro-regional cleavage was
0.39 and decreased to 0.25 when control variables were added to the model. The
magnitude of the association between suburban residence and Presidential voting
increased significantly when control variables were added and reflects the decrease of
micro-regional cleavage.
Fifth, the overall Kappa Index of the 6-category micro-regional (Belt code)
cleavage was 0.45 and decreased to 0.32 when control variables were added to the model.
Although the Kappa Index decreased, there was no change in the influence of the control
variables on the 6-category micro-regional cleavage.
Sixth, the overall Kappa Index of the 5-category micro-regional cleavage was
0.47 and decreased to 0.29 when control variables were added to the model. Although the
Kappa Index decreased, there was no evidence that the control variables changed the 5category micro-regional cleavage.
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Consequently, the results shows that social cleavages in terms of class, religion,
macro-region, and micro-region have a statistically significant influence on Presidential
voting in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. This influence does not disappear when control
variables are added although the magnitude decreased except macro-region. Thus, these
results support the argument that influence of social factors on Presidential voting persists
between 1980 and 2008.
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting (Hypothesis 2)
Hypothesis 2 examined the influence of economic and cultural factors on
Presidential voting pattern in social cleavage models (class, religion, 5-category macroregion, 3-category micro-region) and the Presidential voting pattern. The procedure are as
follows:
First, a likelihood ratio test was used to examine the statistical significance of two
economic and three cultural variables both respectively and simultaneously. The
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was also used to confirm improvement of model fit
when the economic and cultural variables were added. Whereas the lr test can be used
only for nested models, the BIC can be used to compare non-nested models. The Wald
statistic was also used to examine the significance of the economic and cultural variables
in the model.
Second, I examined the change of the Kappa Index of each social group after the
economic and cultural variables were added. The Kappa Index is the standard deviation
of the logistic coefficients of a social group, so it is possible to compare the Kappa Index
across models.
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Third, the relative effect-size of the economic and cultural variables on
Presidential voting was tested by using a standardized logistic coefficient.
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Class
Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-1 and 3-1)

Table 4.7

Model fit of Class Cleavage Models

Models

-2LL

df

BIC

Model 1 (year only)

6307.06

6

6357.72

Model 2 (Model 1 + class)

6219.60

12

6320.88

Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables)

5710.80

19

5871.16

Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation)

5582.59

20

5751.40

Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation)

5641.42

20

5810.22

Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes)

5367.18

20

5535.99

Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes)

5489.83

20

5658.64

Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes)

5321.80

20

5490.61

Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables)

5554.97

21

5732.22

Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables)

5068.39

22

5254.08

Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.)

4915.29

24

5117.87

Note: The -2LL of null model is 6416.55. The number of observations is 4,630.
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Table 4.8

Economic and cultural Factors on Class Voting, 1984-2004
Model 3
b

beta

Model 11

S.E. Wald Exp(B)

Professional

0.44***

0.18

0.10 17.88

Manager

-0.13

-0.04 0.13

Routine White-Collar

0.22*

0.08

Proprietors

b

beta

S.E. Wald Exp(B)

1.55 0.31**

0.13 0.11 7.24

1.36

1.05

0.88 -0.19

-0.06 0.14 1.87

0.83

0.11

3.99

1.24 0.13

0.05 0.12 1.21

1.14

-0.37**

-0.10 0.14

7.00

0.69 -0.47**

-0.12 0.16 8.97

0.63

Skilled Worker

0.00

0.00

0.15

0.00

1.00 0.01

0.00 0.16 0.00

1.01

Un/Semi-Skilled Worker

0.19

0.04

0.16

1.35

1.21 0.21

0.04 0.18 1.34

1.23

Female

0.22**

0.11

0.07 10.61

1.25 -0.02

-0.01 0.08 0.06

0.98

Education

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.09

1.00 -0.07*** -0.16 0.02 13.42

0.93

Age

0.00

-0.01 0.00

0.06

1.00 0.01**

0.13 0.00 9.42

1.01

Family income

-0.27*** -0.29 0.03 63.50

0.76 -0.32*** -0.35 0.04 74.34

0.72

White

-0.24

-0.09 0.16

0.79 -0.43*

-0.17 0.18 5.88

0.65

Black

2.27***

0.69

0.23 95.78

9.65 2.31***

0.70 0.25 84.37 10.05

Hispanic

0.47*

0.10

0.21

1.60 0.43

0.09 0.24 3.30

1.53

2.16
4.86

Retrospective evaluation

0.25***

0.39 0.03 86.89

1.28

Prospective expectation

0.14***

0.18 0.03 24.56

1.15

Abortion attitudes

0.42***

0.44 0.04 129.26 1.52

Gender equality attitudes

0.19***

0.31 0.02 59.63

Gay/Lesbian attitudes

0.02***

0.57 0.00 189.99 1.02

1.21

1988

0.23*

0.09

0.10

5.15

1.26 0.07

0.03 0.11 0.41

1.08

1992

0.79***

0.32

0.10 62.83

2.21 0.10

0.04 0.12 0.69

1.11

1996

0.79***

0.30

0.11 56.39

2.21 0.64***

0.24 0.12 29.85

1.89

2000

0.64***

0.19

0.13 25.49

1.90 0.17

0.05 0.14 1.42

1.18

2004
Constant

0.25*
0.18

0.09

0.11
0.31

1.29 -0.44** -0.15 0.14 10.68
1.20 -2.63***
0.37 50.62

0.64
0.07

4.92
0.35

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting. The reference variable for class is the not-in-labor force group. N=4,630.

Table 4.7 shows model fit statistics, namely the -2LL and BIC, for class cleavage
models. Table 4.8 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the relationship
between class groups and the Presidential voting pattern when economic and cultural
factors were controlled. The dependent variable is Presidential voting (Democratic
voting=1). Model 1 included election year dummy variables to control for election year
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effects. In Model 2, the main independent variables (class groups) were added to examine
the total effect of class groups on Presidential voting. In Model 3, several control
variables were added, and in Model 4, the influence of economic and cultural factors on
the goodness-of-fit of the class cleavage models was examined. In this analysis, the data
for the years between 1984 and 2004 are used because the information on attitudes
toward gays and lesbians was not available for 1980. Model 4 tested the influence of
retrospective economic evaluation on model fit improvement. Model 5 tested the
influence of prospective economic expectations on model fit improvement of the class
cleavage model. Model 6 tested the influence of attitudes toward abortion rights on the fit
of the model for the relationship between class and voting. Model 7 tested the influence
of attitudes toward gender equality on the goodness-of-fit of the class cleavage model.
Model 8 tested the influence of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on the model fit
improvement of the class voting model. Model 9 tested the combined influence of the
two economic and three cultural variables on the goodness-of-fit of the class voting
model.
Table 4.7 indicates that all five variables improved the fit of each model. Model 4
(-2LL: 5582.59, BIC: 5751.40), Model 5 (-2LL: 5641.42, BIC: 5810.22), Model 6 (-2LL:
5367.18, BIC: 5535.99), Model 7 (-2LL: 5489.83, BIC: 5658.64), and Model 8 (-2LL:
5321.80, BIC: 5490.61) showed improvement over Model 3 (-2LL: 5710.80, BIC:
5871.16). The likelihood ratio (lr) test was performed to test the statistical significance of
the two economic and three cultural variables on model fit improvement. The fit of the
models that include two economic and three cultural variables (Model 4 to Model 8) was
compared with the fit of the model that includes the election year and class group
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variables (Model 3). Model 9 tested the combined effect of retrospective evaluation and
prospective expectation on model fit improvement compared to the fit of Model 3. Model
10 tested the combined effect of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality, and gays and
lesbians on model fit improvement. Model 11 tested the combined effect of the two
economic and three cultural variables on model fit improvement,
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=128.21, df = 1, p <0.01). The effect of
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=69.38, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01
level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=343.62, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=220.97, df=1, p <0.01). The
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians
is equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=389.00, df=1, p <0.01).
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The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the coefficients of retrospective evaluation and prospective
expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chisquare=155.82, df=1, p <0.01). So, at least one of economic variables was statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 5871.16 to
5732.22)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality,
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR
Chi-square=642.41, df=1, p <0.01). At least one cultural variable was statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from 5871.16 to
5254.08).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective
and prospective evaluation) and the three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion,
gender equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at
the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=795.50, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients
was statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
5871.16 to 5117.87).
Table 4.8 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians in Model 11.
In Table 4.8, the coefficients for professional, routine white-collar, and proprietor
were statistically significant in Model 3, while the coefficients for professional and
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proprietor were statistically significant in Model 11. The significance level of the
coefficient for routine white-collar became non-significant when the two economic and
three cultural variables were added to the model.
To compare the relative sizes of the coefficients of the two economic and three
cultural variables, I used standardized coefficients. The standardized coefficients suggest
that attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the strongest relationship (Beta=0.57). The
next strongest relationship was attitudes toward abortion (Beta=0.44). Retrospective
evaluation was third (Beta=0.39), attitudes toward gender equality was fourth
(Beta=0.31), and prospective expectation was last (Beta=0.18) in terms of the strength of
the relationships to Presidential voting.

Figure 4.7

Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of Class
Cleavage, 1980-2004

Note: Attitudes toward gays and lesbians was not included in Model 11 in 1980.
Figure 4.7 shows the trend of class cleavage and the influence of economic and
cultural factors on class cleavage between 1980 and 2004. Overall, economic and cultural
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factors were not influential on class cleavage. However, the direction of the influence of
these factors in 1980 and 1984 was different from that of 1988, 1992, 2000, and 2004.
The magnitude of the Kappa Index for both models was higher in 2000 and 2004.
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Religious
Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-2 and 3-2)

Table 4.9

Model fit of Religious Cleavage Models
-2LL

df

BIC

Model 1 (year only)

7156.31

7

7216.30

Model 2 (Model 1 + religion)

6562.26

13

6673.67

Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables)

6151.85

20

6323.26

Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation)

6016.64

21

6196.61

Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation)

6071.68

21

6251.66

Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes)

5908.25

21

6088.23

Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes)

5994.79

21

6174.77

Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes)

5854.17

21

6034.15

Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables)

5981.04

22

6169.59

Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables)

5655.95

23

5853.07

Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.)

5487.50

25

5701.76

Note: the -2LL of null model is 7296.808. The number of observation is 5,273
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Table 4.10

Economic and Cultural Effects on Religious Voting, 1984-2008
Model 3
b

Model 11

beta S.E. Wald

Exp(B)

b

beta S.E.

Wald Exp(B)

Evangelical Protestant

-0.95***

-0.40 0.09 116.40

0.39 -0.57***

-0.24 0.10

35.61

0.56

Mainline Protestant

-0.38***

-0.17 0.08 22.39

0.68 -0.42***

-0.19 0.09

22.98

0.66

Black Protestant

0.19

0.05 0.31

0.35

1.20 0.25

0.07 0.33

0.57

1.28

Other religion

0.02

0.00 0.18

0.01

1.02 -0.03

0.00 0.20

0.02

0.97

Jewish

1.69***

0.25 0.25 45.68

5.42 1.19***

0.18 0.26

20.64

3.28

No Religion

0.39***

0.12 0.11 12.09

1.48 0.01

0.00 0.12

0.01

1.01

Female

0.37***

0.18 0.06 34.13

1.44 0.09

0.05 0.07

1.86

1.10

Education

0.00

-0.01 0.01

0.11

1.00 -0.06***

-0.15 0.02

16.37

0.94

Age

0.00

-0.05 0.00

2.56

1.00 0.00*

0.07 0.00

4.25

1.00

Family income

-0.3***

-0.33 0.03 86.78

0.74 -0.34***

-0.37 0.03

96.58

0.71

White

-0.42**

-0.17 0.16

7.17

0.66 -0.54**

-0.22 0.17

10.25

0.59

Black

2.07***

0.68 0.27 60.50

7.93 2.08***

0.68 0.28

53.75

8.02

Hispanic

0.29

0.07 0.20

1.34 0.33

0.08 0.22

2.33

1.40

2.02

Retrospective

0.24***

0.39 0.03

91.14

1.28

Prospective

0.15***

0.20 0.03

32.34

1.16

Abortion attitudes

0.37***

0.39 0.04 105.13

1.44

Gender equality attitudes

0.16***

0.27 0.02

49.90

1.18

Gay/lesbian attitudes

0.02***

0.51 0.00 163.26

1.02

1988

0.29**

0.11 0.10

8.14

1.34 0.09

0.03 0.11

0.64

1.09

1992

0.86***

0.35 0.10 73.42

2.35 0.20

0.08 0.12

2.70

1.22

1996

0.81***

0.30 0.11 59.22

2.26 0.65***

0.24 0.11

32.76

1.92

2000

0.58***

0.16 0.13 20.42

1.79 0.15

0.04 0.14

1.22

1.17

2004

0.17

0.06 0.12

1.19 -0.44***

-0.15 0.13

11.04

0.64

2008

0.72***

0.18 0.15 22.35

2.05 -0.43*

-0.11 0.18

5.82

0.65

Constant

0.98***

0.29 11.45

0.34

26.75

0.17

2.28

2.65 -1.76***

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential
voting. The reference variable for religion group is Catholic. N=5,273.
Table 4.9 shows model fit statistics (Log-likelihood and BIC) for the religious
cleavage models. Table 4.10 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the
relationship between religious groups and the Presidential voting pattern between 1984
and 2008 before and after economic and cultural factors were added. Table 4.9 indicates
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that all five variables improved the fit of each model, that is, Model 4 (-2LL: 6016.64,
BIC: 6196.61), Model 5 (-2LL: 6071.68, BIC: 6251.66), Model 6 (-2LL: 5908.25, BIC:
6088.23), Model 7 (-2LL: 5994.79, BIC: 6174.77), and Model 8 (-2LL: 5854.17, BIC:
6034.15) showed improvement over Model 3 (-2LL: 6151.85, BIC: 6323.26).
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=135.22, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=80.17, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01
level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=243.60, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=157.06, df=1, p <0.01). The
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians
is equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=297.68, df=1, p <0.01).
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The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficients for retrospective evaluation and
prospective expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level
(LR Chi-square=170.81, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients is statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 6323.26 to
6169.59)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality,
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR
Chi-square=495.90, df=1, p <0.01). Therefore, at least one of these coefficients was
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from
6323.26 to 5853.07).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective
and prospective evaluation) and three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01
level (LR Chi-square=664.35, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
6323.26 to 5701.76).
Table 4.10 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians in Model 11.
In Table 4.10, evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, Jewish, and no religion
were statistically significant in Model 3. The coefficient of no religion changed from
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significant to non-significant when the two economic and three cultural variables were
added to the model.
The standardized coefficients show that attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the
strongest effect (Beta=0.51) of the economic and cultural variables. The next strongest
was attitudes toward abortion and retrospective evaluation (Beta=0.39) followed by
attitudes toward gender equality (Beta=0.27) and prospective expectation (Beta=0.20).

Figure 4.8

Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of
Religious Cleavage, 1980-2008

Note: The results of 1996 and 2008 were excluded. In both cases, the values of the
logistic coefficients were too large because there was no vote for the Republican Party
among the Jewish group in 1996 and Black Protestants in 2008.
Figure 4.8 shows the trend of religious cleavage and the influence of the
economic and cultural factors on class cleavage between 1980 and 2004. Overall,
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economic and cultural factors did not influence the trend of religious cleavage. However,
unlike the pattern of class cleavage, the trend of the influence of economic and cultural
factors is consistent throughout the period. The magnitude of the Kappa Index for both
models is highest in 2000.
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Macroregional Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-3 and 3-3)

Table 4.11

Model fit of Macro-regional Cleavage
2LL

df

BIC

Model 1 (year only)

7211.96

7

7272.01

Model 2 (Model 1 + macro-region)

7198.43

11

7292.80

Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables)

6421.84

18

6576.25

Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation)

6277.58

19

6440.57

Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation)

6339.54

19

6502.54

Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes)

6085.89

19

6248.89

Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes)

6216.84

19

6379.84

Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes)

6026.80

19

6189.80

Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables)

6242.07

20

6413.64

Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables)

5776.52

21

5956.67

Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.)

5603.19

23

5800.51

Note: The -2LL of null model is 7359.79. The number of observation is 5,318
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Table 4.12

Economic and Cultural Factors on Macro-region Voting, 1984-2008
Model 3
b

beta

Model 11

S.E. Wald Exp(B)

b

beta S.E. Wald Exp(B)

South

-0.6*** -0.27

0.10 39.59

0.55 -0.17

-0.08 0.10 2.55

0.85

Mountain

-0.31*

-0.08

0.13 5.80

0.74 -0.04

-0.01 0.14 0.09

0.96

Midwest

-0.21*

-0.09

0.09 5.06

0.81 0.17

0.08 0.10 2.84

1.19

Northeast

-0.01

0.00

0.10 0.00

0.99 0.15

0.06 0.11 1.86

1.16

Female

0.29*** 0.14

0.06 22.88

1.33 0.03

0.01 0.07 0.19

1.03

Education

0.02

0.06

0.01 2.85

1.02 -0.05***-0.12 0.02 11.26

0.95

Age

0.00*

-0.06

0.00 4.11

1.00 0.00*

0.07 0.00 4.38

1.00

Family income

-0.30*** -0.32

0.03 89.84

0.74 -0.34***-0.37 0.03 95.88

0.71

White

-0.36*

0.15 5.84

0.70 -0.55***-0.23 0.16 11.27

0.57

Black

2.42*** 0.79

0.22 125.65 11.29 2.42*** 0.79 0.23 109.08 11.29

Hispanic

0.62**

0.20 9.87

-0.15
0.14

1.85 0.58** 0.13 0.21 7.22

1.78

Retrospective evaluation

0.25*** 0.40 0.03 98.42

1.28

Prospective expectation

0.14*** 0.19 0.03 29.43

1.15

Abortion attitudes

0.4*** 0.43 0.03 135.28 1.49

Gender equality attitudes

0.17*** 0.28 0.02 55.81

Gay/Lesbian attitudes

0.02*** 0.56 0.00 200.77 1.02

1.18

1988

0.25*

0.09

0.10 6.19

1.28 0.08

0.03 0.11 0.49

1.08

1992

0.82*** 0.33

0.10 72.49

2.28 0.16

0.06 0.12 1.79

1.17

1996

0.84*** 0.31

0.10 66.09

2.32 0.67*** 0.24 0.11 34.76

1.95

2000

0.64*** 0.18

0.12 26.55

1.90 0.19

0.05 0.14 1.86

1.21

2004

0.23*

0.08

0.11 4.32

1.26 -0.44***-0.14 0.13 11.32

0.64

2008

0.74*** 0.18

0.15 25.36

2.10 -0.43* -0.11 0.17 6.14

0.65

Constant

0.56*

0.28 4.02

1.75 -2.37***

0.09

0.34 9.68

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential voting.
The reference variable for macro-region is the Pacific region. N=5,318.
Table 4.11 shows model fit statistics (Log-likelihood and BIC) for the macroregional cleavage models. Table 4.12 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the
relationship between macro-region and the Presidential voting pattern between 1984 and
2008 before and after the economic and cultural factors were added. Table 4.11 indicates
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that all five variables improved the fit of each model, that is, Model 4 (-2LL: 6277.58,
BIC: 6440.57), Model 5 (-2LL: 6339.54, BIC: 6502.54), Model 6 (-2LL: 6085.89, BIC:
6248.89), Model 7 (-2LL: 6216.84, BIC: 6379.84), and Model 8 (-2LL: 6026.80, BIC:
6189.80) all showed improvement over Model 2 (-2LL: 7198.43, BIC: 7292.80). Table
4.11 further indicates that the five variables improved the fit of each model over Model 3
(-2LL: 6421.84, BIC: 6576.25).
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=144.26, df = 1, p <0.01). The effect of
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=82.30, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01
level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=335.94, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=205.00, df=1, p <0.01). The
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
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The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians
is equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=395.03, df=1, p <0.01).
The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the coefficients for retrospective evaluation and prospective
expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chisquare=179.77, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 6576.25 to
6413.64)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality,
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR
Chi-square=645.32, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from 6576.25 to
5956.67).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective
and prospective evaluation) and three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01
level (LR Chi-square=818.64, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
6576.25 to 5800.51).
Table 4.12 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitude toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians in Model 11.
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In Table 4.12, the South, Mountain, and Midwest regions were statistically
significant in Model 3. On the other hand, no macro-regional variable was statistically
significant in Model 11.
The standardized coefficients of the economic and cultural variables show that
attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the strongest effect (Beta=0.56). The next
strongest influence was attitudes toward abortion (Beta=0.43) followed by retrospective
evaluation (Beta=0.40), attitudes toward gender equality (Beta=0.28), and prospective
expectation (Beta=0.19).

Figure 4.9

Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of 5category Macro-regional Cleavage, 1980-2008

Figure 4.9 shows the trend of macro-regional cleavage and the influence of
economic and cultural factors on the macro-regional cleavage between 1980 and 2008.
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Overall, economic and cultural factors did not influence the trend of macro-regional
cleavage. The magnitude of the Kappa Index for both models is relatively flat until 1996
and highest in 2000 and 2008.
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Microregional Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-4 and 3-4)

Table 4.13

Model fit of Micro-regional Cleavage
2LL

df

BIC

Model 1 (year only)

5862.51

5

5904.36

Model 2 (Model 1 + micro-region)

5738.80

7

5797.39

Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables)

5297.86

14

5415.04

Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation)

5241.20

15

5366.75

Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation)

5262.17

15

5387.72

Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes)

5038.93

15

5164.48

Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes)

5108.52

15

5234.07

Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes)

4962.50

15

5088.05

Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables)

5224.49

16

5358.41

Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables)

4761.05

17

4903.34

Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.)

4683.30

19

4842.33

Note: The -2LL of null model is 5977.75. The number of observations is 4,316.

144

Table 4.14

Economic and Cultural Factors on Micro-region Voting, 1984- 2000
Model 3
b

Suburbs

-0.44*

Model 11

beta S.E. Wald Exp(B)
-0.22 0.09 25.84 0.64

b

beta S.E. Wald Exp(B)

-0.30** -0.15 0.09 9.98

0.74

Rural

-0.53*** -0.25 0.09 32.64 0.59

-0.18

-0.08 0.10 3.20

0.83

Female

0.28*** 0.14 0.07 17.99 1.33

0.04

0.02 0.07 0.29

1.04

-0.08*** -0.18 0.02 20.33

0.93

Education

0.00

0.00 0.02 0.00

1.00

Age

0.00

-0.06 0.00 2.55

1.00

Family income
White

0.07 0.00 3.44

1.00

-0.32*** -0.34 0.04 70.98

0.72

0.69

-0.60** -0.23 0.18 10.50

0.55

2.04*** 0.63 0.25 67.78 7.69

2.10*** 0.64 0.26 63.29

8.17

-0.26*** -0.28 0.04 56.71 0.77
-0.38*

Black
Hispanic

0.06 0.25 1.23

1.31

Retrospective evaluation

0.18*** 0.29 0.03 43.50

1.20

Prospective expectation

0.11*** 0.14 0.03 14.41

1.11

Abortion attitudes

0.37*** 0.39 0.04 98.05

1.45

Gender equality attitudes

0.18*** 0.31 0.02 55.90

1.20

Gay/Lesbian attitudes

0.02*** 0.56 0.00 176.17

1.02

1988

0.28

-0.15 0.17 4.99

0.24*

0.06 0.23 1.51

0.10 0.10 5.80

1.32

0.00

0.27

1.27

0.13

0.05 0.11 1.42

1.14

1992

0.80*** 0.34 0.10 67.71 2.21

0.27*

0.12 0.12 5.08

1.31

1996

0.78*** 0.31 0.10 57.74 2.18

0.63*** 0.25 0.11 31.29

1.87

2000

0.63*** 0.19 0.12 25.48 1.88

Constant

0.95**

0.31 9.32

2.59

0.17
-1.51***

0.05 0.14 1.61

1.19

0.37 16.53

0.22

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential voting.
The reference variable for micro-region is central city. N=4,316.
Table 4.13 shows model fit statistics (Log-likelihood and BIC) for the microregional cleavage models. Table 4.14 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the
relationship between micro-region and the Presidential voting pattern between 1984 and
2000 before and after economic and cultural factors were added. Table 4.13 indicates that
all five variables improved the fit of each model, that is, Model 4 (-2LL: 5241.20, BIC:
145

5366.75), Model 5 (-2LL: 5262.17, BIC: 5387.72), Model 6 (-2LL: 5038.93, BIC:
5164.48), Model 7 (-2LL: 5108.52, BIC: 5234.07), and Model 8 (-2LL: 4962.50, BIC:
5088.05) showed improvement over Model 3 (-2LL: 5297.86, BIC: 5415.04).
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=56.66, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=35.69, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01
level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=258.93, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the
0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=189.34, df=1, p <0.01). The
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians
is equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=335.36, df=1, p <0.01).
The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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The hypothesis that the coefficients of retrospective evaluation and prospective
expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chisquare=73.37, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these variables was statistically significant
at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 5415.04 to 5358.41)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality,
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR
Chi-square=536.81, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these cultural variables was
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from
5415.04 to 4903.34).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective
and prospective evaluation) and three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01
level (LR Chi-square=614.56, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these variables was
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
5415.04 to 4842.33).
Table 4.14 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians in Model 11.
In Table 4.14, the coefficients of suburban and rural residence were statistically
significant in Model 3. However, the coefficient of rural residence was not statistically
significant in Model 11.
The standardized coefficients showed that attitudes toward gays and lesbians had
the strongest effect on Presidential voting (Beta=0.56). The next strongest influence was
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attitudes toward abortion (Beta=0.39) followed by attitudes toward gender equality
(Beta=0.31), retrospective evaluation (Beta=0.29), and prospective expectation
(Beta=0.14).

Figure 4.10

Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of Microregional Cleavage, 1980-2000

Figure 4.10 shows the trend of the 3-category micro-regional cleavage and the
influence of economic and cultural factors on class cleavage between 1980 and 2000.
Overall, economic and cultural factors did not influence the trend of micro-regional
cleavage. The magnitude of the Kappa Index for both models was relatively consistent.
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CONCLUSION

The current study examines the relationship between social cleavage and
Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008. Social cleavage represents the influence of
social structure on voting behavior. Even though there are various types of structural
factors – such as economic structure, social structure, and cultural structure – electoral
scholars who study cleavage tend to focus on social group membership when examining
the relationship between social structure and voting behavior. Thus, the current study
examines the relationship between social cleavage and voting behavior to examine the
influence of social structure on voting behavior.
The Decline of Traditional Social Cleavages
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that social cleavage has a stable relationship with
political voting patterns since it was created by two societal revolutions – national and
industrial revolutions – in industrialized countries. Because Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
argue that the relationship between social cleavage and voting behavior had remained
stable until the 1960s, which is known as the “freezing hypothesis,” many electoral
scholars have examined whether this stable relationship has continued to be aligned or
has dealigned or realigned. Some scholars argue that political voting patterns were
dealigned with social group membership and that social cleavage has declined since the
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1960s; however, others suggest that political voting patterns continued to be aligned or
realigned with social group membership and that social cleavage still influences political
cleavage (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Franklin
2010; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995; Manza and Brooks 2008). Franklin (2010) argues
that voting patterns were dealigned with social group membership and that the magnitude
of class cleavage has declined since the 1960s. Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992)
acknowledge the existence of political cleavage, but are skeptical about the relevance of
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) classical definition of cleavage. On the other hand, Manza
and Brooks (1999), using advanced methodology and social cleavage schemas, show that
social cleavage did not decline until the 1990s
There may be various reasons why the magnitude of social cleavage declined.
One possibility is that the influence of intra-group division became stronger than that of
inter-groups divisions. The traditional concept of cleavage deals with inter-group
divisions based on class, religion, and region; however, there is also a possibility of intragroup divisions among social groups. For example, there may be Catholic working-class,
conservative Protestant working-class, and liberal Protestant working-class members in
the same working-class group. So, if there is variation based on religious group
membership, there may be intra-group divisions among groups of the same class. For this
reason, it is necessary to consider intra-group division of social groups for electoral
studies.
However, if the magnitude of intra-group divisions is stronger than that of intergroups divisions, it may be because the influence of one social cleavage is stronger than
that of others. Alternatively, it may be that short-term factors, such as preference toward
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candidates or attitudes toward various election-specific issues, are more influential than
long-term factors such as social group membership on voting behavior.
Because the traditional concept of social cleavage applies to inter-group divisions,
the current study focuses on inter-group divisions. Although the current study deals with
intra-group division by examining the influence of short-term factors on long-term
factors, the main focus of the current study is limited to traditional social cleavages.
Thus, the influence of intra-group divisions on vote choice will be a subject for future
research.
The Influence of Short-Term Factors on Voting
The current study contributes to this debate about social cleavage by analyzing the
social cleavage pattern of the U.S. Presidential elections since the 1980s. The study
demonstrates the influence of both long-term factors (social cleavages) and short-term
factors (evaluation of previous performance and expectation of prospective policies) on
Presidential elections. It also shows the relative importance of short-term factors on
Presidential voting.
Social cleavage has been influenced by social structural change and short-term
factors, such as attitudes toward economics and culture. Although many scholars agree
with Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) argument, others argue that the decline of social
cleavage results from the influence of short-term factors (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen
1992; Dalton 1996; Manza and Brooks 1999). Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992) assert
that since 1960s traditional social cleavage does not reflect the change of social change
caused by feminist movement, civil rights movement, and post-materialism. Still other
scholars emphasize that voters’ attitudes toward economic or cultural issues are
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influential on voting (Key 1966; Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987;
Erikson 1989; Welch and Hibbing 1992; Carmines, Gerrity, and Wagner 2010; Wilcox
1992; 1994)
The current study tested hypotheses about social cleavages to examine the
argument that social cleavage has declined. This study also tested hypotheses about the
influence of economic and cultural factors on Presidential voting in the social cleavage
models between 1980 and 2008. If the argument about the decline of social cleavage is
correct, then social cleavage in Presidential elections will show low levels of magnitude.
If economic and cultural factors strongly influence social cleavage in Presidential voting,
then the magnitude of social cleavage will decline when economic and cultural variables
are controlled. Additionally, the study examined the relative strength of economic and
cultural factors on the relationship between social cleavage and Presidential voting.
Continued Influence of Regional Cleavage on Voting
This study also investigated regional cleavage patterns in national elections.
Regional cleavage is important in the analysis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). However,
there are relatively few studies of regional cleavages, although geopolitical studies often
focus on regional differences of voting patterns (Gainsborough 2005; McKee and Shaw
2003; McKee and Teigen 2009). Regional cleavage continues to influence political
behavior after the nation-building process. Many studies suggest that political preferences
differ across regions, such as the South and non-South and cities, suburbs, and rural
areas. Since the 1930s, regional differences in urbanization and suburbanization have
significantly affected voting behavior. This study, therefore, explores regional
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dimensions of social cleavage in U.S. Presidential elections by using more specific
measurements of macro- and micro-regions.
Significance of Social Cleavage on Voting between 1980 and 2008
Significance of Class Cleavage
Debate about the decline of class cleavage thesis is one of the main topics in
political sociology. Some studies indicate that class voting declined because of the
influence of post-materialism, emergence of racial issues, working class affluence,
weakening of labor unions, and influence of welfare states (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987;
Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Carmines and Stimson 1984; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld
1989). Absolute measurement, such as the Alford Index, was used in these studies to
demonstrate the decline of class voting: however, when other investigations used relative
measurement to analyze social structural change, they showed that class cleavage was
still influential in Presidential voting in industrialized countries after the 1960s (Heath et
al. 1985; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Weakliem 1995; Goldthorpe 1999). The
decline of class cleavage thesis also implies that social structural factors, such as social
class, do not substantially influence individuals’ political behavior. The current study
explores whether social structural factors influenced individuals’ political behavior
between 1980 and 2004. The study used the class classification of Manza and Brooks
(1999), which originated from Goldthorpe (1980), to investigated class cleavage between
1980 and 2004. While Manza and Brooks (1999) investigate class cleavage in the United
States until the 1990s, this study extended the period to 2004.
The study finds that class was a significant predictor of voting behavior in
Presidential elections between 1980 and 2004. Manza and Brooks (1999:79) argue that
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class cleavage shows “trendless fluctuation” through 1992, and the current study shows
that class cleavage was constant through 2004. So the current study supports Manza and
Brooks (1999) and shows that the constant trend of class cleavage did not change until
recently. Hout and Moodie (2007) also confirm that the trend of class cleavage had
remained flat through 2004 although class coalitions realigned in the United States
starting in the 1960s. Many European scholars show that class cleavage is still influential
in European elections (Rennwald 2014; Goldberg and Sciarini 2014; Vanhoutte and
Hooghe 2013; Jansen, Evans, and De Graaf 2013).
Significance of Religious Cleavage
Religious cleavage was also investigated. Religious cleavage in the United States
was explained by the ethnocultural model of voting theory in the 19th century (Benson
1961; Kleppner 1970; Jensen 1971; Formisano 1971; McCormick 1974; Feller 1992). In
the early 20th century, debates about evolutionism affected religious cleavage in the
United States. Since World War II, the relationship between political preferences and
religious membership has changed due to secularization and a decline of
denominationalism (Manza and Brooks 1999). Many scholars studied the contribution of
the Christian Right movement on the victory of the Republican Presidential candidates in
the 1980s (Brooks and Manza 2004; Claassen and Povtak 2010). Other scholars argued
that the Christian Right movement led by the Christian Coalition was more successful
than the movement led by the Moral Majority in the 1980s (Williams 2010; Wilcox
1994). Still other scholars argued that the de-alignment of Catholics and Mainline
Protestants changed the relationship between political preferences and religious
membership (Mills 1956; Baltzell 1964; Lopatto 1985; Manza and Brooks 1999). Manza
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and Brooks (1999: 38) state that “the magnitude of the religious cleavage remains
substantial” between 1960 and 1992. The current study extended the period to elections
between 1980 and 2008 and found that religious variables significantly affected
Presidential voting during this period. This study also shows that the magnitude of
religious cleavage was highest in 2000 although it soon dropped to its previous level.
This study also shows that the magnitude of religious cleavage is biggest of the four
kinds of social cleavage. Raymond (2011) also shows that religious cleavage still has an
important influence on vote choice in the United States, and the magnitude of religious
cleavage is larger than that of other social cleavages. European scholars also show that
religion is still influential on vote choice in European countries (Emmenegger and
Manow 2014; Botterman and Hooghe 2012). Thus, religious cleavage should be
considered in electoral studies.
Significance of Regional Cleavage
Regional cleavage in the United States has received less attention than class and
religious cleavages, although sectional cleavage was one of the main factors influencing
political preferences in the 19th century (Turner 1932; Key 1942; Archer 1988; Layman
2001). Mendelson (1977) argues that micro-regional cleavage became more influential
than macro-regional cleavage in elections since the 1930s; however, Archer (1988)
argues that macro-regional cleavage was more influential than micro-regional cleavage in
elections by analyzing county-level data between 1940 and 1984. Even though the
current study did not compare the relative influence of macro-regional and microregional cleavage in Presidential elections, it showed that both regional cleavages
significantly influenced Presidential elections between 1980 and 2008.
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Findings
A binary logistic regression analysis of a pooled dataset of Presidential elections
between 1980 and 2008 showed that social groups have significantly affected these
elections since the 1980s. The effect of class, religion, macro-region (5-category), and
micro-region (3-category, 5-category, and 6-category) was tested using the Likelihood
Ratio test (lr test). The fit of the model without social group variables was compared to
that of the models with social group variables. The results showed that most social group
variables have statistically significant effects on Presidential voting. Class variables were
statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood Ratio test. Thus, we conclude
that class groups significantly predicted Presidential voting behavior over the study
period. The Kappa Index of class cleavage, not including control variables, was 0.33,
meaning that the standard deviation of log-odds ratios of class groups was 0.33. It
decreased to 0.22 when control variables were added. The overall trend of the Kappa
Index showed that class cleavage increased as an influence on Presidential voting
between 1980 and 2004. The Kappa Index values of 2000 and 2004 were greater than
those of the 1980s and 1990s. Class group membership, therefore, continues to influence
Presidential voting, in agreement with the argument of Manza and Brooks (1999) rather
than that of Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992).
Religious variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood
Ratio test, showing that religious group membership predicts Presidential voting
behavior. The Kappa Index of religious cleavage without control variables, was 1.06.
That is, the standard deviation of log-odds ratios of class groups was 1.06. It decreased to
0.42 when control variables were included. The Kappa Index for religious cleavage
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increased until 2000 and decreased in 2004. The overall magnitude of the Index was
greater for religious cleavage than for class cleavage. Religious group membership thus
seems to be the more influential factor in voting behavior in Presidential elections.
Regional cleavage at the macro- and micro-levels were analyzed. A 5-category
macro-regional variable was used to analyze cleavage across the South,
Mountains/Plains, Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast regions. The macro-regional
variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood Ratio test, and
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) value did not improve when these variables
were added in the model. The Kappa Index of the 5-category macro-regional cleavage
variables without control variables, was 0.14, and it increased to 0.22 when control
variables were included. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 5-category macro-regional
cleavage was less than these of the class and religious cleavages.
Micro-regional cleavage was examined with three different variables: a 3category variable (city, suburban, and rural), a 5-category variable (core, inner suburb,
mature suburb, emerging suburb, and exurb), and a 6-category variable (from belt 1
(central city, large Metropolitan Area) to belt 6 (other rural area)) classifications. These
three different measures were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood
Ratio test. The BIC value also improved when the three micro-regional variables were
added to the model. The Kappa Index values of the 3-, 5-, and 6-category micro-regional
cleavages without control variables were 0.39, 0.47, and 0.45, respectively. These values
decreased to 0.32, 0.29, and 0.32, respectively. The level of micro-regional cleavages was
similar among the three measures when control variables were added. The magnitudes of
all micro-regional cleavages were higher than those of the macro-regional cleavage and
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class cleavage; conversely, micro-regional cleavages were lower in magnitude than
religious cleavages.
Consequently, social group membership and geographical residence are judged to
be significant factors in Presidential elections between 1980 and 2008. That is, voters’
political preferences are based on their social group membership and geographical
residence. Political cleavage based on religious group membership is the greatest. Voters
also have more distinctive political preferences based on micro-regional residence
compared to macro-regional residence.
These results are consistent with recent studies on the relationship between social
group membership and Presidential voting behavior (Evans 1999; Hout and Moodie
2007; Raymond 2011; Zingher 2014). Social group memberships based on class, religion,
and region are statistically significant variables between 1980 and 2008. Even though it
seems as if the Kappa graphs have variations, overall, the graphs show that the trend in
social cleavage is not declining. Thus, the thesis regarding the decline of social cleavage
in Presidential voting must be reconsidered in electoral studies and the social basis of
voting should continue to be considered in future studies of Presidential voting.
Influence of Economic and Cultural Issues on Social Cleavage, 1980-2008
Influence of Economic Issues
The influence about influence of economic and cultural factors on voting behavior
is a key issue in political sociology. Economic issues became important in politics after
the United States became industrialized and became more salient with the introduction of
the New Deal policy. (Lynch 1999; Lin 1999). Although economic factors include both
objective and subjective measures, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) argue that
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subjective economic assessment is more important than objective economic conditions in
voting behavior because subject measures are more closely related to voting behavior.
Key (1966), Kramer (1971), and Fiorina (1981) emphasize the importance of
retrospective economic voting rather than prospective economic voting, assuming
individuals tend to vote based on the economic performance of the incumbent party
because voters do not have enough information about future candidates’ policies. On the
other hand, Stigler (1973) suggests that voters have an interest in prospective policy
rather than in retrospective economic evaluation. The current study found that
retrospective economic evaluation had a relatively stronger effect on Presidential voting
between 1980 and 2008 than did prospective economic evaluation. Both economic factors
were statistically significant in the analyses.
Influence of Cultural Issues
Cultural issues became important factors in Presidential voting preference after
World War II, and gender equality, abortion, and gay and lesbian issues became
particularly important after the early 1970s (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Layman and
Carmines. 1997; Adams 1997; Carmines and Woods 2002; Williams 2010). Many studies
have explored the influence of cultural factors on political behavior. For example, Killian
and Wilcox (2008) argue that abortion attitudes influence political preferences. Carmines
and Woods (2002) suggest that the general public was polarized on the abortion issue in
the 1990s and that abortion has been an important issue for political elites since the late
1970s. Campbell and Monson (2008) maintain that the gay marriage initiative was a main
cause of political cleavage in the Presidential election of 2004. Conover (1988) argues
that feminism has influenced the gender gap in political preferences and partisanship, and
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Manza and Brooks (1998) assert that attitude toward the feminist movement is related to
voting behavior. The current study found that three cultural variables significantly affect
Presidential voting. Attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the strongest effect among
these variables and had a stronger effect than the economic variables. On the other hand,
attitudes toward gender equality had a weaker effect on Presidential voting than
retrospective evaluation in all the models except the micro-region voting model.
Findings
The binary logistic regression analysis showed that economic and cultural factors
are significantly associated with Presidential elections between 1984 and 2008, and that
the magnitude of social cleavage changed when economic and cultural variables were
included. The statistical effect of the two economic and three cultural variables on
Presidential elections was tested by using the likelihood ratio test (lr test) and the BIC. In
the lr test, the fit of the model, including economic and cultural variables, was compared
with that of the models that excluded the economic and cultural variables. The results
showed that economic and cultural variables have statistically significant effects on
Presidential voting both individually and concurrently in the models for the four social
cleavages examined (class, religion, macro-region, and 3-category micro-region).
These results showed that social cleavages are still influential even after
controlling for voters’ economic evaluations and attitudes toward cultural issues.
Raymond (2011) also argues that (1) social cleavage has an indirect influence on vote
choice through short-term factors, such as economic evaluations, Left-Right selfplacement, and party leader preference, and (2) the influence of social cleavage may be
not less than that of short-term factors. The current study shows that both social cleavage
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and short-term factors influence Presidential election voting, so it is necessary to examine
the relative strength of these two variables and to examine how short-term variables
change the relationship between social cleavage and Presidential election voting in future
studies.
The current study shows that voters’ attitudes toward economic and cultural
issues are statistically significant in social cleavage voting models. When attitudes toward
economic and cultural issues are added to social cleavage models, the magnitude and
significance level of the logistic coefficients of social groups also change; however, it is
hard to interpret the change of magnitude and significance level of logistic coefficients
when attitudes toward economic and cultural issues are added to the social cleavage
models. This is because the total variance of dependent variables differs between models;
however, there is a possibility that attitudes toward economic and cultural issues may
influence social groups’ voting patterns because the significance levels of logistic
coefficients of social groups change after attitudes toward economic and cultural issues
are added to social cleavage models. For example, the significance level of the coefficient
for routine white-collar became non-significant when short-term factors, such as attitudes
toward economic and cultural issues, were added to the class voting model. In the
religious voting model, the coefficient of no religion changed from significant to nonsignificant when the attitudes toward economic and cultural issues were added to the
religious voting model. In the macro-region voting model, the significance level changed
to insignificant for three macro-region group variables – namely, the South, Mountain,
and Midwest. In the micro-region voting model, the significance level of the logistic
coefficient of rural residence became insignificant after short-term factors were added.
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These results show that short-term factors may explain some of the voting
patterns of social groups. Thus, it is necessary to measure how attitudes toward economic
and cultural issues influence social groups’ voting patterns in the binary logistic
regression models. The relative size of effect of the variable that measured attitudes
toward gays and lesbians is the strongest among the economic and cultural variables in
the four social cleavage models. The variable that measured abortion attitudes has the
second strongest effect in these models. The variable for retrospective economic
evaluation has the third strongest effect in these models while the variable that measured
attitudes toward gender equality has the third strongest effect in the 3-category microregion model. The measure of attitudes toward gender equality has the fourth strongest
effect in the class, religion, and macro-region cleavage models. The variable that
measured prospective economic expectation has the weakest effect in all four social
cleavage models.
These results show that attitudes towards gays and lesbians were more influential
than attitudes toward economic issues on social groups’ voting patterns between 1980
and 2008; however, it is necessary to examine how the relative size of the effect of
attitudes toward economic and cultural issues changes over time because the trajectories
of attitudes toward cultural and economic issues vary over time. For example, attitudes
toward gays and lesbians began to be liberalized dramatically in the 1990s (Keleher and
Smith 2012; Baunach 2011; 2012; Hicks and Lee 2006; Brewer 2003). The general
public’s attitudes toward abortion became polarized in the 1990s, although it became
polarized among political elites in the late 1970s (Carmines and Woods 2002; Carmines,
Gerrity, and Wagner 2010; Adams 1997). Attitudes toward gender equality liberalized
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between 1974 and 1994, but this trend stagnated after 1994 (Cotter, Hermsen, and
Vanneman 2011). Attitudes toward abortion and feminism changed over time as well
(Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Adamczyk 2013). Although these three issues became
politically important in the 1970s, the trajectories of attitudes toward cultural issues vary
over time. For this reason, the stagnation of the liberalization of gender equality may be
one reason why attitude toward gender equality shows a relatively weaker effect on
Presidential voting than attitudes toward gays and lesbians or abortion. Thus, the relative
strength of attitudes toward cultural issues on voting behavior needs to be examined over
time.
Attitudes toward economic issues show a relatively weaker effect on voting
behavior than attitudes toward cultural issues; however, the current study does not show
whether attitudes toward economic issues have a stronger effect on Presidential voting
than social group membership. The relative strength of voters’ economic perception and
social group membership may differ over time. Thus, it is necessary to examine which
factor has a stronger effect on voting behavior between long-term factors, such as social
group membership, and short-term factors, such as attitudes toward economic issues.
Furthermore, future studies should examine the trajectories of both factors in terms of
relative strength.
Limitations and Future Research
The limitations of this study need to be considered. First, the primary purpose was
to examine the existence of social cleavages between 1980 and 2008, so the study did not
investigate change over time in the relationship between class and Presidential voting. All
models in the current study assume that the effect of social group on Presidential voting
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remains relatively constant between 1980 and 2008. Although the trend of social
cleavage was demonstrated by calculating the magnitude of social cleavage by election
year, this procedure did not provide statistical evidence for change of social cleavage
over time. Thus, the statistical significance of temporal change in social cleavage in
Presidential elections needs to be examined, which may be accomplished in future
research by using interaction variables between election years and social groups.
Second, this study does not take into account for change across time in the
influence of economic and cultural factors on Presidential voting. The study examined
the influence of economic and cultural variables on Presidential voting between 1984 and
2008; however, it did not explore temporal change in the influence of economic and
cultural factors on Presidential voting. It is necessary, therefore, to include variables for
the interaction between time and the economic and cultural variables to investigate the
possibility of temporal change in the effect of economic and cultural variables in future
studies.
Third, this study did not examine the magnitude of the influence of economic and
cultural variables on social cleavages. In linear regression, it is possible to calculate the
magnitude of the influence of third variables (Z) on the independent variable (X) by
comparing the coefficient of the independent variable (X) with and without the third
variables. The difference of the coefficients of the independent variable show the
magnitude of the influence of the controlled variables in linear regression (Mood 2010;
Karlson, Holm, and Breen 2012). Williams (2011) explains that, in OLS regression, the
total variance of dependent variable (Y) is fixed and it consists of two variances: variance
explained by the independent variables (X) and residual variance (Ԑ). Because the total
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variance of Y is fixed, it is possible to examine the degree of change of the variance
explained by the independent variables (X) and residual variance (Ԑ) when the control
variables (Z) are added.
However, in the logistic regression model, the total variance of Y is not fixed.
Instead, the residual variance is fixed, so changes were observed in both total variance
and explained variance when control variables are added. For this reason, the change of
the coefficients of the independent variables can be explained by influences of both
control variables and by a rescaling of the model. The increase of explained variance may
therefore cause the increase of total variance. Because the total variance of the dependent
variable changes when control variables are added, it is hard compare the coefficients of
two nested models. Williams argues that “comparisons of coefficients between nested
models and across groups do not work the same way in logistic regression as they do in
OLS” (Williams 2011). Thus, it is hard to estimate how much the control variables, such
as the economic and cultural variables, mediate, confound, or explain the association
between social groups and Presidential voting. Fortunately, several scholars have
suggested alternatives to address this problem (Allison 1999; Williams 2009; Karlson,
Holm, and Breen 2012; Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013). Thus, in a future study, these
methods will be applied to examine the influence of economic and cultural factors on the
association between social groups and Presidential voting.
Fourth, this study did not consider group size and voter turnout because the
primary purpose was to focus on the structural relationship between social groups and
Presidential voting. That is, the study examined the political preference of a specific
social group in Presidential elections independent of change of group size and voter
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turnout. Even though the size of a specific group may change, the structural association
between the group and the voting pattern is relatively constant, if the proportion of the
group’s vote for the specific party does not change. Without considering group size and
voter turnout, it is hard to examine the actual contribution of a social group to the election
result. Accordingly, future research should take group size and voter turnout into account
more accurately to ascertain the magnitude of the influence of social groups on the
political alignment of specific parties in Presidential elections.
Fifth, this study does not consider social cleavages along the lines of gender and
race. Rather, the study considers traditional types of cleavage, such as class, religion, and
region, using gender and race as control variables. However, gender and race became
important sources of social cleavage beginning in the 1960s (Manza and Brooks 1998;
1999; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Ogorzalek 2011). Although some scholars argue that
the importance of race declined in American politics after President Obama was elected
in 2008, Ogorzalek (2011) argues that race remained an important factor and influenced
the Presidential election in 2008. He argues that “the election of Obama itself was not
actually a triumph of post-racial politics” because racial cleavage is still influential in
American politics (Ogorzalek 2011:27). Thus, future research will need to examine the
influence of gender cleavage and race cleavage on Presidential voting.
Sixth, the NES pooled data were collected by telephone-interview methods as
well as face-to-face interview methods in 1992, 1994, 2000. Respondents of telephoneinterview methods may differ from respondents of face-to-face interview methods
(Malhotra and Krosnick 2007). Although it would be desirable to consider the mode of
data collection, the current study did not differentiate among modes of data collection to
166

avoid sample size reduction. However, it is recommended that the mode of data
collection be taken into account in future studies.
Seventh, some information is not available in the NES dataset. For example, the
NES does not provide county-level information after 2000. For this reason, microregional cleavage could be analyzed only until 2000. However, researchers may obtain
county-level data through the Restricted Data Access (RDA) process. It may be necessary
then to use the county-level data for the election years of 2004, 2008, and 2012 in future
research. Additionally, the NES has not published occupational information for 2008
because of cross-year consistency issues. The NES staff explained that “the pre-existing
coding system was abandoned in 2008. The 2012 data have not yet been coded at all.”3
Thus, class variables could be created only until 2004. In future research, it will be
possible to use the class variables of 2008 and 2012 based on occupation once the NES
publishes the necessary occupational coding information.
Eighth, the current study only deals with inter-group divisions even though there
is a possibility of intra-group divisions among social groups. To examine the effect of
intra-group divisions on vote choice, it is necessary to use a more advanced statistical
methodology. One possible way is to test statistical effects of interaction variables
between class and religion, between class and region, and between religion and region in
the social cleavage voting models in future studies. Another way to test intra-group
divisions would be to measure social cleavages separately based on other types of social
division. For example, class cleavage may be different when it is measured separately for

3

NES staff communicated through email (March 11, 2014).
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different religious groups, such as Protestants, Catholics, and Jewish groups; however,
another methodology may be used to test the intra-group division effect on Presidential
elections and the relationship between intra-group and inter-groups divisions. Thus, it is
necessary to use more advanced methodologies to resolve these issues in future research.
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